| 2011 | Modal and Anti-Luck Epistemology |
| 1 | p.188 | 19728 | Gettier and lottery cases seem to involve luck, meaning bad connection of beliefs to facts |
| Full Idea: The protagonists in Gettier cases and in lottery cases fail to have knowledge because their beliefs are true simply as a matter of luck, where this means that their beliefs themselves are not appropriately connected to the facts. | |||
| From: Tim Black (Modal and Anti-Luck Epistemology [2011], 1) | |||
| A reaction: The lottery problem is you correctly believe 'my ticket won't win the lottery' even though you don't seem to actually know it won't. Is the Gettier problem simply the problem of lucky knowledge? 'Luck' is a rather vague concept. |
| 1 | p.189 | 19729 | 'Modal epistemology' demands a connection between the belief and facts in possible worlds |
| Full Idea: In 'modal epistemologies' a belief counts as knowledge only if there is a modal connection - a connection not only to the actual world, but also to other non-actual possible worlds - between the belief and the facts of the matter. | |||
| From: Tim Black (Modal and Anti-Luck Epistemology [2011], 1) | |||
| A reaction: [Pritchard 2005 seems to be a source for this] This sounds to me a bit like Nozick's tracking or sensitivity theory. Nozick is, I suppose, diachronic (time must pass, for the tracking), where this theory is synchronic. |