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Ideas of Aristotle, by Text

[Greek, 384 - 322 BCE, Born Stageira. Plato's Academy in 368 BCE, for 20 years. Tutor to Alexander the Great. Founded Lyceum in Athens. Died at Chalcis.]

350BCE The Art of Rhetoric
1355a p.68 It is the role of dialectic to survey syllogisms
1355b p.69 All good things can be misused, except virtue
1356a p.75 Rhetoric is a political offshoot of dialectic and ethics
1360b p.87 Happiness is composed of a catalogue of internal and external benefits
1361b p.89 Pentathletes look the most beautiful, because they combine speed and strength
1366a p.102 The four constitutions are democracy (freedom), oligarchy (wealth), aristocracy (custom), tyranny (security)
1366b p.105 The best virtues are the most useful to others
1367a19 p.189 It is noble to avenge oneself on one's enemies, and not come to terms with them
1372a p.121 Nobody fears a disease which nobody has yet caught
1373b p.125 We all feel universal right and wrong, independent of any community or contracts
1389b p.175 Self-interest is a relative good, but nobility an absolute good
1390a p.176 The young feel pity from philanthropy, but the old from self-concern
1390b p.177 Men are physically prime at thirty-five, and mentally prime at forty-nine
1391a p.178 Rich people are mindlessly happy
1401b p.210 People assume events cause what follows them
1402b p.213 A single counterexample is enough to prove that a truth is not necessary
347BCE The Poetics
1451b05 p.1464 Poetry is more philosophic than history, as it concerns universals, not particulars
337BCE Physics
p.5 When Aristotle's elements compound they are stable, so why would they ever separate?
p.6 The four explanations are the main aspects of a thing's nature
p.51 Four Explanations: the essence and form; the matter; the source; and the end
p.53 The 'form' of a thing explains why the matter constitutes that particular thing
p.54 A 'material' cause/explanation is the form of whatever is the source
p.55 Matter is potentiality
p.60 In feature-generation the matter (such as bronze) endures, but in generation it doesn't
p.85 Aristotle's four 'causes' are four items which figure in basic explanations of nature
184a12 p.9 We know a thing if we grasp its first causes, principles and basic elements
184a22 p.9 We first sense whole entities, and then move to particular parts of it
185b11 p.125 Are a part and whole one or many? Either way, what is the cause?
188a11 p.226 The features of a thing (whether quality or quantity) are inseparable from their subjects
189a06 p.22 Reason grasps generalities, while the senses grasp particulars
190a16 p.25 Unity of the form is just unity of the definition
190b01 p.26 Substance is not predicated of anything - but it still has something underlying it, that originates it
190b06 p.26 Coming to be is by shape-change, addition, subtraction, composition or alteration
190b39- p.27 A nature is related to a substance as shapeless matter is to something which has a shape
191a08 p.232 We only infer underlying natures by analogy, observing bronze of a statue, or wood of a bed
191a27 p.28 Do things come to be from what is, or from what is not? Both seem problematical.
191b13 p.234 Coming-to-be may be from nothing in a qualified way, as arising from an absence
192a22 p.235 Matter desires form, as female desires male, and ugliness desires beauty
192b09 p.33 Natural objects include animals and their parts, plants, and the simple elements
192b14 p.33 Natural things are their own source of stability through change
192b20 p.33 A thing's nature is what causes its changes and stability
193b07 p.35 Form, not matter, is a thing's nature, because it is actual, rather than potential
193b27 p.36 Scientists must know the essential attributes of the things they study
193b33 p.36 Mathematicians study what is conceptually separable, and doesn't lead to error
193b36 p.36 You can't abstract natural properties to make Forms - objects and attributes are defined together
194a09 p.37 Geometry studies naturally occurring lines, but not as they occur in nature
194a12 p.37 'Nature' refers to two things - form and matter
194a29 p.37 The nature of a thing is its end and purpose
194a35 p.38 A thing's purpose is ambiguous, and from one point of view we ourselves are ends
194b18 p.38 To know something we need understanding, which is grasp of the primary cause
194b23- p.39 The four causes are the material, the form, the source, and the end
194b33-5 p.16 We assign the cause of someone's walking when we say why they are doing it
195b39 p.42 Maybe there is no pure chance; a man's choices cause his chance meetings
196b25 p.44 Causes produce a few things in their own right, and innumerable things coincidentally
197a05 p.45 Chance is a coincidental cause among events involving purpose and choice
197a19 p.45 Chance is inexplicable, because we can only explain what happens always or usually
198a10 p.48 Intrinsic cause is prior to coincidence, so nature and intelligence are primary causes, chance secondary
198a16 p.48 There are as many causes/explanations as there are different types of why-question
198a23 p.49 Science refers the question Why? to four causes/explanations: matter, form, source, purpose
198a24 p.2 Aristotle's formal and material 'becauses' [aitiai] arguably involve grounding
198a24 p.49 A thing's form and purpose are often the same, and form can be the initiator of change too
198b16 p.50 Nature has purpose, and aims at what is better. Is it coincidence that crops grow when it rains?
199b33 p.51 Teeth and crops are predictable, so they cannot be mere chance, but must have a purpose
200b12 p.56 Nature is a principle of change, so we must understand change first
200b18 p.56 Continuity depends on infinity, because the continuous is infinitely divisible
201a10 p.57 Change is the implied actuality of that which exists potentially
201a10-11 p.89 Motion fulfils potentiality
202b19 p.62 The separation from here to there is not the same as the separation from there to here
203a09 p.63 Plato's Forms are said to have no location in space
203b25 p.65 The heavens seem to be infinite, because we cannot imagine their end
206a22 p.265 A day, or the games, has one thing after another, actually and potentially occurring
206b09 p.24 Without infinity time has limits, magnitudes are indivisible, and numbers come to an end
209a23 p.80 If everything has a place, this causes an infinite regress, because each place must have place
210a16 p.273 There is no whole except for the parts
211b06 p.86 Place is not shape, or matter, or extension between limits; it is the limits of a body
212b14 p.89 The universe as a whole is not anywhere
217b34 p.102 If all of time has either ceased to exist, or has not yet happened, maybe time does not exist
218a05 p.378 Time has parts, but the now is not one of them, and time is not composed of nows
218b19 p.104 Time is not change, but requires change in our minds to be noticed
218b32 p.105 Time does not exist without change
219a09 p.105 Time is an aspect of change
221b36 p.112 The incommensurability of the diagonal always exists, and so it is not in time
223a21 p.115 Would there be time if there were no mind?
224a2-14 p.117 Ten sheep and ten dogs are the same numerically, but it is not the same ten
225b06 p.121 Predicates are substance, quality, place, relation, quantity and action or affection
230a29 p.135 Is ceasing-to-be unnatural if it happens by force, and natural otherwise?
231a23 p.210 A continuous line cannot be composed of indivisible points
246a12 p.175 Goodness is when a thing (such as a circle) is complete, and conforms with its nature
247a08 p.176 All moral virtue is concerned with bodily pleasure and pain
252a11 p.189 Nothing natural is disorderly, because nature is responsible for all order
252b24 p.190 If movement can arise within an animal, why can't it also arise in the universe?
254b21 p.196 When there is unnatural movement (e.g. fire going downwards) the cause is obvious
255b14 p.199 Heavy and light are defined by their tendency to move down or up
267b19 p.231 The source of all movement must be indivisible and have no magnitude
336BCE On the Heavens
271a33 p.61 An unworn sandal is in vain, but nothing in nature is in vain
274a26 p.71 It seems possible that there exists a limited number of other worlds apart from this one
277a26 p.83 There has to be some goal, and not just movement to infinity
279b12 p.42 Everyone agrees that the world had a beginning, but thinkers disagree over whether it will end
286a08 p.121 Each thing that has a function is for the sake of that function
294a12 p.153 If the more you raise some earth the faster it moves, why does the whole earth not move?
296b33 p.433 A very hungry man cannot choose between equidistant piles of food
297b29 p.167 The Earth must be spherical, because it casts a convex shadow on the moon
297b30 p.167 The earth must be round and of limited size, because moving north or south makes different stars visible
302a05 p.4 An element is what bodies are analysed into, and won't itself divide into something else
335BCE Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr)
316b11 p.476 Wood is potentially divided through and through, so what is there in the wood besides the division?
316b24 p.476 If a body is endlessly divided, is it reduced to nothing - then reassembled from nothing?
317a24 p.478 True change is in a thing's logos or its matter, not in its qualities
317a27 p.478 A change in qualities is mere alteration, not true change
317b21 p.479 Does the pure 'this' come to be, or the 'this-such', or 'so-great', or 'somewhere'?
317b29 p.479 Philosophers have worried about coming-to-be from nothing pre-existing
318a17 p.480 If each thing can cease to be, why hasn't absolutely everything ceased to be long ago?
318a21 p.480 Infinity is only potential, never actual
319a07 p.483 All comings-to-be are passings-away, and vice versa
319a19 p.483 The substratum changing to a contrary is the material cause of coming-to-be
319b08-16 p.484 If the substratum persists, it is 'alteration'; if it doesn't, it is 'coming-to-be' or 'passing-away'
319b11-17 p.484 If a perceptible substratum persists, it is 'alteration'; coming-to-be is a complete change
320a03 p.485 Matter is the substratum, which supports both coming-to-be and alteration
320b16 p.487 Matter is the limit of points and lines, and must always have quality and form
326b27 p.502 Bodies are endlessly divisible
327b24 p.504 Existence is either potential or actual
329a30 p.508 The primary matter is the substratum for the contraries like hot and cold
329b04 p.509 Which of the contrary features of a body are basic to it?
