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Ideas of JP Burgess / G Rosen, by Text

[American, fl. 1997, Both professors at Princeton University.]

1997	A Subject with No Object

I.A.1.a

p.14

9918

Abstract/concrete is a distinction of kind, not degree

I.A.1.b

p.17

9919

The old debate classified representations as abstract, not entities

I.A.2.c

p.43

9921

'True' is only occasionally useful, as in 'everything Fermat believed was true'

II.A.1

p.102

9922

If space is really just a force-field, then it is a physical entity

II.B.3.a

p.137

9923

We should talk about possible existence, rather than actual existence, of numbers

II.B.3.b

p.141

9924

Modal logic gives an account of metalogical possibility, not metaphysical possibility

II.C.0

p.147

9925

Structuralism and nominalism are normally rivals, but might work together

II.C.1.a

p.150

9926

A relation is either a set of sets of sets, or a set of sets

II.C.1.b

p.153

9927

Mathematics has ascended to higher and higher levels of abstraction

II.C.1.b

p.156

9928

Mereology implies that acceptance of entities entails acceptance of conglomerates

III.A.1.d

p.179

9929

Much of what science says about concrete entities is 'abstraction-laden'

III.B.2.c

p.199

9930

Abstraction is on a scale, of sets, to attributes, to type-formulas, to token-formulas

III.C.1.b

p.223

9932

The paradoxes no longer seem crucial in critiques of set theory

III.C.1.b

p.224

9933

The paradoxes are only a problem for Frege; Cantor didn't assume every condition determines a set

III.C.2.a

p.228

9934

Number words became nouns around the time of Plato