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Ideas of Robert Audi, by Text

[American, b.1941, Professor at the University of Nebraska. Father of Paul?]

1992 Action, Intention and Reason
p.177 p.96 Actions are not mere effects of reasons, but are under their control
1998 Epistemology: contemporary introduction
I p.17 p.17 To see something as a field, I obviously need the concept of a field
I p.20 p.20 How could I see a field and believe nothing regarding it?
I p.23 p.23 Perception is first simple, then objectual (with concepts) and then propositional
I p.33 p.33 Sense data imply representative realism, possibly only representing primary qualities
I p.36 p.36 Sense-data (and the rival 'adverbial' theory) are to explain illusions and hallucinations
I p.42 p.42 If you gradually remove a book's sensory properties, what is left at the end?
I p.43 p.43 Sense-data theory is indirect realism, but phenomenalism is direct irrealism
II p.66 p.66 I might remember someone I can't recall or image, by recognising them on meeting
II p.68 p.68 To remember something is to know it
III p.83 p.83 We can be ignorant about ourselves, for example, our desires and motives
Intr.p.7 p.7 Beliefs are based on perception, memory, introspection or reason
IV p.100 p.100 Red and green being exclusive colours seems to be rationally graspable but not analytic
IV p.103 p.103 The concepts needed for a priori thought may come from experience
IV p.105 p.105 Virtually all rationalists assert that we can have knowledge of synthetic a priori truths
IV p.116 p.116 Because 'gold is malleable' is necessary does not mean that it is analytic
VII p.183 p.183 Justification is either unanchored (infinite or circular), or anchored (in knowledge or non-knowledge)
VII p.192 p.192 Maths may be consistent with observations, but not coherent
VII p.193 p.193 It is very hard to show how much coherence is needed for justification
VII p.194 p.194 A consistent madman could have a very coherent belief system
VII p.198 p.198 Could you have a single belief on its own?
VIII p.220 p.220 We can make certain of what we know, so knowing does not entail certainty
VIII p.225 p.225 'Reliable' is a very imprecise term, and may even mean 'justified'
VIII p.229 p.229 Consistent accurate prediction looks like knowledge without justified belief
VIII p.234 p.234 Internalism about justification implies that there is a right to believe something
VIII p.243 p.243 A reliability theory of knowledge seems to involve truth as correspondence
X p.311 p.311 The principles of justification have to be a priori