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Ideas of José A. Benardete, by Text
[American, fl. 1992, Taught at Syracuse University.]
1989
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Metaphysics: the logical approach
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After
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p.202
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3358
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Metaphysics focuses on Platonism, essentialism, materialism and anti-realism
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Ch. 2
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p.15
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3304
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Why should packed-together particles be a thing (Mt Everest), but not scattered ones?
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Ch. 4
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p.20
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3306
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The clearest a priori knowledge is proving non-existence through contradiction
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Ch. 4
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p.21
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3308
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In the ontological argument a full understanding of the concept of God implies a contradiction in 'There is no God'
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Ch. 6
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p.34
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3309
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If a soldier continues to exist after serving as a soldier, does the wind cease to exist after it ceases to blow?
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Ch. 6
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p.36
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3310
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If slowness is a property of walking rather than the walker, we must allow that events exist
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Ch. 6
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p.36
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12793
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Early pre-Socratics had a mass-noun ontology, which was replaced by count-nouns
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Ch. 7
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p.44
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3312
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There are the 'is' of predication (a function), the 'is' of identity (equals), and the 'is' of existence (quantifier)
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Ch. 8
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p.50
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3314
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Absolutists might accept that to exist is relative, but relative to what? How about relative to itself?
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Ch.11
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p.70
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3323
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Maybe self-identity isn't existence, if Pegasus can be self-identical but non-existent
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Ch.13
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p.89
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3326
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Set theory attempts to reduce the 'is' of predication to mathematics
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Ch.13
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p.90
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3327
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The set of Greeks is included in the set of men, but isn't a member of it
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Ch.13
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p.94
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3329
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Presumably the statements of science are true, but should they be taken literally or not?
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Ch.14
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p.99
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3330
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Negatives, rationals, irrationals and imaginaries are all postulated to solve baffling equations
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Ch.15
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p.109
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3332
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Greeks saw the science of proportion as the link between geometry and arithmetic
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Ch.16
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p.119
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3334
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Rationalists see points as fundamental, but empiricists prefer regions
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Ch.17
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p.124
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3335
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The standard Z-F Intuition version of set theory has about ten agreed axioms [PG]
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Ch.17
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p.130
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3337
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Natural numbers are seen in terms of either their ordinality (Peano), or cardinality (set theory)
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Ch.18
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p.131
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3341
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Logical positivism amounts to no more than 'there is no synthetic a priori'
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Ch.18
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p.135
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3344
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Assertions about existence beyond experience can only be a priori synthetic
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Ch.18
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p.136
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3345
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Appeals to intuition seem to imply synthetic a priori knowledge
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Ch.18
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p.139
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3349
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If we know truths about prime numbers, we seem to have synthetic a priori knowledge of Platonic objects
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Ch.20
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p.146
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3350
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Could a horse lose the essential property of being a horse, and yet continue to exist?
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Ch.21
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p.156
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3351
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One can step into the same river twice, but not into the same water
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Ch.22
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p.172
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3352
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Analytical philosophy analyses separate concepts successfully, but lacks a synoptic vision of the results
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Ch.22
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p.174
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3353
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If there is no causal interaction with transcendent Platonic objects, how can you learn about them?
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