| 2019 | Why Medieval Philosophy Matters |
| 1 | p.33 | 22134 | Thoughts are general, but the world isn't, so how can we think accurately? |
| Full Idea: Our thoughts are full of generalities, but the world contains no generalities. So how can our thoughts accurately represent the world? This is the problem of universals. | |||
| From: Stephen Boulter (Why Medieval Philosophy Matters [2019], 1) | |||
| A reaction: I so love it when someone comes up with a really clear explanation of a problem, and this is a beauty from Stephen Boulter. Only a really clear explanation can motivate philosophical issues for non-philosophers. |
| 1 | p.38 | 22135 | Our concepts can never fully capture reality, but simplification does not falsify |
| Full Idea: While the natural order is richer than our conceptual representations of it, nonetheless our concepts can be adequate to real singulars because simplification is not falsification. | |||
| From: Stephen Boulter (Why Medieval Philosophy Matters [2019], 1) | |||
| A reaction: I don't know if 'simplification' is one of the faculties I am trying to identify. I suspect it is a common factor among most of our intellectual faculties. I love 'simplification is not falsification'. Vagueness isn't falsification either. |
| 2 | p.51 | 22136 | Science begins with sufficient reason, de-animation, and the importance of nature |
| Full Idea: Three assumptions needed for the emergence of science are central to medieval thought: that the natural order is subject to the principle of sufficient reason, that nature is de-animated, and that it is worthy of study. | |||
| From: Stephen Boulter (Why Medieval Philosophy Matters [2019], 2) | |||
| A reaction: A very illuminating and convincing observation. Why did Europe produce major science? The answer is likely to be found in Christianity. |
| 2 | p.55 | 22138 | Science rests on scholastic metaphysics, not on Hume, Kant or Carnap |
| Full Idea: The metaphysical principles that allow the scientist to learn from experience are scholastic, not Humean or Kantian or those of twentieth-century positivism. | |||
| From: Stephen Boulter (Why Medieval Philosophy Matters [2019], 2) | |||
| A reaction: Love this. Most modern philosophers of science would be deeply outraged by this, but I reckon that careful and open-minded interviews with scientists would prove it to be correct. We want to know the essential nature of electrons. |
| 2 | p.58 | 22139 | Experiments don't just observe; they look to see what interventions change the natural order |
| Full Idea: Experiments differ from observational studies in that experiments usually involve intervening in some way in the natural order to see if altering something about that order causes a change in the response of that order. | |||
| From: Stephen Boulter (Why Medieval Philosophy Matters [2019], 2) | |||
| A reaction: Not convinced by this. Lots of experiments isolate a natural process, rather than 'intervening'. Chemists constantly purify substances. Particle accelerators pick out things to accelerate. Does 'intervening' in nature even make sense? |
| 4 | p.104 | 22150 | Logical possibility needs the concepts of the proposition to be adequate |
| Full Idea: One can only be sure that a proposition expresses a genuine logical possibility if one can be sure that one's concepts are adequate to things referred to in the proposition. | |||
| From: Stephen Boulter (Why Medieval Philosophy Matters [2019], 4) | |||
| A reaction: Boulter says this is a logical constraint place on logical possibility by the scholastics which tends to be neglected by modern thinkers, who only worry about whether the proposition implies a contradiction. So we now use thought experiments. |
| 5 | p.122 | 22152 | Aristotelians accept the analytic-synthetic distinction |
| Full Idea: Aristotle and the scholastics accept the analytic/synthetic distinction, but do not take it to be particularly significant. | |||
| From: Stephen Boulter (Why Medieval Philosophy Matters [2019], 5) | |||
| A reaction: I record this because I'm an Aristotelian, and need to know what I'm supposed to think. Luckily, I accept the distinction. |
| 6 | p.144 | 22156 | The facts about human health are the measure of the values in our lives |
| Full Idea: The objective facts relating to human health broadly construed are the facts that measure the moral value of our actions, policies and institutions. | |||
| From: Stephen Boulter (Why Medieval Philosophy Matters [2019], 6) | |||
| A reaction: This is the Aristotelian approach to facts and values, which I thoroughly endorse. To say there is nothing instrinsically wrong with being unhealthy is an absurd attitude. |