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Single Idea 21567

[catalogued under 5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / a. The Liar paradox]

Full Idea

Such a proposition as 'all the judgements made by Epimenedes are true' will only be prima facie capable of truth if all his judgements are of the same order.

Gist of Idea

'All judgements made by Epimenedes are true' needs the judgements to be of the same type


Bertrand Russell (The Theory of Logical Types [1910], p.227)

A Reaction

This is an attempt to use his theory of types to solve the Liar. Tarski's invocation of a meta-language is clearly in the same territory.

Book Reference

Russell,Bertrand: 'Essays in Analysis', ed/tr. Lackey,Douglas [George Braziller 1973], p.227