329b1 p.509 The Four Elements must change into one another, or else alteration is impossible
330b02 p.511 Fire is hot and dry; Air is hot and moist; Water is cold and moist; Earth is cold and dry
332a09 p.515 There couldn't be just one element, which was both water and air at the same time
336b13 p.526 An Order controls all things
336b29 p.527 Being is better than not-being
337a24 p.528 There is no time without movement
334BCE Nichomachean Ethics
p.8 Aristotle is unsure about eudaimonia because he is unsure what people are
p.8 For Aristotle 'good' means purpose, and value is real but relational
p.9 Seeing particulars as parts of larger wholes is to perceive their value
p.12 Aristotle thinks human life is not important enough to spend a whole life on it
p.19 Aristotle gives a superior account of rationality, because he allows emotions to participate
p.29 Eudaimonia is said to only have final value, where reason and virtue are also useful
p.36 Nowadays we (unlike Aristotle) seem agreed that someone can have one virtue but lack others
p.40 Aristotle needed to distinguish teleological description from teleological explanation
p.58 Aristotle said there are two levels of virtue - the conventional and the intellectual
p.70 Aristotle never discusses free will
p.256 For Aristotle, true self-love is love of the higher parts of one's soul
1094a02 p.63 The good is 'that at which all things aim'
1094a03 p.91 Not all actions aim at some good; akratic actions, for example, do not
1094b14 p.65 Moral acts are so varied that they must be convention, not nature
1094b18 p.65 Trained minds never expect more precision than is possible
1095b15 p.68 The masses believe, not unreasonably, that the good is pleasure
1095b22 p.68 Honour depends too much on the person who awards it
1095b25 p.39 If you aim at honour, you make yourself dependent on the people to whom you wish to be superior
1096a02 p.68 You can be good while asleep, or passive, or in pain
1096a06 p.69 Wealth is not the good, because it is only a means
1096a23 p.70 Each category of existence has its own good, so one Good cannot unite them
1096a27 p.70 There should be one science of the one Good, but there are many overlapping sciences
1096a32 p.70 It is meaningless to speak of 'man-himself', because it has the same definition as plain 'man'
1096b05 p.70 Eternal white is no whiter than temporary white, and it is the same with goodness
1096b15 p.71 Intelligence and sight, and some pleasures and honours, are candidates for being good in themselves
1097a p.230 We desire final things just for themselves, and not for the sake of something else
1097a12 p.72 How will a vision of pure goodness make someone a better doctor?
1097a32 p.73 Goods like pleasure are chosen partly for happiness, but happiness is chosen just for itself
1097b10 p.74 Man is by nature a social being
1097b21 p.74 Happiness is perfect and self-sufficient, the end of all action
1097b22 p.3 Does Aristotle say eudaimonia is the aim, or that it ought to be?
1097b22 p.75 Perhaps we get a better account of happiness as the good for man if we know his function
1097b30 p.75 If bodily organs have functions, presumably the whole person has one
1098a09 p.76 Each named function has a distinctive excellence attached to it
1098a13 p.76 The good for man is an activity of soul in accordance with virtue
1098b12 p.77 A statement is true if all the data are in harmony with it
1098b13 p.78 Goods are external, of the soul, and of the body; those of the soul (such as action) come first
1098b21 p.78 Happiness seems to involve virtue, or practical reason, or wisdom, or pleasure, or external goods
1099a14 p.79 Many pleasures are relative to a person, but some love what is pleasant by nature, and virtue is like that
1099a32 p.79 The fine deeds required for happiness need external resources, like friends or wealth
1099b03 p.80 A man can't be happy if he is ugly, or of low birth, or alone and childless
1099b17 p.80 If happiness can be achieved by study and effort, then it is open to anyone who is not corrupt
1099b29 p.81 Political science aims at the highest good, which involves creating virtue in citizens
1099b32 p.81 Oxen, horses and children cannot be happy, because they cannot perform fine deeds
1100a05 p.81 Happiness needs total goodness and a complete life
1100a17 p.82 Some good and evil can happen to the dead, just as the living may be unaware of a disaster
1101a13 p.84 Happiness is activity in accordance with complete virtue, for a whole life, with adequate external goods
1101a14 p.75 Aristotle must hold that virtuous King Priam's life can be marred, but not ruined
1101a15 p.93 How can an action be intrinsically good if it is a means to 'eudaimonia'?
1102a27 p.88 The rational and irrational parts of the soul are either truly separate, or merely described that way
1102a33 p.88 Everything that receives nourishment has a vegetative soul, with it own distinctive excellence
1102b14 p.85 Aristotle seems not to explain why the better syllogism is overcome in akratic actions
1102b16 p.89 In a controlled person the receptive part of the soul is obedient, and it is in harmony in the virtuous
1102b33 p.90 The irrational psuché is persuadable by reason - shown by our criticism and encouragement of people
1103a04 p.90 The two main parts of the soul give rise to two groups of virtues - intellectual, and moral
1103a15 p.91 Intellectual virtue arises from instruction (and takes time), whereas moral virtue result from habit
1103a19 p.91 Moral virtue is not natural, because its behaviour can be changed, unlike a falling stone
1103a21 p.91 Nature enables us to be virtuous, but habit develops virtue in us
1103b01 p.91 We acquire virtues by habitually performing good deeds
1103b03 p.92 The mark of a good legislator is that they make their citizens good by habituation
1103b16 p.92 Justice concerns our behaviour in dealing with other people
1103b22 p.92 Like activities produce like dispositions, so we must give the right quality to the activity
1103b27 p.93 We aim not to identify goodness, but to be good
1103b31 p.93 We must take for granted that we should act according to right principle
1104a08 p.93 There is no fixed art of good conduct, and each situation is different, as in navigation
1104a13 p.60 The mean implies that vices are opposed to one another, not to virtue
1104a15 p.94 Excess and deficiency are bad for virtue, just as they are for bodily health
1104a23 p.94 Virtues are destroyed by the excess and preserved by the mean
1104a24 p.101 Aristotle aims at happiness by depressing emotions to a harmless mean
1104b02 p.73 We must practise virtuous acts because practice actually teaches us the nature of virtue
1104b04 p.95 Character is revealed by the pleasures and pains people feel
1104b10 p.110 Feelings are vital to virtue, but virtue requires choice, which feelings lack
1104b14 p.95 True education is training from infancy to have correct feelings
1104b29 p.96 We choose things for their fineness, their advantage, or for pleasure
1105a07 p.96 Feeling inappropriate pleasure or pain affects conduct, and is central to morality
1105a19 p.97 How can good actions breed virtues, if you need to be virtuous to perform good actions?
1105a24 p.97 People can break into the circle of virtue and good action, by chance, or with help
1105a29 p.97 Actions are not virtuous because of their quality, but because of the way they are done
1105b04 p.98 We acquire virtue by the repeated performance of just and temperate acts
1106a10 p.99 If virtues are not feelings or faculties, then they must be dispositions
1106a17 p.99 If a thing has excellence, this makes the thing good, and means it functions well
1106a32 p.100 The mean is relative to the individual (diet, for example)
1106b09 p.100 Skills are only well performed if they observe the mean
1106b16 p.43 Virtue is the feeling of emotions that accord with one's perception of value
1106b16 p.162 One drink a day is moderation, but very drunk once a week could exhibit the mean
1106b17 p.160 In most normal situations it is not appropriate to have any feelings at all
1106b18 p.101 We must tune our feelings to be right in every way
1107a01 p.101 Virtue is a purposive mean disposition, which follows a rational principle and prudent judgment
1107a18 p.102 There is no right time or place or way or person for the committing of adultery; it is just wrong
1107a29 p.103 Actions concern particular cases, and rules must fit the cases, not the other way round
1108a16 p.105 The mean is always right, and the extremes are always wrong
1108a29 p.106 There is a mean of feelings, as in our responses to the good or bad fortune of others
1108b33 p.108 Contraries are by definition as far distant as possible from one another
1109a12 p.108 The vices to which we are most strongly pulled are most opposed to the mean
1109a26 p.109 To make one's anger exactly appropriate to a situation is very difficult
1110a15 p.111 An action is voluntary if the limb movements originate in the agent
1110a27 p.112 A man should sooner die than do some dreadful things, no matter how cruel the death
1110b22 p.113 If you repent of an act done through ignorance, you acted involuntarily, not non-voluntarily
1110b29 p.113 Bad people are just ignorant of what they ought to do
1110b31 p.113 Acts may be forgivable if particular facts (rather than principles) are unknown
1110-ish p.67 Aristotle assesses whether people are responsible, and if they are it was voluntary
1111a04 p.114 There are six categories of particular cirumstance affecting an action
1111a17 p.114 An act is involuntary if the particular facts (esp. circumstances and effect) are unknown
1111a29 p.115 At times we ought to feel angry, and we ought to desire health and learning
1111b06 p.176 For an action to be 'free', it must be deliberate as well as unconstrained
1111b14 p.116 The akrates acts from desire not choice, and the enkrates acts from choice not desire
1111b15 p.1 Virtue is right reason and feeling and action. Akrasia and enkrateia are lower levels of action.
