1950 | Truth |
§3 | p.28 | 10835 | True sentences says the appropriate descriptive thing on the appropriate demonstrative occasion |
Full Idea: A sentence is said to be true when the historic state of affairs to which it is correlated by the demonstrative conventions (the one to which it 'refers') is of a type with which the sentence used in making it is correlated by the descriptive conventions. | |||
From: J.L. Austin (Truth [1950], §3) | |||
A reaction: This is correspondence by convention rather than correspondence by mapping. Personally I prefer some sort of mapping account, despite all the difficulty and vagueness of specifying what maps onto what. |
n 24 | p.40 | 10836 | Correspondence theorists shouldn't think that a country has just one accurate map |
Full Idea: Correspondence theorists too often talk as one would who held that every map is either accurate or inaccurate; that every country can have but one accurate map. | |||
From: J.L. Austin (Truth [1950], n 24) | |||
A reaction: A well-made point, for those who intuitively hang on to correspondence as not only good common sense, but also some sort of salvation for a realist view of the world which might give us certainty in epistemology. |
1956 | A Plea for Excuses |
p.185 | p.11 | 21960 | Ordinary language is the beginning of philosophy, but there is much more to it |
Full Idea: Ordinary language is not the last word: in principle it can everywhere be supplemented and improved upon and superseded. Only remember, it is the first word. | |||
From: J.L. Austin (A Plea for Excuses [1956], p.185), quoted by A.W. Moore - The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics Intro | |||
A reaction: To claim anything more would be absurd. The point is that this remark comes from the high priest of ordinary language philosophy. |
1962 | Sense and Sensibilia |
p.125-8 | p.71 | 21598 | Austin revealed many meanings for 'vague': rough, ambiguous, general, incomplete... |
Full Idea: Austin's account brought out the variety of features covered by 'vague' in different contexts: roughness, ambiguity, imprecision, lack of detail, generality, inaccuracy, incompleteness. Even 'vague' is vague. | |||
From: report of J.L. Austin (Sense and Sensibilia [1962], p.125-8) by Timothy Williamson - Vagueness 3.1 | |||
A reaction: Some of these sound the same. Maybe Austin distinguishes them. |