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Ideas of A.J. Ayer, by Text

[British, 1910 - 1989, Born London. Taught by Gilbert Ryle. Visited Vienna Circle in early 1930s. Professor at Universities of London and Oxford.]

1936 Language,Truth and Logic
p.15 7919 Humeans rejected the a priori synthetic, and so rejected even Kantian metaphysics [Macdonald,C]
p.123 4729 Empiricism lacked a decent account of the a priori, until Ayer said it was entirely analytic [O'Grady]
p.227 6524 Positivists prefer sense-data to objects, because the vocabulary covers both illusions and perceptions [Robinson,H]
p.227 6523 Positivists regard ontology as either meaningless or stipulated [Robinson,H]
p.227 6525 Logical positivists could never give the sense-data equivalent of 'there is a table next door' [Robinson,H]
Ch.1 p.45 5179 Philosophy deals with the questions that scientists do not wish to handle
Ch.1 p.45 5180 All propositions (especially 'metaphysics') must begin with the senses
Ch.1 p.48 5181 A sentence is factually significant to someone if they know how to verify its proposition
Ch.1 p.51 5183 Only tautologies can be certain; other propositions can only be probable
Ch.1 p.52 5184 Factual propositions imply (in conjunction with a few other premises) possible experiences
Ch.1 p.53 5185 It is further sense-experience which informs us of the mistakes that arise out of sense-experience
Ch.1 p.56 5186 Tautologies and empirical hypotheses form the entire class of significant propositions
Ch.1 p.58 5187 When we ascribe an attribute to a thing, we covertly assert that it exists
Ch.2 p.65 5189 Philosophers should abandon speculation, as philosophy is wholly critical
Ch.2 p.66 5190 The induction problem is to prove generalisations about the future based on the past
Ch.2 p.66 5191 We can't use the uniformity of nature to prove induction, as that would be circular
Ch.2 p.71 5193 Causal and representative theories of perception are wrong as they refer to unobservables
Ch.2 p.75 5195 Critics say analysis can only show the parts, and not their distinctive configuration
Ch.2 p.76 5196 Philosophy is a department of logic
Ch.2 p.77 5197 By changing definitions we could make 'a thing can't be in two places at once' a contradiction
Ch.2 p.77 5198 We could verify 'a thing can't be in two places at once' by destroying one of the things [Ierubino]
Ch.4 p.96 5199 Empiricism, it is said, cannot account for our knowledge of necessary truths
Ch.4 p.98 5200 The main claim of rationalism is that thought is an independent source of knowledge
Ch.4 p.103 5202 Maths and logic are true universally because they are analytic or tautological
Ch.4 p.110 2619 Whether geometry can be applied to reality is an empirical question outside of geometry
Ch.4 p.115 5204 To say that a proposition is true a priori is to say that it is a tautology
Ch.5 p.118 4749 We cannot analyse the concept of 'truth', because it is simply a mark that a sentence is asserted
Ch.6 p.17 23725 Ayer defends the emotivist version of expressivism [Smith,M]
Ch.6 p.141 5205 Moral intuition is worthless if there is no criterion to decide between intuitions
Ch.6 p.142 5206 To say an act is wrong makes no further statement about it, but merely expresses disapproval
Ch.6 p.153 5207 If theism is non-sensical, then so is atheism.
Ch.6 p.154 5208 A person with non-empirical attributes is unintelligible.