1111b15 p.24 Akrasia merely neglects or misunderstands knowledge, rather than opposing it
1112a07 p.117 Opinion is praised for being in accordance with truth
1112a09 p.117 Some people are good at forming opinions, but bad at making moral choices
1112a28 p.118 Types of cause are nature, necessity and chance, and mind and human agency
1112b12 p.119 We deliberate about means, not ends
1112b33 p.120 Particular facts (such as 'is it cooked?') are matters of sense-perception, not deliberation
1113a06 p.120 Deliberation ends when the starting-point of an action is traced back to the dominant part of the self
1113a32 p.121 A person of good character sees the truth about what is actually fine and pleasant
1113b18 p.66 A human being fathers his own actions as he fathers his children
1114a07 p.123 People develop their characters through the activities they pursue
1114b13 p.117 For Aristotle responsibility seems negative, in the absence of force or ignorance
1114b21 p.126 We are partly responsible for our own dispositions and virtues
1115a33 p.128 Strictly speaking, a courageous person is one who does not fear an honourable death
1115b14 p.128 The end of virtue is what is right and honourable or fine
1115b18 p.128 True courage is an appropriate response to a dangerous situation
1115b23 p.129 The nature of any given thing is determined by its end
1116a14 p.130 A suicide embraces death to run away from hardships, rather than because it is a fine deed
1117b11 p.135 The more virtuous and happy a person is, the worse the prospect becomes of ending life
1117b28 p.136 There are pleasures of the soul (e.g. civic honour, and learning) and of the body
1118a25 p.137 Licentiousness concerns the animal-like pleasures of touch and taste
1118b21 p.138 To eat vast amounts is unnatural, since natural desire is to replenish the deficiency
1119b09 p.141 If beings are dominated by appetite, this can increase so much that it drives out reason
1123b20 p.154 Honour is clearly the greatest external good
1124b08 p.156 For the great-souled man it is sometimes better to be dead
1125b33 p.160 Patient people are indignant, but only appropriately, as their reason prescribes
1126a05 p.161 It is foolish not to be angry when it is appropriate
1126b04 p.162 We cannot properly judge by rules, because blame depends on perception of particulars
1127a29 p.165 The sincere man is praiseworthy, because truth is the mean between boasting and irony
1129a03 p.164 What emotion is displayed in justice, and what are its deficiency and excess?
1129a07 p.171 When people speak of justice they mean a disposition of character to behave justly
1129a32 p.172 The word 'unjust' describes law-breaking and exploitation
1129b12 p.173 We hold that every piece of legislation is just
1129b18 p.173 Justice is whatever creates or preserves social happiness
1130a07 p.174 The best people exercise their virtue towards others, rather than to themselves
1132b34 p.183 Society collapses if people cannot rely on exchanging good for good and evil for evil
1134b18 p.189 Natural justice is the same everywhere, and does not (unlike legal justice) depend on acceptance
1139a06 p.204 Assume our reason is in two parts, one for permanent first principles, and one for variable things
1139a28 p.205 Practical intellect serves to arrive at the truth which corresponds to right appetite
1139b10 p.206 The attainment of truth is the task of the intellectual part of the soul
1139b24 p.207 The object of scientific knowledge is what is necessary
1141b03 p.212 Wisdom is scientific and intuitive knowledge of what is by nature most precious
1141b14 p.213 Prudence is mainly concerned with particulars, which is the sphere of human conduct
1142a25 p.215 Intuition grasps the definitions that can't be proved
1143b20 p.221 Wisdom does not study happiness, because it is not concerned with processes
1144a07 p.222 Virtue ensures that we have correct aims, and prudence that we have correct means of achieving them
1144a10 p.222 People who perform just acts unwillingly or ignorantly are still not just
1144a19 p.222 A person is good if they act from choice, and for the sake of the actions in themselves
1144a33 p.223 One cannot be prudent without being good
1144b04 p.223 Dispositions to virtue are born in us, but without intelligence they can be harmful
1144b30 p.224 For Socrates virtues are principles, involving knowledge, but we say they only imply the principle of practical reason
1145a02 p.225 The one virtue of prudence carries with it the possession of all the other virtues
1145a15 p.158 Character can be heroic, excellent, controlled, uncontrolled, bad, or brutish
1145a16 p.226 The three states of character to avoid are vice, 'akrasia' and brutishness
1145a24 p.226 Gods exist in a state which is morally superior to virtue
1145b09 p.227 'Enkrateia' (control) means abiding by one's own calculations
1145b33 p.228 Some people explain akrasia by saying only opinion is present, not knowledge
1147a01 p.232 A person may act against one part of his knowledge, if he knows both universal and particular
1148b16 p.237 Some things are not naturally pleasant, but become so through disease or depravity
1150b28 p.244 Licentious people feel no regret, but weak-willed people are capable of repentance
1152a03 p.251 While replenishing we even enjoy unpleasant things, but only absolute pleasures when we are replenished
1152b15 p.250 The greater the pleasure, the greater the hindrance to thought
1153b19 p.224 It is nonsense to say a good person is happy even if they are being tortured or suffering disaster
1154a08 p.255 If we criticise bodily pleasures as licentious and bad, why do we consider their opposite, pain, to be bad?
1154b25 p.257 God feels one simple pleasure forever
1155a03- p.305 Aristotle does not confine supreme friendship to moral heroes
1155a23 p.258 Friendship holds communities together, and lawgivers value it more than justice
1155a26 p.259 Between friends there is no need for justice
1155b16 p.260 Only lovable things are loved, and they must be good, or pleasant, or useful
1156b10 p.308 For Aristotle in the best friendships the binding force is some excellence of character
1157a16 p.265 Bad men can have friendships of utility or pleasure, but only good men can be true friends
1159a13 p.271 Most people want to be loved rather than to love, because they desire honour
1159b30 p.273 Friendship is based on a community of sharing
1161a29 p.278 A bad political constitution (especially a tyranny) makes friendship almost impossible
1161b09 p.278 Democracy is the best constitution for friendship, because it encourages equality
1162a20 p.280 Even more than a social being, man is a pairing and family being
1166a23 p.294 Nobody would choose all the good things in world, if the price was loss of identity
1166a25 p.294 It would seem that the thinking part is the individual self
1168b06 p.300 All altruism is an extension of self-love
1168b09 p.301 A man is his own best friend; therefore he ought to love himself best
1169a01 p.302 Our reasoned acts are held to be voluntary and our own doing
1169a12 p.302 Self-love benefits ourselves, and also helps others
1170a09 p.305 Good people enjoy virtuous action, just as musicians enjoy beautiful melodies
1170a12 p.305 Associating with good people can be a training in virtue
1170a32 p.306 To perceive or think is to be conscious of our existence
1170b09 p.306 Existence is desirable if one is conscious of one's own goodness
1173a01 p.314 If everyone believes it, it is true
1173b20 p.152 For Aristotle, pleasure is the perception of particulars as valuable
1173b20 p.317 Disreputable pleasures are only pleasant to persons with diseased perception
1174a02 p.317 Nobody would choose the mentality of a child, even if they had the greatest childish pleasures
1174a06 p.318 There are many things we would want even if they brought no pleasure
1174a08 p.318 Pleasure is not the Good, and not every pleasure is desirable
1175a15 p.322 It is right to pursue pleasure, because it enhances life, and life is a thing to choose
1176a02 p.324 Intellectual pleasures are superior to sensuous ones
1176b28 p.327 If happiness were mere amusement it wouldn't be worth a lifetime's effort
1177a03 p.327 The happy life is in accordance with goodness, which implies seriousness
1177a08 p.328 Slaves can't be happy, because they lack freedom
1177a32 p.329 Wise people can contemplate alone, though co-operation helps
1177b p.231 Only contemplation is sought for its own sake; practical activity always offers some gain
1177b17 p.330 Contemplation (with the means to achieve it) is the perfect happiness for man
1177b31 p.330 The intellectual life is divine in comparison with ordinary human life
1177b33 p.331 We should aspire to immortality, and live by what is highest in us
1178a08 p.331 The best life is that of the intellect, since that is in the fullest sense the man
1178a10 p.331 A life of moral virtue brings human happiness, but not divine happiness
1178a28 p.332 The virtue of generosity requires money
1178a32 p.332 Clearly perfect conduct will involve both good intention and good action
1178b p.235 The gods live, but action is unworthy of them, so that only leaves contemplation?
