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### Single Idea 21498

#### [catalogued under 13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / b. Pro-coherentism]

Full Idea

A set of statements, or a set of supposed facts asserted, will be said to be congruent if and only if they are so related that the antecedent probability of any one of them will be increased if the remainder of the set can be assumed as given premises.

Gist of Idea

Congruents assertions increase the probability of each individual assertion in the set

Source

C.I. Lewis (An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation [1946], 338), quoted by Erik J. Olsson - Against Coherence 2.2

A Reaction

This thesis is vigorously attacked by Erik Olson, who works through the probability calculations. There seems an obvious problem without that. How else do you assess 'congruence', other than by evidence of mutual strengthening?

Book Reference

Olsson,Erik J.: 'Against Coherence' [OUP 2008], p.13