green numbers give full details.     |    back to list of philosophers     |     expand these ideas

Ideas of David M. Armstrong, by Text

[Australian, 1926 - 2014, Born in Melbourne. Pupil of John Anderson. Taught at Sydney University.]

1968 A Materialist Theory of Mind (Rev)
p.5 5493 If pains are defined causally, and research shows that the causal role is physical, then pains are physical [Lycan]
p.98 4600 Armstrong and Lewis see functionalism as an identity of the function and its realiser [Heil]
p.396 5690 A mental state without belief refutes self-intimation; a belief with no state refutes infallibility [Shoemaker]
270-90 p.63 6498 Armstrong suggests secondary qualities are blurred primary qualities [Robinson,H]
6.VI p.88 14330 To be realists about dispositions, we can only discuss them through their categorical basis
1973 Belief Truth and Knowledge
p.336 3900 Maybe experience is not essential to perception, but only to the causing of beliefs [Scruton]
11.III.6 p.157 4253 Externalism says knowledge involves a natural relation between the belief state and what makes it true
1978 Nominalism and Realism
p.41 p.14 4032 The problem of universals is how many particulars can all be of the same 'type'
1978 A Theory of Universals
p.30 10729 Universals explain resemblance and causal power [Oliver]
p.44 9478 Even if all properties are categorical, they may be denoted by dispositional predicates [Bird]
p.91 7024 Properties are universals, which are always instantiated [Heil]
p.202 15544 If what is actual might have been impossible, we need S4 modal logic [Lewis]
II p.11 p.30 10728 A thing's self-identity can't be a universal, since we can know it a priori [Oliver]
p.8 p.13 4031 It doesn't follow that because there is a predicate there must therefore exist a property
xiii,16/17 p.147 10024 The type-token distinction is the universal-particular distinction [Hodes]
1980 Against 'Ostrich Nominalism'
§1 p.104 8505 Refusal to explain why different tokens are of the same type is to be an ostrich
§3 p.109 8506 Particulars and properties are distinguishable, but too close to speak of a relation
§3 p.111 8507 Some think of reality as made of things; I prefer facts or states of affairs
1983 What is a Law of Nature?
p.15 16246 Rather than take necessitation between universals as primitive, just make laws primitive [Maudlin]
p.47 9480 Armstrong has an unclear notion of contingent necessitation, which can't necessitate anything [Bird]
p.56 12677 Armstrong holds that all basic properties are categorical [Ellis]
p.213 8582 Regularities are lawful if a second-order universal unites two first-order universals [Lewis]
01.1 p.4 17662 Science depends on laws of nature to study unobserved times and spaces
01.2 p.5 17663 If you know what it is, investigation is pointless. If you don't, investigation is impossible
01.2 p.7 17664 Each subject has an appropriate level of abstraction
01.3 p.9 17666 Actualism means that ontology cannot contain what is merely physically possible
01.3 p.9 17667 Dispositions exist, but their truth-makers are actual or categorical properties
02.3 p.14 17668 It is likely that particulars can be individuated by unique conjunctions of properties
02.4 p.16 17669 Realist regularity theories of laws need universals, to pick out the same phenomena
02.6 p.18 17671 A naive regularity view says if it never occurs then it is impossible
02.7 p.21 17670 Newton's First Law refers to bodies not acted upon by a force, but there may be no such body
04.2 p.40 17672 A good reason for something (the smoke) is not an explanation of it (the fire)
04.3 p.42 17674 The raven paradox has three disjuncts, confirmed by confirming any one of them
04.5 p.58 17675 Unlike 'green', the 'grue' predicate involves a time and a change
05.4 p.73 17676 Best explanations explain the most by means of the least
06.2 p.82 17677 Past, present and future must be equally real if universals are instantiated
06.2 p.82 17678 Universals are just the repeatable features of a world
06.2 p.83 17679 All instances of some property are strictly identical
06.2 p.83 17680 The identity of a thing with itself can be ruled out as a pseudo-property
06.3 p.85 17681 The laws of nature link properties with properties
06.4 p.90 17682 A universe couldn't consist of mere laws
06.7 p.99 17683 Science suggests that the predicate 'grue' is not a genuine single universal
06.7 p.102 17684 To explain observations by a regular law is to explain the observations by the observations
06.7 p.104 17685 Induction aims at 'all Fs', but abduction aims at hidden or theoretical entities
08.3 p.123 17687 If everything is powers there is a vicious regress, as powers are defined by more powers
10.3 p.144 17688 Negative facts are supervenient on positive facts, suggesting they are positive facts
10.4 p.147 17689 Absences might be effects, but surely not causes?