1178b25 p.333 Lower animals cannot be happy, because they cannot contemplate
1178b29 p.334 The more people contemplate, the happier they are
1179b18 p.336 It is very hard to change a person's character traits by argument
1180a05 p.337 Most people are readier to submit to compulsion than to argument
II 5.1 p.211 Practical reason is truth-attaining, and focused on actions good for human beings
334BCE Protrepticus (frags)
p.120 Inquiry is the cause of philosophy
333BCE Eudemian Ethics
1214a30 p.2 Happiness involves three things, of which the greatest is either wisdom, virtue, or pleasure
1214b10 p.2 It is folly not to order one's life around some end
1215 p.232 No one would choose life just for activities not done for their own sake
1216b07 p.6 For Socrates, virtues are forms of knowledge, so knowing justice produces justice
1217a26 p.8 Horses, birds and fish are not happy, lacking a divine aspect to their natures
1217b20 p.9 The thesis of the Form of the Good (or of anything else) is verbal and vacuous
1218a30 p.10 Everything seeks, not a single good, but its own separate good
1218b34 p.12 Goods in the soul are more worthy than those outside it, as everybody wants them
1219a02 p.12 Excellence is the best state of anything (like a cloak) which has an employment or function
1219a08 p.12 Each thing's function is its end
1219b32 p.140 Whether the mind has parts is irrelevant, since it obviously has distinct capacities
1220a11 p.14 Character virtues (such as courage) are of the non-rational part, which follows the rational part
1220a36 p.15 Character (éthos) is developed from habit (ethos)
1227b17 p.33 Virtue is different from continence
1228a15 p.34 We judge people from their deeds because we cannot see their choices (which matter more)
1246a26 p.35 Eyes could be used for a natural purpose, or for unnatural seeing, or for a non-seeing activity
332BCE Politics
p.12 Human beings, alone of the animals, have logos
1252a01 p.54 Every state is an association formed for some good purpose
1252a30 p.57 Intelligence which looks ahead is a natural master, while bodily strength is a natural slave
1252b03 p.57 The best instruments have one purpose, not many
1252b26 p.59 Men imagine gods to be of human shape, with a human lifestyle
1253a01 p.59 Man is by nature a political animal
1253a12 p.60 Reasoning distinguishes what is beneficial, and hence what is right
1253a17 p.60 A community must share a common view of good and justice
1253a31 p.61 Man is the worst of all animals when divorced from law and justice
1253b20 p.63 Some say slavery is unnatural and created by convention, and is therefore forced, and unjust
1255b12 p.73 Master and slave can have friendship through common interests
1256b20 p.79 If nature makes everything for a purpose, then plants and animals must have been made for man
1263b03 p.115 Selfishness is wrong not because it is self-love, but because it is excessive
1263b33 p.116 A state is plural, and needs education to make it a community
1265a32 p.123 It is quite possible to live a moderate life and yet be miserable
1266a38 p.127 Phaleas proposed equality of property, provided there is equality of education
1269a23 p.139 If it is easy to change the laws, that makes them weaker
1271a10 p.147 It is wrong that a worthy officer of state should seek the office
1276b28 p.179 The virtues of a good citizen are relative to a particular constitution
1277b27 p.182 The only virtue special to a ruler is practical wisdom
1278b20 p.187 People want to live together, even when they don't want mutual help
1279b04 p.190 The six constitutions are monarchy/tyranny, aristocracy/oligarch, and polity/democracy
1281a02 p.198 The state exists not for community, but for noble actions
1281b01 p.202 The many may add up to something good, even if they are inferior as individuals
1281b08 p.203 The collective judgement of many people on art is better than that of an individual
1282b17 p.207 The good is obviously justice, which benefits the whole community, and involves equality in some sense
1286a30 p.222 Like water, large numbers of people are harder to corrupt than a few
1287a19 p.226 It is preferable that law should rule rather than any single citizen
1287a31 p.226 Law is intelligence without appetite
1287b04 p.227 The law is the mean
1294a11 p.260 We can claim an equal right to aristocratic virtue, as well as to wealth or freedom
1295b25 p.267 The state aims to consist as far as possible of those who are like and equal
1309a27 p.328 Equality is obviously there to help people who do not get priority in the constitution
1318b05 p.367 It is always the weak who want justice and equality, not the strong
1319b35 p.373 Any constitution can be made to last for a day or two
1323a14 p.391 We must decide the most desirable human life before designing a constitution
1323b24 p.392 God is not blessed and happy because of internal goods, but because of his own nature
1325b09 p.400 Nothing contrary to nature is beautiful
1330a08 p.419 The whole state should pay for the worship of the gods
1332a38 p.429 People become good because of nature, habit and reason
1332b10 p.430 Men learn partly by habit, and partly by listening
1335b24 p.443 Abortions should be procured before the embryo has acquired life and sensation
1338b01 p.457 Free and great-souled men do not keep asking "what is the use of it?"
1339a20 p.462 Music can mould the character to be virtuous (just as gymnastics trains the body)
1339a30 p.462 The aim of serious childhood play is the amusement of the complete adult
6.2 p.66 One principle of liberty is to take turns ruling and being ruled
I.2 p.149 Aristotle says the state is natural, not conventional or contractual
331BCE Categories
p.13 Substance,Quantity,Quality,Relation,Place,Time,Being-in-a-position,Having,Doing,Being affected
p.16 Is primary substance just an ultimate subject, or some aspect of a complex body?
p.26 Secondary substances do have subjects, so they are not ultimate in the ontology
p.42 The categories (substance, quality, quantity, relation, action, passion, place, time) peter out inconsequentially
p.50 Aristotle gave up his earlier notion of individuals, because it relied on universals
p.51 Aristotle denigrates the category of relation, but for modern absolutists self-relation is basic
p.56 Aristotle promoted the importance of properties and objects (rather than general and particular)
p.71 Only what can be said of many things is a predicable
p.110 Primary being is 'that which lies under', or 'particular substance'
p.178 In earlier Aristotle the substances were particulars, not kinds
p.188 Aristotle derived categories as answers to basic questions about nature, size, quality, location etc.
p.190 Earlier Aristotle had objects as primary substances, but later he switched to substantial form
p.207 Primary being must be more than mere indeterminate ultimate subject of predication
p.453 Primary substances are ontological in 'Categories', and explanatory in 'Metaphysics'
01a20 p.4 Some things said 'of' a subject are not 'in' the subject
01b10 p.4 Predications of predicates are predications of their subjects
01b16 p.4 The differentiae of genera which are different are themselves different in kind
01b25 p.5 There are ten basic categories for thinking about things
02a11 p.5 A 'primary' substance is in each subject, with species or genera as 'secondary' substances
02b02 p.6 Colour must be in an individual body, or it is not embodied
02b29 p.7 We call them secondary 'substances' because they reveal the primary substances
02b29-37 p.94 Genus and species are substances, because only they reveal the primary substance
03a04 p.8 Things are called 'substances' because they are subjects for everything else
03b10 p.9 A primary substance reveals a 'this', which is an individual unit
03b18 p.10 Some predicates signify qualification of a substance, others the substance itself
03b33 p.10 Substances have no opposites, and don't come in degrees (including if the substance is a man)
04a10/20 p.11 A single substance can receive contrary properties
04b20 p.12 Some quantities are discrete, like number, and others continuous, like lines, time and space
04b33 p.13 Parts of a line join at a point, so it is continuous
08b23 p.24 Without extensive examination firm statements are hard, but studying the difficulties is profitable
12b01 p.35 It is not possible for fire to be cold or snow black
13a35 p.36 Change goes from possession to loss (as in baldness), but not the other way round
13b36 p.38 The contrary of good is bad, but the contrary of bad is either good or another evil
14a06 p.38 Both sides of contraries need not exist (as health without sickness, white without black)
14a29 p.39 One is prior to two, because its existence is implied by two
14a32 p.39 A thing is prior to another if it implies its existence
14b12 p.39 Of interdependent things, the prior one causes the other's existence
14b18 p.40 A true existence statement has its truth caused by the existence of the thing
15a13 p.41 There are six kinds of change: generation, destruction, increase, diminution, alteration, change of place
Ch.8 p.537 Four species of quality: states, capacities, affects, and forms
331BCE Sophistical Refutations
165a01 p.13 Reasoning is a way of making statements which makes them lead on to other statements
165b01 p.15 Didactic argument starts from the principles of the subject, not from the opinions of the learner
165b03 p.15 Dialectic aims to start from generally accepted opinions, and lead to a contradiction
165b15 p.17 Competitive argument aims at refutation, fallacy, paradox, solecism or repetition
176a08 p.95 'Are Coriscus and Callias at home?' sounds like a single question, but it isn't
179a01 p.117 Generic terms like 'man' are not substances, but qualities, relations, modes or some such thing
179a37 p.121 Only if two things are identical do they have the same attributes
331BCE Topics
100a25 p.273 Reasoning is when some results follow necessarily from certain claims
100a30 p.273 Dialectic starts from generally accepted opinions
101b18 p.279 Differentia are generic, and belong with genus
102a18 p.283 An 'idion' belongs uniquely to a thing, but is not part of its essence
102a32 p.283 'Genus' is part of the essence shared among several things
102b07 p.285 An 'accident' is something which may possibly either belong or not belong to a thing
103a20 p.289 All water is the same, because of a certain similarity
103a24-33 p.291 'Same' is mainly for names or definitions, but also for propria, and for accidents
103b20 p.293 There are ten categories: essence, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, position, state, activity, passivity
105a15 p.303 Induction is the progress from particulars to universals
108b05 p.327 We describe the essence of a particular thing by means of its differentiae
108b30 p.329 Unit is the starting point of number
109b17 p.335 Begin examination with basics, and subdivide till you can go no further
117a03 p.391 We value friendship just for its own sake
117a36 p.393 Justice and self-control are better than courage, because they are always useful
118b07 p.401 Friendship is preferable to money, since its excess is preferable
121a18 p.425 'Being' and 'oneness' are predicated of everything which exists
122b17 p.435 The differentia indicate the qualities, but not the essence
128a24 p.477 Genus gives the essence better than the differentiae do
128b17 p.481 Man is intrinsically a civilized animal
129a27 p.485 An individual property has to exist (in past, present or future)
132a12 p.507 In definitions the first term to be assigned ought to be the genus
141a36 p.575 Everything that is has one single essence
145b17 p.69 Puzzles arise when reasoning seems equal on both sides
149b24 p.633 The definition is peculiar to one thing, not common to many
150a19 p.637 In the case of a house the parts can exist without the whole, so parts are not the whole
152a02 p.649 If two things are the same, they must have the same source and origin
152a36 p.653 Two identical things have the same accidents, they are the same; if the accidents differ, they're different
152b32 p.655 Numerical sameness and generic sameness are not the same
153a19 p.657 The genera and the differentiae are part of the essence
153b30 p.663 Destruction is dissolution of essence
154a11 p.665 There can't be one definition of two things, or two definitions of the same thing
155a03 p.671 Definitions are easily destroyed, since they can contain very many assertions
157a25 p.687 We say 'so in cases of this kind', but how do you decide what is 'of this kind'?
