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Ideas of C.D. Broad, by Text

[British, 1887 - 1971, Professor at Bristol University, and then Professor of Moral Philosophy at Cambridge University.]

1923 Scientific Thought
p.1 The present and past exist, but the future does not
     Full Idea: Not only the present but also the past exist, but the future (so long as it is the future) does not.
     From: report of C.D. Broad (Scientific Thought [1923]) by Michael Dummett - Thought and Reality 1
     A reaction: This is quite appealing, and seems right if you believe that every truth has a truthmaker, and that there are no truths about the future. And yet the whole misery of people dying is that they cease to exist.
10 'Duration' p.393 A thing is simply a long event, linked by qualities, and spatio-temporal unity
     Full Idea: A thing is simply a long event, throughout the course of which there is either qualitative similarity or continuous qualitative change, together with a characteristic spatio-temporal unity.
     From: C.D. Broad (Scientific Thought [1923], 10 'Duration')
     A reaction: At least he is trying to give some sort of principle that links the stages of the event together.
II p.59 We imagine the present as a spotlight, moving across events from past to future
     Full Idea: We imagine presentness moving, like the spot of light from a policeman's bulls eye traversing the fronts of houses in a street. What is illuminated is present, what was illuminated is past, and what is not yet illuminated is the future.
     From: C.D. Broad (Scientific Thought [1923], II)
     A reaction: This is the 'moving spotlight' compromise theory, which retains the B-series eternal sequence of ordered events, but adds the A-series privileged present moment. Le Poidevin says Broad represents time twice over.
II p.66 We could say present and past exist, but not future, so that each event adds to the total history
     Full Idea: One theory accepts the reality of the present and the past, but holds that the future is simply nothing at all. Nothing has happened to the present by becoming past except that fresh slices of existence have been added to the total history of the world.
     From: C.D. Broad (Scientific Thought [1923], II)
     A reaction: This is now known as Broad's 'Growing Block' view of time. It is tempting to say that neither past nor future exist, but it seems undeniable that statements about the past can be wholly true, unlike those about the future.
p.54 p.31 If short-lived happenings like car crashes are 'events', why not long-lived events like Dover Cliffs?
     Full Idea: We call a lightning flash or a motor accident an event, but refuse to apply this to the cliffs of Dover. ...But quantitative differences (of time) give no good grounds for calling one bit of history an event, and refusing the name to another bit.
     From: C.D. Broad (Scientific Thought [1923], p.54), quoted by David Wiggins - Sameness and Substance Renewed 2.3 n13
     A reaction: Wiggins calls this proposal a 'terrible absurdity', but it seems to me to demand attention. There is a case to be made for a 'process' to be the fundamental category of our ontology, with stable physical objects seen in that light.
1925 Mind and Its Place in Nature
p.7 Broad rejects the inferential component of the representative theory
     Full Idea: Broad, one of the most important modern defenders of the representative theory of perception, explicitly rejects the inferential component of the theory.
     From: report of C.D. Broad (Mind and Its Place in Nature [1925]) by Barry Maund - Perception Ch.1
     A reaction: Since the supposed inferences happen much too quickly to be conscious, it is hard to see how we could distinguish an inference from an interpretation mechanism. Personally I interpret things long before the question of truth arises.
1933 Examination of McTaggart's Philosophy
I.349-50 p.186 Surely the past phases of a thing are not parts of the thing?
     Full Idea: It is plainly contrary to common sense to say that the phases in the history of a thing are parts of the thing.
     From: C.D. Broad (Examination of McTaggart's Philosophy [1933], I.349-50), quoted by Richard Cartwright - Scattered Objects n18
     A reaction: Nicely expressed! To suggest that me ten years ago is a mere part of some huge me, or that you are only talking to a part of me now, is a very long way indeed from normal usage.