10.4 p.148 17690 Oaken conditional laws, Iron universal laws, and Steel necessary laws [PG]
10.7 p.156 17691 Nothing is genuinely related to itself
11 p.15 17692 We can't deduce the phenomena from the One
11.2 p.163 17693 The necessary/contingent distinction may need to recognise possibilities as real
7 p.112 17686 Universals are abstractions from states of affairs
p.83-4 p.92 15442 Universals are abstractions from their particular instances [Lewis]
1986 The Nature of Possibility
p.118 11003 The best version of reductionist actualism around is Armstrong's combinatorial account [Read]
1989 A Combinatorial Theory of Possibility
p.198 15542 All possibilities are recombinations of properties in the actual world [Lewis]
p.205 15547 Negative existentials have 'totality facts' as truthmakers [Lewis]
1992 Pref to new 'Materialist Theory'
p.xiv p.-10 7429 Causal Functionalism says mental states are apt for producing behaviour
p.xiv p.-10 7432 One mental role might be filled by a variety of physical types
p.xvi p.-8 7431 The identity of mental states with physical properties is contingent, because the laws of nature are contingent
p.xvi p.-8 7434 Behaviourism is false, but mind is definable as the cause of behaviour
p.xvii p.-7 7436 The manifestations of a disposition need never actually exist
p.xvii p.-7 7437 Consciousness and experience of qualities are not the same
p.xviii p.-6 7438 A causal theory of mentality would be improved by a teleological element
p.xxii p.-2 7440 Secondary qualities are microscopic primary qualities of physical things
1992 Properties
p.22 4036 What matters is not how many entities we postulate, but how many kinds of entities [Mellor/Oliver]
§1 p.161 4034 Whether we apply 'cold' or 'hot' to an object is quite separate from its change of temperature
§1 p.161 8529 Deniers of properties and relations rely on either predicates or on classes
§1 p.161 8530 Change of temperature in objects is quite independent of the predicates 'hot' and 'cold'
§1 p.161 8531 In most sets there is no property common to all the members
§1 p.163 8532 Resemblances must be in certain 'respects', and they seem awfully like properties
§1 p.164 8533 Predicates need ontological correlates to ensure that they apply
§1 p.164 4035 There must be some explanation of why certain predicates are applicable to certain objects
§1 p.165 8535 To the claim that every predicate has a property, start by eliminating failure of application of predicate
§1 p.166 8536 We want to know what constituents of objects are grounds for the application of predicates
§2 p.168 8537 Tropes fall into classes, because exact similarity is symmetrical and transitive
§2 p.171 8539 Universals are required to give a satisfactory account of the laws of nature
§2 p.171 8538 Trope theory needs extra commitments, to symmetry and non-transitivity, unless resemblance is exact
§2 p.171 8540 The introduction of sparse properties avoids the regularity theory's problem with 'grue'
§2 p.171 8541 Regularities theories are poor on causal connections, counterfactuals and probability
1 p.164 15753 Essences might support Resemblance Nominalism, but they are too coarse and ill-defined
1 p.165 15754 Without properties we would be unable to express the laws of nature
1995 Universals
p.503 p.503 4437 'Mereological Nominalism' sees whiteness as a huge white object consisting of all the white things
p.503 p.503 4438 'Mereological Nominalism' may work for whiteness, but it doesn't seem to work for squareness
p.503 p.503 4434 'Class Nominalism' says that properties or kinds are merely membership of a set (e.g. of white things)
p.503 p.503 4435 'Class Nominalism' cannot explain co-extensive properties, or sets with random members
p.503 p.503 4436 'Class Nominalism' may explain properties if we stick to 'natural' sets, and ignore random ones
p.503 p.503 4439 'Resemblance Nominalism' says properties are resemblances between classes of particulars
p.503 p.503 4431 'Predicate Nominalism' says that a 'universal' property is just a predicate applied to lots of things
p.503 p.503 4433 Concept and predicate nominalism miss out some predicates, and may be viciously regressive
p.503 p.503 4440 'Resemblance Nominalism' finds that in practice the construction of resemblance classes is hard
p.503 p.503 4432 'Concept Nominalism' says a 'universal' property is just a mental concept applied to lots of things
p.504 p.504 4446 It is claimed that some universals are not exemplified by any particular, so must exist separately
p.504 p.504 4445 If properties and relations are particulars, there is still the problem of how to classify and group them
p.504 p.504 4444 One moderate nominalist view says that properties and relations exist, but they are particulars
p.505 p.505 4448 Should we decide which universals exist a priori (through words), or a posteriori (through science)?