330BCE On Interpretation
p.19 For Aristotle meaning and reference are linked to concepts
16a03-08 p.43 Spoken sounds vary between people, but are signs of affections of soul, which are the same for all
17a01 p.46 A prayer is a sentence which is neither true nor false
19a25 p.53 Things may be necessary once they occur, but not be unconditionally necessary
19a30 p.53 It is necessary that either a sea-fight occurs tomorrow or it doesn't, though neither option is in itself necessary
19a33 p.53 Statements are true according to how things actually are
19a39 p.53 It doesn't have to be the case that in opposed views one is true and the other false
21a31 p.59 Non-existent things aren't made to exist by thought, because their non-existence is part of the thought
23a18 p.64 Maybe necessity and non-necessity are the first principles of ontology
23a31 p.65 In "Callias is just/not just/unjust", which of these are contraries?
Ch.12-13 p.62 Square of Opposition: not both true, or not both false; one-way implication; opposite truth-values
Ch.12a p.7 Modal Square 1: □P and ¬◊¬P are 'contraries' of □¬P and ¬◊P
Ch.12b p.7 Modal Square 2: ¬□¬P and ◊P are 'subcontraries' of ¬□P and ◊¬P
Ch.12c p.7 Modal Square 3: □P and ¬◊¬P are 'contradictories' of ¬□P and ◊¬P
Ch.12d p.7 Modal Square 4: □¬P and ¬◊P are 'contradictories' of ¬□¬P and ◊P
Ch.12e p.7 Modal Square 5: □P and ¬◊¬P are 'subalternatives' of ¬□¬P and ◊P
Ch.12f p.7 Modal Square 6: □¬P and ¬◊P are 'subalternatives' of ¬□P and ◊¬P
330BCE works (frags)
p. It is the mark of an educated mind to be able to entertain an idea without accepting it
p.7 There are potential infinities (never running out), but actual infinity is incoherent
p.17 Aristotle never actually says that man is a rational animal
p.18 The notion of a priori truth is absent in Aristotle
p.18 The notion of analytic truth is absent in Aristotle
p.26 For Aristotle logos is essentially the ability to talk rationally about questions of value
p.27 Aristotelian explanations are facts, while modern explanations depend on human conceptions
p.51 Aristotelian definitions aim to give the essential properties of the thing defined
p.62 Aristotle's standard analysis of species and genus involves specifying things in terms of something more general
p.71 For Aristotle, knowledge is of causes, and is theoretical, practical or productive
p.95 Aristotle is the supreme optimist about the ability of logos to explain nature
p.96 There is practical wisdom (for action), and theoretical wisdom (for deep understanding)
p.133 For Aristotle, the subject-predicate structure of Greek reflected a substance-accident structure of reality
p.151 Aristotle wants to fit common intuitions, and therefore uses language as a guide
p.157 Aristotelian definition involves first stating the genus, then the differentia of the thing
p.162 The unmoved mover and the soul show Aristotelian form as the ultimate mereological atom
p.172 The 'form' is the recipe for building wholes of a particular kind
p.188 Aristotle said the educated were superior to the uneducated as the living are to the dead
p.193 Aristotle relativises the notion of wholeness to different measures
p.235 Aristotle's matter can become any other kind of matter
p.372 Aristotle regularly says that essential properties explain other significant properties
1 p.4 Plato says sciences are unified around Forms; Aristotle says they're unified around substance
329BCE De Anima
p.17 Aristotle led to the view that there are several souls, all somewhat physical
p.33 Aristotle has a problem fitting his separate reason into the soul, which is said to be the form of the body
p.124 Our minds take on the form of what is being perceived
402b18 p.536 To understand a triangle summing to two right angles, we need to know the essence of a line
402b25 p.536 Demonstration starts from a definition of essence, so we can derive (or conjecture about) the properties
403a08- p.128 Emotion involves the body, thinking uses the mind, imagination hovers between them
405b14 p.136 Mind involves movement, perception, incorporeality
407b20 p.96 Early thinkers concentrate on the soul but ignore the body, as if it didn't matter what body received the soul
408a15 p.145 If the soul is composed of many physical parts, it can't be a true unity
408b12 p.146 Does the mind think or pity, or does the whole man do these things?
411b10 p.153 What unifies the soul would have to be a super-soul, which seems absurd
412a20 p.157 Psuché is the form and actuality of a body which potentially has life
412b05 p.157 The soul and the body are inseparable, like the imprint in some wax
412b19 p.556 Sight is the essence of the eye, fitting its definition; the eye itself is just the matter
413b27 p.160 Perception necessitates pleasure and pain, which necessitates appetite
415b09 p.561 The soul is the cause or source of movement, the essence of body, and its end
417a04 p.169 Why can't we sense the senses? And why do senses need stimuli?
417b28 p.171 We may think when we wish, but not perceive, because universals are within the mind
418a15 p.172 Some objects of sensation are unique to one sense, where deception is impossible
418a24 p.172 Many objects of sensation are common to all the senses
425a20 p.190 We perceive number by the denial of continuity
425b07 p.191 Why do we have many senses, and not just one?
426b18 p.194 Sense organs aren't the end of sensation, or they would know what does the sensing
427b32 p.198 Thinking is not perceiving, but takes the form of imagination and speculation
428b18 p.589 Perception of sensible objects is virtually never wrong
430a01 p.203 The intellect has potential to think, like a tablet on which nothing has yet been written
431a10 p.208 Pleasure and pain are perceptions of things as good or bad
431a18 p.208 In moral thought images are essential, to be pursued or avoided
431b22 p.210 In a way the soul is everything which exists, through its perceptions and thoughts
433a12- p.214 Practical reason is based on desire, so desire must be the ultimate producer of movement
433b24 p.216 If all movement is either pushing or pulling, there must be a still point in between where it all starts
434a29 p.218 Nature does nothing in vain
328BCE Prior Analytics
p.2 Aristotle's logic is based on the subject/predicate distinction, which leads him to substances and properties
p.31 Aristotelian syllogisms are three-part, subject-predicate, existentially committed, with laws of thought
p.35 Linguistic terms form a hierarchy, with higher terms predicable of increasing numbers of things
p.39 Aristotelian logic has two quantifiers of the subject ('all' and 'some')
p.42 Aristotelian identified 256 possible syllogisms, saying that 19 are valid
24a16 p.1 Affirming/denying sentences are universal, particular, or indeterminate
24b18 p.2 Deduction is when we suppose one thing, and another necessarily follows
29b29-35 p.13 There are three different deductions for actual terms, necessary terms and possible terms
30a15 p.13 A deduction is necessary if the major (but not the minor) premise is also necessary
Ch.1 p.3 Aristotle listed nineteen valid syllogisms (though a few of them were wrong)
327BCE Posterior Analytics
p.15 For Aristotle knowledge is explanatory, involving understanding, and principles or causes
p.23 'Episteme' means grasping causes, universal judgments, explanation, and teaching
p.196 Aristotle gets asymmetric consequence from demonstration, which reflects real causal priority
p.342 Explanation and generality are inseparable
p.365 Aristotelian essences are properties mentioned at the starting point of a science
71a14 p.1 Everything is either asserted or denied truly
71b10 p.2 We understand a thing when we know its explanation and its necessity
71b17 p.2 We can know by demonstration, which is a scientific deduction leading to understanding
71b22 p.2 Premises must be true, primitive and immediate, and prior to and explanatory of conclusions
71b30 p.3 We only understand something when we know its explanation
72a05 p.3 What is most universal is furthest away, and the particulars are nearest
72a14 p.3 Negation takes something away from something
72a17 p.2 An axiom is a principle which must be understood if one is to learn anything
72a22 p.4 A unit is what is quantitatively indivisible
72a30 p.4 The foundation or source is stronger than the thing it causes
72b04 p.4 When you understand basics, you can't be persuaded to change your mind
72b09 p.5 Sceptics say justification is an infinite regress, or it stops at the unknowable
72b16 p.5 Maybe everything could be demonstrated, if demonstration can be reciprocal or circular
72b19 p.5 Some understanding, of immediate items, is indemonstrable
73a24 p.6 A demonstration is a deduction which proceeds from necessities
73a35 p.7 The essence of a triangle comes from the line, mentioned in any account of triangles
73b33 p.8 Something holds universally when it is proved of an arbitrary and primitive case
74b05- p.10 Demonstrative understanding rests on necessary features of the thing in itself
75a13 p.11 Demonstrations must be necessary, and that depends on the middle term
75a30 p.12 Whatever holds of a kind intrinsically holds of it necessarily
76a25 p.14 Knowledge proceeds from principles, so it is hard to know if we know
76b12 p.15 All demonstration is concerned with existence, axioms and properties
76b23- p.419 Aristotle's axioms (unlike Euclid's) are assumption awaiting proof
77a05 p.16 Separate Forms aren't needed for logic, but universals (one holding of many) are essential
77a23 p.17 Demonstrations by reductio assume excluded middle
79a08 p.21 Mathematics is concerned with forms, not with superficial properties
79a24 p.22 The reason why is the key to knowledge
81a37 p.135 Some knowledge is lost if you lose a sense, and there is no way the knowledge can be replaced
83a34 p.31 We can forget the Forms, as they are irrelevant, and not needed in giving demonstrations
85b24 p.37 Demonstrations are syllogisms which give explanations
85b25 p.37 Universals give better explanations, because they are self-explanatory and primitive
86a30 p.39 Universal demonstrations are about thought; particular demonstrations lead to perceptions
86a35 p.39 Demonstration is better with fewer presuppositions, and it is quicker if these are familiar
87a36 p.41 Units are positionless substances, and points are substances with position
87b28 p.42 You cannot understand anything through perception
88a05 p.43 We learn universals from many particulars
88a06 p.43 Universals are valuable because they make the explanations plain
88a29 p.44 Two falsehoods can be contrary to one another
88b32 p.45 What is necessary cannot be otherwise
89a07 p.45 No one has mere belief about something if they think it HAS to be true
89b24 p.48 What we seek and understand are facts, reasons, existence, and identity
90a15 p.49 What it is and why it is are the same; screening defines and explains an eclipse
90b05 p.49 Definitions are of what something is, and that is universal
90b17 p.50 Definitions recognise essences, so are not themselves essences
90b25 p.50 The principles of demonstrations are definitions
90b30 p.50 There must be definitions before demonstration is possible
92a30 p.54 Why are being terrestrial and a biped combined in the definition of man, but being literate and musical aren't?
