| 1995 | Emotivism |
| p.223 | p.223 | 2853 | Emotivists claim to explain moral motivation by basing morality on non-cognitive attitudes |
| p.224 | p.224 | 2852 | Emotivists tend to favour a redundancy theory of truth, making moral judgement meaningless |
| p.224 | p.224 | 2850 | How can emotivists explain someone who recognises morality but is indifferent to it? |
| p.224 | p.224 | 2848 | Two people might agree in their emotional moral attitude while disagreeing in their judgement |
| p.224 | p.224 | 2851 | Emotivists find it hard to analyse assertions of moral principles, rather than actual judgements |
| p.224 | p.224 | 2849 | Emotivism implies relativism about moral meanings, but critics say disagreements are about moral reference |