1995 Universals and Particulars
p.506 p.506 4442 Most thinkers now reject self-predication (whiteness is NOT white) so there is no Third Man problem
1997 A World of States of Affairs
p.169 4798 In recent writings, Armstrong makes a direct identification of necessitation with causation [Psillos]
p.220 15550 Properties are contingently existing beings with multiple locations in space and time [Lewis]
49-51 p.96 9497 Without modality, Armstrong falls back on fictionalism to support counterfactual laws [Bird]
p.115 p.23 4743 The truth-maker for a truth must necessitate that truth
p.129 p.22 4742 Correspondence may be one-many or many one, as when either p or q make 'p or q' true
2001 Two Problems for Essentialism
p.170 p.170 5492 How can essences generate the right powers to vary with distance between objects?
2004 Truth and Truthmakers
02.3 p.5 18467 Truth-making can't be entailment, because truthmakers are portions of reality
02.3 p.7 18468 Armstrong says truthmakers necessitate their truth, where 'necessitate' is a primitive relation [MacBride]
02.3.2 p.9 18368 For all being, there is a potential proposition which expresses its existence and nature
02.6 p.12 18370 A realm of abstract propositions is causally inert, so has no explanatory value
04.2 p.40 18371 The class of similar things is much too big a truthmaker for the feature of a particular
04.2 p.41 18372 We need properties, as minimal truthmakers for the truths about objects
04.3 p.46 18373 If tropes are non-transferable, then they necessarily belong to their particular substance
04.5 p.49 18374 Truthmaking needs states of affairs, to unite particulars with tropes or universals.
05.1 p.53 18375 General truths are a type of negative truth, saying there are no more ravens than black ones
05.2 p.58 18377 Negative truths have as truthmakers all states of affairs relevant to the truth
05.2.1 p.62 18378 Length is a 'determinable' property, and one mile is one its 'determinates'
05.2.1 p.62 18379 The determinates of a determinable must be incompatible with each other
05.2.3 p.66 18380 Negative causations supervene on positive causations plus their laws?
06.1 p.68 18381 Necessitating general truthmakers must also specify their limits
06.2 p.76 18382 The nature of arctic animals is truthmaker for the absence of penguins there
07.2 p.84 18384 One truthmaker will do for a contingent truth and for its contradictory
07.3 p.89 18385 Logical atomism builds on the simple properties, but are they the only possible properties?
07.4 p.90 18386 What is the truthmaker for 'it is possible that there could have been nothing'?
07.5 p.91 18387 The truthmakers for possible unicorns are the elements in their combination
08.1 p.95 18388 Possible worlds don't fix necessities; intrinsic necessities imply the extension in worlds
08.5 p.103 18389 When entities contain entities, or overlap with them, there is 'partial' identity
08.7 p.107 18390 All metaphysical discussion should be guided by a quest for truthmakers
09.1 p.112 18391 'Naturalism' says only the world of space-time exists
09.1 p.114 18393 For 'there is a class with no members' we don't need the null set as truthmaker
09.1 p.114 18392 Classes have cardinalities, so their members must all be treated as units
09.3 p.117 18394 In mathematics, truthmakers are possible instantiations of structures
09.5 p.122 18396 The set theory brackets { } assert that the member is a unit
10.4 p.139 18397 Powers must result in some non-powers, or there would only be potential without result
10.4 p.140 18399 How does the power of gravity know the distance it acts over?
10.4 p.141 18400 Properties are not powers - they just have powers
11 p.148 18401 The pure present moment is too brief to be experienced