92b14 p.55 Properties must be proved, but not essence; but existents are not a kind, so existence isn't part of essence
94a21 p.59 Explanation is of the status of a thing, inferences to it, initiation of change, and purpose
94b38 p.61 A stone travels upwards by a forced necessity, and downwards by natural necessity
96b03 p.64 The predicates of a thing's nature are necessary to it
96b16 p.65 Aim to get definitions of the primitive components, thus establishing the kind, and work towards the attributes
97a23 p.66 Definition by division needs predicates, which are well ordered and thorough
97b07-14 p.67 You can define objects by progressively identifying what is the same and what is different
97b37 p.68 If you shouldn't argue in metaphors, then you shouldn't try to define them either
99b09 p.72 Are particulars explained more by universals, or by other particulars?
99b35- p.73 Animals may have some knowledge if they retain perception, but understanding requires reasons to be given
100a05 p.73 Many memories of the same item form a single experience
100a12 p.73 Perception creates primitive immediate principles by building a series of firm concepts
100a15- p.74 A perception lodging in the soul creates a primitive universal, which becomes generalised
100b04 p.74 We learn primitives and universals by induction from perceptions
81b22 p.35 To seek truth, study the real connections between subjects and attributes
Bk I.2 p.130 There is pure deductive reasoning, and explanatory demonstration reasoning
Bk II.2 p.35 An Aristotelian definition is causal
324BCE Metaphysics
p.610 Mature Aristotle sees organisms as the paradigm substances
0980a p.4 All men long to understand, as shown by their delight in the senses
0980a22 p.15 Translate as 'humans all desire by nature to understand' (not as 'to know')
0980b28 p.4 Many memories make up a single experience
0981a p.4 Skill comes from a general assumption obtained from thinking about similar things
0981a p.5 Experience knows particulars, but only skill knows universals
0981a p.5 It is not much help if a doctor knows about universals but not the immediate particular
0981a p.5 It takes skill to know causes, not experience
0981b p.5 The ability to teach is a mark of true knowledge
0982a p.8 Knowledge chosen for its own sake, rather than for results, is wisdom
0982a02 p.6 Wisdom is knowledge of principles and causes
0982a20 p.8 Wise men aren't instructed; they instruct
0983a p.10 All philosophy begins from wonder, either at the physical world, or at ideas
0983a25 p.12 To know a thing is to know its primary cause or explanation
0988b23- p.61 Materialists cannot explain change
0993b p.43 Even people who go astray in their opinions have contributed something useful
0993b4 p.27 If each of us can give some logos about parts of nature, our combined efforts can be impressive
0995a p.48 Mathematical precision is only possible in immaterial things
0995a27- p.57 We must start with our puzzles, and progress by solving them, as they reveal the real difficulty
0995b p.58 Is there cause outside matter, and can it be separated, and is it one or many?
0996a18-b26 p.83 Aporia 1: is there one science of explanation, or many?
0996b26-997a15 p.83 Aporia 2: Does one science investigate both ultimate and basic principles of being?
0997a p.62 Axioms are the underlying principles of everything, and who but the philosopher can assess their truth?
0997a15-25 p.84 Aporia 3: Does one science investigate all being, or does each kind of being have a science?
0997a25-34 p.84 Aporia 4: Does metaphysics just investigate pure being, or also the characteristics of being?
0997a34-998a19 p.84 Aporia 5: Do other things exist besides what is perceptible by the senses?
0998a20-b13 p.85 Aporia 6: Are the basic principles of a thing the kinds to which it belongs, or its components?
0998b13-999a23 p.86 Aporia 7: Is a thing's kind the most general one, or the most specific one?
0999a p.67 If nothing exists except individuals, how can there be a science of infinity?
0999a24-b24 p.86 Aporia 8: Are there general kinds, or merely particulars?
0999b24-1000a04 p.86 Aporia 9: Is there one principle, or one kind of principle?
0999b33 p.68 The one in number just is the particular
1 Intro p.13 Being must be understood with reference to one primary sense - the being of substance
1000a05-1001a03 p.87 Aporia 10: Do perishables and imperishables have the same principle?
1001a04--b25 p.87 Aporia 11: Are primary being and unity distinct, or only in the things that are?
1001b26-1002b11 p.88 Aporia 12: Do mathematical entities exist independently, or only in objects?
1002b12-32 p.88 Aporia 13: Are there kinds, as well as particulars and mathematical entities?
1002b32-1003a05 p.88 Aporia 14: Are ultimate causes of things potentialities, or must they be actual?
1003a05-17 p.89 Aporia 15: Are the causes of things universals or particulars?
1003a08 p.76 Universal principles are not primary beings, but particular principles are not universally knowable
1003b07 p.81 Some things exist as substances, others as properties of substances
1003b19 p.81 If substance is the basis of reality, then philosophy aims to understand substance
1003b28 p.82 Nothing is added to a man's existence by saying he is 'one', or that 'he exists'
1004a04 p.82 The immediate divisions of that which is are genera, each with its science
1004b p.84 Philosophy has different powers from dialectic, and a different life from sophistry
1005a p.86 The axioms of mathematics are part of philosophy
1005b19 p.88 A thing cannot be both in and not-in the same thing (at a given time)
1006a p.89 Not everything can be proven, because that would lead to an infinite regress
1006b33 p.92 We cannot say that one thing both is and is not a man
1008b p.97 If one error is worse than another, it must be because it is further from the truth
1009b p.99 If the majority had diseased taste, and only a few were healthy, relativists would have to prefer the former
1010b p.102 Dreams aren't a serious problem. No one starts walking round Athens next morning, having dreamt that they were there!
1011a p.104 The starting point of a proof is not a proof
1011a p.105 If truth is relative it is relational, and concerns appearances relative to a situation
1011a p.105 If relativism is individual, how can something look sweet and not taste it, or look different to our two eyes?
1011b p.107 Falsity says that which is isn't, and that which isn't is; truth says that which is is, and that which isn't isn't
1011b13 p.149 The most certain basic principle is that contradictories can't be true at the same time
1011b13 p.152 For Aristotle predication is regulated by Non-Contradiction, because underlying stability is essential
1011c p.127 Aristotle's truth formulation concerns referring parts of sentences, not sentences as wholes
1013b p.115 We exercise to be fit, but need fitness to exercise
1015b03 p.120 Necessity makes alternatives impossible
1015b05- p.292 Wholes are continuous, rigid, uniform, similar, same kind, similar matter
1015b14 p.121 Some things have external causes of their necessity; others (the simple) generate necessities
1016b03 p.123 Things are one to the extent that they are indivisible
1016b30 p.124 Things are one numerically in matter, formally in their account, generically in predicates, and by analogy in relations
1017a13-23 p.126 Substance [ousia] is the subject of predication and cause [aitia?] of something's existence
1017a21-35 p.91 Being is either what falls in the categories, or what makes propositions true
1017a22- p.127 Essence (fixed by definition) is also 'ousia', so 'ousia' is both ultimate subject, and a this-thing
1019a04 p.131 Prior things can exist without posterior things, but not vice versa
1019a18 p.131 A 'potentiality' is a principle of change or process in a thing
1019a27 p.132 Things are destroyed not by their powers, but by their lack of them
1019b26 p.133 Possibility is when the necessity of the contrary is false
1019b31 p.134 Potentiality in geometry is metaphorical
1020a09 p.134 Pluralities divide into discontinous countables; magnitudes divide into continuous things
1021b p.139 Excellence is a sort of completion
1023a24 p.145 The contents of an explanatory formula are parts of the whole
1024a01-5 p.146 A 'whole' (rather than a mere 'sum') requires an internal order which distinguishes it
1024b01 p.147 'Plane' is the genus of plane figures, and 'solid' of solids, with differentiae picking out types of corner
1027b22 p.163 Truth is a matter of asserting correct combinations and separations
1027b27 p.163 Simple and essential truth seems to be given, with further truth arising in thinking
1028a33-6 p.12 The three main candidates for primary being are particular, universal and essence; essence is the answer
1028a36 p.168 We know something when we fully know what it is, not just its quality, quantity or location
1028b p.168 The baffling question of what exists is asking about the nature of substance
1028b25- p.110 Primary being is either universals, or the basis of predication, or essence
1028b30 p.174 A substance is what-it-is-to-be, or the universal, or the genus, or the subject of saying
1029a p.174 It is unclear whether Aristotle believes in a propertyless subject, his 'ultimate matter'
1029a01 p.174 Substance (ousia) may well be, most fully, the primary subject of predication
1029a10 p.175 It is matter that turns out to be substance [ousia]
1029a10 p.175 If you extract all features of the object, what is left over?
