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Single Idea 21621

[catalogued under 10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary]

Full Idea

The inference from metaphysical necessity to a priori knowlability is, as Kripke has emphasized, fallacious. Indeed, metaphysical necessities cannot be assumed knowable in any way at all.

Gist of Idea

We can't infer metaphysical necessities to be a priori knowable - or indeed knowable in any way


Timothy Williamson (Vagueness [1994], 7.4)

A Reaction

The second sentence sounds like common sense. He cites Goldbach's Conjecture. A nice case of the procedural rule of keeping your ontology firmly separated from your epistemology. How is it? is not How do we know it?

Book Reference

Williamson,Timothy: 'Vagueness' [Routledge 1996], p.203