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Single Idea 21545

[catalogued under 9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Impossible objects]

Full Idea

I should prefer to say that there is no such object as 'the round square'. The difficulties of excluding such objects can, I think, be avoided by the theory of denoting.

Gist of Idea

I prefer to deny round squares, and deal with the difficulties by the theory of denoting


Bertrand Russell (Review: Meinong 'Untersuchungen zur..' [1905], p.81)

A Reaction

The 'theory of denoting' is his brand new theory of definite descriptions, which makes implicit claims of existence explicit, so that they can be judged. Why can't we just say that a round square can be an intentional object, but not a real object?

Book Reference

Russell,Bertrand: 'Essays in Analysis', ed/tr. Lackey,Douglas [George Braziller 1973], p.81