1029a20 p.785 Matter is neither a particular thing nor a member of a determinate category
1029a27 p.175 Matter is not substance, because substance needs separability and thisness
1029b02 p.176 Understanding moves from the less to the more intelligible
1029b13 p.178 A thing's essence is its intrinsic nature
1029b36 p.174 Things are predicated of the basic thing, which isn't predicated of anything else
1030a p.178 Having an essence is the criterion of being a substance
1030a02 p.177 A thing's essence is what is mentioned in its definition
1030a02 p.179 Essence only belongs to things whose account is a definition
1030a06 p.179 Things have an essence if their explanation is a definition
1030a08 p.180 A definition must be of something primary
1030a22 p.180 Some philosophers say that in some qualified way non-existent things 'are'
1030b12 p.181 Existence requires thisness, as quantity or quality
1030b20 p.183 Whiteness can only belong to man because an individual like Callias happens to be white
1030b28 p.183 Whiteness can be explained without man, but femaleness cannot be explained without animal
1030b34 p.184 Only substance [ousias] admits of definition
1031a12 p.184 A definition is an account of a what-it-was-to-be-that-thing
1031a30 p.186 Forms are said to be substances to which nothing is prior
1031b08 p.186 We know a thing when we grasp its essence
1032a05 p.188 Primary things just are what-it-is-to-be-that-thing
1032a33 p.190 Things are produced from skill if the form of them is in the mind
1032b01 p.190 The form of a thing is its essence and its primary being
1032b30 p.793 Something must pre-exist any new production
1033a08 p.192 The statue is not called 'stone' but 'stoney'
1033b p.195 Is there a house over and above its bricks?
1033b32 p.195 Unusual kinds like mule are just a combination of two kinds
1034b20 p.201 The parts of a definition are isomorphic to the parts of the entity
1034b20-1037b p.427 Definitions need the complex features of form, and don't need to mention the category
1034b24 p.201 It is unclear whether acute angles are prior to right angles, or fingers to men
1035b27 p.204 Generalities like man and horse are not substances, but universal composites of account and matter
1036a09 p.204 Matter is perceptible (like bronze) or intelligible (like mathematical objects)
1036a28 p.207 A definition is of the universal and of the kind
1036b01 p.207 If we only saw bronze circles, would bronze be part of the concept of a circle?
1036b20 p.208 The material element may be essential to a definition
1037a01 p.208 Every distinct thing has matter, as long as it isn't an essence or a Form
1037a11 p.209 Perhaps numbers are substances?
1037a22 p.209 Sometimes parts must be mentioned in definitions of essence, and sometimes not
1037a29 p.210 The substance is the form dwelling in the object
1037b10 p.212 If we define 'man' as 'two-footed animal', why does that make man a unity?
1037b30 p.212 Definition by division is into genus and differentiae
1038a05- p.213 If the genus is just its constitutive forms (or matter), then the definition is the account of the differentiae
1038b05 p.216 A substrate is either a 'this' supporting qualities, or 'matter' supporting actuality
1038b10 p.216 Substance is not a universal, as the former is particular but a universal is shared
1038b1-15 p.158 Substance is unified and universals are diverse, so universals are not substance
1038b14 p.216 Two things with the same primary being and essence are one thing
1038b25 p.217 It is absurd that a this and a substance should be composed of a quality
1038b31 p.217 Genera are not substances, and do not exist apart from the ingredient species
1039a01 p.217 Predications only pick out kinds of things, not things in themselves
1039a15 p.218 Two can't be a self-contained unit, because it would need to be one to do that
1039b30 p.223 Particulars are not definable, because they fluctuate
1040a13 p.223 If I define you, I have to use terms which are all true of other things too
1040a33- p.224 You can't define particulars, because accounts have to be generalised
1040b27 p.226 No universals exist separately from particulars
1041a p.226 We may have to postulate unobservable and unknowable substances
1041a05-b36 p.421 'Categories' answers 'what?' with species, genus, differerentia; 'Met.' Z.17 seeks causal essence
1041a12 p.228 We can't understand self-identity without a prior grasp of the object
1041a28 p.228 Real enquiries seek causes, and causes are essences
1041b08 p.228 The explanation is what gives matter its state, which is the form, which is the substance
1041b16 p.229 A syllable is something different from its component vowels and consonants
1041b16-19 p.811 If a syllable is more than its elements, is the extra bit also an element?
1041b27 p.229 A thing's substance is its primary cause of being
1041b31 p.229 A true substance is constituted by some nature, which is a principle
1042a p.233 Elements and physical objects are substances, but ideas and mathematics are not so clear
1042a p.234 Substance must exist, because something must endure during change between opposites
1043a16 p.814 Giving the function of a house defines its actuality
1045a p.248 How is man a unity of animal and biped, especially if the Forms of animal and of biped exist?
1045a17 p.249 If men exist by participating in two forms (Animal and Biped), they are plural, not unities
1045a24 p.249 Things are a unity because there is no clash between potential matter and actual shape/form
1045b04 p.249 An essence causes both its own unity and its kind
1045b06 p.253 Other types of being all depend on the being of substance
1045b07 p.250 If partaking explains unity, what causes participating, and what is participating
1045b19 p.250 Primary matter and form make a unity, one in potentiality, the other in actuality
1045b24 p.250 Objects lacking matter are intrinsic unities
1046a10 p.254 Potentiality is a principle of change, in another thing, or as another thing
1046b28 p.258 The Megarans say something is only capable of something when it is actually doing it
1047a10 p.259 Megaran actualism is just scepticism about the qualities of things
1047a15 p.259 Megaran actualists prevent anything from happening, by denying a capacity for it to happen!
1047a30 p.260 An actuality is usually thought to be a process
1047b05 p.261 Anything which is possible either exists or will come into existence
1048a08 p.264 When a power and its object meet in the right conditions, an action necessarily follows
1048a18 p.264 Potentialities are always for action, but are conditional on circumstances
1048a33 p.267 Some things cannot be defined, and only an analogy can be given
1049a09 p.272 Nature is an active principle of change, like potentiality, but it is intrinsic to things
1049a25 p.271 Primary matter is what characterises other stuffs, and it has no distinct identity
1050a16 p.274 A thing's active function is its end
1050b p.276 The Forms have to be potentialities, not actual knowledge or movement
1050b05 p.275 Actualities are arranged by priority, going back to what initiates process
1051a29 p.279 We recognise potentiality from actuality
1051b10 p.281 Truth-thinking does not make it so; it being so is what makes it true
1051b30 p.282 Truth is either intuiting a way of being, or a putting together
1051b34 p.282 There is only being in a certain way, and without that way there is no being
1052a12 p.282 The truth or falsity of a belief will be in terms of something that is always this way not that
1052a20 p.286 Things may be naturally unified because they involve an indivisible process
1052a24 p.286 Things are more unified if the unity comes from their own nature, not from external force
1052a28 p.286 Some things are unified by their account, which rests on a unified thought about the thing
1052a30 p.286 A unity may just be a particular, a numerically indivisible thing
1052a31 p.286 The formal cause may be what unifies a substance
1052a35 p.286 Indivisibility is the cause of unity, either in movement, or in the account or thought
1052b21 p.287 The idea of 'one' is the foundation of number
1052b35 p.288 The unit is stipulated to be indivisible
1053b p.290 None of the universals can be a substance
1054a03 p.291 If only rectilinear figures existed, then unity would be the triangle
1054a16 p.292 The essence of a single thing is the essence of a particular
1054a35 p.294 You are one with yourself in form and matter
1054b06 p.294 Things such as two different quadrangles are alike but not wholly the same
1054b26 p.295 For two things to differ in some respect, they must both possess that respect
1055b p.298 There is no middle ground in contradiction, but there is in contrariety
1056b16 p.304 Each many is just ones, and is measured by the one
1057a04 p.304 Number is plurality measured by unity
1059a p.317 Philosophy is a kind of science that deals with principles
1059a05 p.314 A thing has a feature necessarily if its denial brings a contradiction
1060a p.322 The world can't be arranged at all if there is nothing eternal and separate
1061a p.325 Mathematicians study quantity and continuity, and remove the perceptible features of things
1061a/b p.325 Mathematics studies abstracted relations, commensurability and proportion
1065b p.338 Even if the world is caused by fate, mind and nature are still prior causes
1065b30- p.336 There cannot be a science of accidentals, but only of general truths
1069a p.356 The Pre-Socratics were studying the principles, elements and causes of substance
1069b p.358 It doesn't explain the world to say it was originally all one. How did it acquire diversity?