Ch.6 p.155 5209 The 'truths' expressed by theists are not literally significant
Ch.7 p.161 5169 My empiricism logically distinguishes analytic and synthetic propositions, and metaphysical verbiage
Ch.7 p.162 5170 Material things are constructions from actual and possible occurrences of sense-contents
Ch.7 p.164 5171 The supposed 'gulf' between mind and matter is based on the senseless concept of 'substances'
Ch.7 p.165 5172 If the self is meaningful, it must be constructed from sense-experiences
Ch.7 p.165 5173 Two experiences belong to one self if their contents belong with one body
Ch.7 p.168 5176 Empiricists can define personal identity as bodily identity, which consists of sense-contents
Ch.7 p.170 5177 Other minds are 'metaphysical' objects, because I can never observe their experiences
Ch.7 p.172 5178 A conscious object is by definition one that behaves in a certain way, so behaviour proves consciousness
1940 The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge
p.303 8824 No one has defended translational phenomenalism since Ayer in 1940 [Kim]
IV.18 p.186 15251 The attribution of necessity to causation is either primitive animism, or confusion with logical necessity
1946 Introduction to 'Language Truth and Logic'
p.10 p.10 5162 Sentences only express propositions if they are meaningful; otherwise they are 'statements'
p.13 p.13 5163 Basic propositions refer to a single experience, are incorrigible, and conclusively verifiable
p.15 p.15 5164 A statement is meaningful if observation statements can be deduced from it
p.17 p.17 5165 Directly verifiable statements must entail at least one new observation statement
p.21 p.21 5166 The principle of verification is not an empirical hypothesis, but a definition
p.26 p.26 5167 The argument from analogy fails, so the best account of other minds is behaviouristic
p.27 p.27 5168 Moral approval and disapproval concerns classes of actions, rather than particular actions
1947 Phenomenalism
§1 p.125 2614 Modern phenomenalism holds that objects are logical constructions out of sense-data
§1 p.131 2615 The concept of sense-data allows us to discuss appearances without worrying about reality
1949 On the analysis of moral judgements
p.246 6973 Moral theories are all meta-ethical, and are neutral as regards actual conduct
p.233 p.233 6968 Some people think there are ethical facts, but of a 'queer' sort
p.237 p.237 6969 Approval of historical or fictional murders gives us leave to imitate them
p.238 p.238 6970 Moral judgements are not expressions, but are elements in a behaviour pattern
p.239 p.239 6971 I would describe intuitions of good as feelings of approval
p.244 p.244 6972 A right attitude is just an attitude one is prepared to stand by
p.247 p.247 6974 Moral judgements cannot be the logical consequence of a moral philosophy
1956 The Problem of Knowledge
2.iii p.45 19459 To say 'I am not thinking' must be false, but it might have been true, so it isn't self-contradictory
2.iii p.48 19460 'I know I exist' has no counterevidence, so it may be meaningless
2.iii p.52 19461 Knowing I exist reveals nothing at all about my nature
2.viii p.7 19463 Induction assumes some uniformity in nature, or that in some respects the future is like the past
2.viii p.72 19462 Induction passes from particular facts to other particulars, or to general laws, non-deductively
2.viii p.74 19464 We only discard a hypothesis after one failure if it appears likely to keep on failing
1963 The Concept of a Person
§I p.84 5661 We identify experiences by their owners, so we can't define owners by their experiences
§I p.87 5662 Maybe induction could never prove the existence of something unobservable
§IV p.113 5664 Consciousness must involve a subject, and only bodies identify subjects
§IV p.114 5665 Memory is the best proposal as what unites bundles of experiences
§IV p.114 5666 Not all exerience can be remembered, as this would produce an infinite regress
§IV p.116 5668 People own conscious states because they are causally related to the identifying body
§IV p.128 5669 Personal identity can't just be relations of experiences, because the body is needed to identify them
1973 The Central Questions of Philosophy
§VI.A p.112 5322 Self-consciousness is not basic, because experiences are not instrinsically marked with ownership
§VI.B p.116 5324 Bodily identity and memory work together to establish personal identity
§VI.B p.118 5325 Is something an 'experience' because it relates to other experiences, or because it relates to a subject?
§VI.B p.118 5326 Qualia must be united by a subject, because they lead to concepts and judgements
§VI.C p.125 5327 Temporal gaps in the consciousness of a spirit could not be bridged by memories
§VI.D p.126 5328 Originally I combined a mentalistic view of introspection with a behaviouristic view of other minds
§VI.D p.130 5329 Why shouldn't we say brain depends on mind? Better explanation!
§VI.E p.132 5330 Physicalism undercuts the other mind problem, by equating experience with 'public' brain events
§VI.E p.134 2613 The theory of other minds has no rival
§VI.E p.134 5331 You can't infer that because you have a hidden birth-mark, everybody else does
9.A.5 p.197 16520 We see properties necessary for a kind (in the definition), but not for an individual
IX.C p.204 2611 It is currently held that quantifying over something implies belief in its existence
IX.C p.208 2610 Talk of propositions is just shorthand for talking about equivalent sentences