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Ideas of Tyler Burge, by Text
[American, b.1946, At the University of California, Los Angeles.]
1984
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Frege on Extensions from Concepts
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p.68
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3115
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Are meaning and expressed concept the same thing? [Segal]
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1986
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Intellectual Norms and Foundations of Mind
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p.5
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14349
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If there are no finks or antidotes at the fundamental level, the laws can't be ceteris paribus [Corry]
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1992
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Frege on Knowing the Third Realm
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p.316
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p.316
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13479
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Given that thinking aims at truth, logic gives universal rules for how to do it
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1993
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Content Preservation
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p.20
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9382
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Subjects may be unaware of their epistemic 'entitlements', unlike their 'justifications'
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1998
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Frege on Knowing the Foundations
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3
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p.345
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17622
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We come to believe mathematical propositions via their grounding in the structure
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2000
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Frege on Apriority (with ps)
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1
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p.363
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16892
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Is apriority predicated mainly of truths and proofs, or of human cognition?
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4
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p.384
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16901
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The equivalent algebra model of geometry loses some essential spatial meaning
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5
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p.385
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16902
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Peano arithmetic requires grasping 0 as a primitive number
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IV
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p.38
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9159
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You can't simply convert geometry into algebra, as some spatial content is lost
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2005
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Philosophy of Mind: 1950-2000
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p.453
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p.453
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8126
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Anti-individualism says the environment is involved in the individuation of some mental states
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p.454
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p.454
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8127
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Broad concepts suggest an extension of the mind into the environment (less computer-like)
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p.457
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p.457
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8129
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Anti-individualism may be incompatible with some sorts of self-knowledge
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p.460
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p.460
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8131
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Some qualities of experience, like blurred vision, have no function at all
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p.462
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p.462
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8132
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We now have a much more sophisticated understanding of logical form in language
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