1071a27 p.366 Individuals within a species differ in their matter, form and motivating cause
1071b p.369 There is no point at all in the theory of Forms unless it contains a principle that produces movement
1071b p.369 It is hard to see how either time or movement could come into existence or be destroyed
1072a p.373 Something which both moves and is moved is intermediate, so it follows that there must be an unmoved mover
1072b p.374 The first mover is necessary, and because it is necessary it is good
1072b p.374 Contemplation is a supreme pleasure and excellence
1073a05 p.375 There must a source of movement which is eternal, indivisible and without magnitude
1073a34 p.377 There are as many eternal unmovable substances as there are movements of the stars
1074b p.382 It is readily agreed that thinking is the most godlike of things in our experience
1074b p.383 Absolute thinking is the thinking of thinking
1075a p.385 Is excellence separate from things, or part of them, or both?
1075a p.386 Not everything is composed of opposites; what, for example, is the opposite of matter?
1075a p.386 If everything is made of opposites, are the opposed things made of opposites?
1075a p.386 Is the good a purpose, a source of movement, or a pure form?
1075a p.386 Everything is arranged around a single purpose
1075b p.387 If you accept Forms, you must accept the more powerful principle of 'participating' in them
1075b p.387 Why are some things destructible and others not?
1075b p.388 Pure Forms and numbers can't cause anything, and especially not movement
1077b p.399 If health happened to be white, the science of health would not study whiteness
1077b31 p.398 It is a simple truth that the objects of mathematics have being, of some sort
1078a p.399 Mathematics studies the domain of perceptible entities, but its subject-matter is not perceptible
1078a p.399 Science is more accurate when it is prior and simpler, especially without magnitude or movement
1078a p.400 The good is found in actions, but beauty can exist without movement
1078a p.400 Mathematicians suppose inseparable aspects to be separable, and study them in isolation
1078a p.400 Beauty involves the Forms of order, symmetry and limit, which can be handled mathematically
1079a p.402 Are there forms for everything, or for negations, or for destroyed things?
1079a p.402 All attempts to prove the Forms are either invalid, or prove Forms where there aren't supposed to be any
1079b p.405 What possible contribution can the Forms make to perceptible entities?
1079b28 p.406 Forms have to be their own paradigms, which seems to fuse the paradigm and the copy
1080a01 p.406 How can the Forms both be the substance of things and exist separately from them?
1080b16 p.409 Pythagoreans say the whole universe is made of numbers
1081a24 p.411 Units came about when the unequals were equalised
1082 p.91 Aristotle is not asserting facts about the location of properties, but about their ontological status
1082a16 p.413 Things are unified by contact, mixture and position
1082a18 p.413 Two men do not make one thing, as well as themselves
1082b29 p.414 If two is part of three then numbers aren't Forms, because they would all be intermingled
1082b32 p.414 When we count, are we adding, or naming numbers?
1086a p.424 There is a confusion because Forms are said to be universal, but also some Forms are separable and particular
1086b p.425 The acquisition of scientific knowledge is impossible without universals
1086b36 p.427 Demonstrations about particulars must be about everything of that type
1087a12 p.428 Knowledge of potential is universal and indefinite; of the actual it is definite and of individuals
6.6 p.241 Ultimate matter is discredited, as Aristotle merged substratum of change with bearer of properties
Bk 01.2 p.4 Wisdom seeks explanations, causes, and reasons why things are as they are
Bk 04 p.89 There cannot be uninstantiated properties
Bk 12 p.281 The main characteristic of the source of change is activity [energeia]
book p.3 Is a primary substance a foundation of existence, or the last stage of understanding?
book p.26 In 'Metaphysics' substantial forms take over from objects as primary
book p.29 Metaphysics is the science of ultimate explanation, or of pure existence, or of primary existence
change p.76 For animate things, only the form, not the matter or properties, must persist through change
defs p.109 Aristotle's definitions are not unique, but apply to a range of individuals
defs p.207 Essence is what is stated in the definition
ess p.3 Individual essences are not universals, since those can't be substances, or cause them
ess p.3 Essence is the cause of individual substance, and creates its unity
ess p.3 Standardly, Aristotelian essences are taken to be universals of the species
ess p.3 Essences are not properties (since those can't cause individual substances)
ess p.52 Plato says changing things have no essence; Aristotle disagrees
ess p.129 Essential form is neither accidental nor necessary to matter, so it appears not to be a property
ess p.143 Aristotelian essence is not universal properties, but individual essence
ess p.179 Aristotelian essences are causal, not classificatory
ess p.187 Aristotle's says necessary truths are distinct and derive from essential truths
ess p.213 The hallmark of an artefact is that its active source of maintenance is external
ess p.215 Aristotle says changing, material things (and not just universals) have an essence
ess p.228 Are essences actually universals?
ess p.241 How a thing is generated does not explain its essence
ess p.369 Aristotle does not accept individual essences; essential properties are always general
God p.42 The traditional view of Aristotle is God (actual form) at top and prime matter (potential matter) at bottom
God p.49 God is not a creator (involving time and change) and is not concerned with the inferior universe
God p.94 For Aristotle God is defined in an axiom, for which there is no proof
hylom p.9 Aristotle's solution to the problem of unity is that form is an active cause or potentiality or nature
hylom p.126 Aristotle's essence explains the existence of an individual substance, not its properties
hylom p.238 Aristotle's form improves on being non-predicable as a way to identify a 'this'
hylom p.242 Aristotle's cosmos is ordered by form, and disordered by matter
id p.78 For Aristotle, things are not made individual by some essential distinguishing mark
id p.189 Aristotle wants definition, not identity, so origin is not essential to him
id p.218 There is no being unless it is determinate and well-defined
id p.348 Aristotle discusses fundamental units of being, rather than existence questions
kind p.35 Aristotelian explanations mainly divide things into natural kinds
kind p.49 Aristotle distinguishes two different sorts of generality - kinds, and properties
kind p.121 Species and genera are largely irrelevant in 'Metaphysics'
logic p.125 Aristotle does not take the principle of non-contradiction for granted
matter p.23 In Aristotle, bronze only becomes 'matter' when it is potentially a statue
matter p.36 Aristotle's conception of matter applies to non-physical objects as well as physical objects
matter p.36 Aristotle had a hierarchical conception of matter
matter p.42 I claim that Aristotle's foundation is the four elements, and not wholly potential prime matter
matter p.46 Aristotle may only have believed in prime matter because his elements were immutable
matter p.77 Aristotle's matter is something that could be the inner origin of a natural being's behaviour
matter p.193 Matter is secondary, because it is potential, determined by the actuality of form
matter p.376 Aristotle says matter is a lesser substance, rather than wholly denying that it is a substance
ousia p.10 'Ousia' is 'primary being' not 'primary substance'
ousia p.11 Primary being ('proté ousia') exists in virtue of itself, not in relation to other things
ousia p.12 In Aristotle, 'proté ousia' is 'primary being', and 'to hupokeimenon' is 'that which lies under' (or 'substance')
ousia p.26 Aristotle moved from realism to nominalism about substances
ousia p.58 Substance is prior in being separate, in definition, and in knowledge
ousia p.101 Substance is distinct being because of its unity
ousia p.167 A substance is a proper subject because the matter is a property of the form, not vice versa
ousia p.215 Non-primary beings lack essence, or only have a derived essence
ousia p.228 Primary being is both the essence, and the subject of predication
partic p.74 Form and matter may not make up a concrete particular, because there are also accidents like weight
partic p.153 If definition is of universals, many individuals have no definition, and hence no essence
partic p.154 Aristotle claims that the individual is epistemologically prior to the universal
partic p.251 Aristotle takes essence and form as a particular, not (as some claim) as a universal, the species
potent p.149 Actual knowledge is of the individual, and potential knowledge of the universal
props p.60 For Aristotle, there are only as many properties as actually exist
props p.80 Properties are just the ways in which forms are realised at various times
props p.187 The 'propriae' or 'necessary accidents' of a thing are separate, and derived from the essence
props p.196 The Aristotelian view is that the essential properties are those that sort an object
props p.369 Essential properties explain in conjunction with properties shared by the same kind
props p.377 Aristotle doesn't think essential properties are those which must belong to a thing
subst p.192 It is wrong to translate 'ousia' as 'substance'
Theta p.173 Active 'dunamis' is best translated as 'power' or 'ability' (rather than 'potentiality')
univs p.169 Universals are indeterminate and only known in potential, because they are general
Z p.89 Aristotle says that the form is what makes an entity what it is
Z p.90 Forms of sensible substances include unrealised possibilities, so are not fully actual
Z.13 p.26 In 'Met.' he says genera can't be substances or qualities, so aren't in the ontology
Z.3 p.39 Statues depend on their bronze, but bronze doesn't depend on statues
Z.3 p.41 To be a subject a thing must be specifiable, with some essential properties
Z.3 p.83 A subject can't be nothing, so it must qualify as separate, and as having a distinct identity