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Ideas of Robert Audi, by Text
[American, b.1941, Professor at the University of Nebraska. Father of Paul?]
1992
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Action, Intention and Reason
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p.177
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p.96
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20064
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Actions are not mere effects of reasons, but are under their control
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1998
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Epistemology: contemporary introduction
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I p.17
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p.17
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2716
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To see something as a field, I obviously need the concept of a field
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I p.20
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p.20
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2717
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How could I see a field and believe nothing regarding it?
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I p.23
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p.23
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2718
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Perception is first simple, then objectual (with concepts) and then propositional
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I p.33
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p.33
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2719
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Sense data imply representative realism, possibly only representing primary qualities
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I p.36
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p.36
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2720
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Sense-data (and the rival 'adverbial' theory) are to explain illusions and hallucinations
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I p.42
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p.42
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2721
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If you gradually remove a book's sensory properties, what is left at the end?
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I p.43
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p.43
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2722
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Sense-data theory is indirect realism, but phenomenalism is direct irrealism
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II p.66
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p.66
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2724
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I might remember someone I can't recall or image, by recognising them on meeting
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II p.68
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p.68
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2725
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To remember something is to know it
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III p.83
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p.83
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2726
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We can be ignorant about ourselves, for example, our desires and motives
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Intr.p.7
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p.7
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2715
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Beliefs are based on perception, memory, introspection or reason
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IV p.100
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p.100
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2727
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Red and green being exclusive colours seems to be rationally graspable but not analytic
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IV p.103
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p.103
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2728
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The concepts needed for a priori thought may come from experience
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IV p.105
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p.105
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2729
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Virtually all rationalists assert that we can have knowledge of synthetic a priori truths
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IV p.116
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p.116
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2730
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Because 'gold is malleable' is necessary does not mean that it is analytic
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VII p.183
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p.183
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2731
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Justification is either unanchored (infinite or circular), or anchored (in knowledge or non-knowledge)
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VII p.192
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p.192
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2732
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Maths may be consistent with observations, but not coherent
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VII p.193
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p.193
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2733
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It is very hard to show how much coherence is needed for justification
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VII p.194
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p.194
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2734
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A consistent madman could have a very coherent belief system
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VII p.198
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p.198
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2735
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Could you have a single belief on its own?
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VIII p.220
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p.220
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2736
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We can make certain of what we know, so knowing does not entail certainty
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VIII p.225
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p.225
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2737
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'Reliable' is a very imprecise term, and may even mean 'justified'
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VIII p.229
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p.229
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2738
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Consistent accurate prediction looks like knowledge without justified belief
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VIII p.234
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p.234
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2739
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Internalism about justification implies that there is a right to believe something
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VIII p.243
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p.243
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2740
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A reliability theory of knowledge seems to involve truth as correspondence
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X p.311
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p.311
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2741
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The principles of justification have to be a priori
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