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Ideas of JP Burgess / G Rosen, by Text
[American, fl. 1997, Both professors at Princeton University.]
1997
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A Subject with No Object
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I.A.1.a
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p.14
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9918
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Abstract/concrete is a distinction of kind, not degree
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I.A.1.b
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p.17
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9919
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The old debate classified representations as abstract, not entities
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I.A.2.c
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p.43
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9921
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'True' is only occasionally useful, as in 'everything Fermat believed was true'
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II.A.1
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p.102
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9922
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If space is really just a force-field, then it is a physical entity
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II.B.3.a
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p.137
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9923
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We should talk about possible existence, rather than actual existence, of numbers
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II.B.3.b
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p.141
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9924
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Modal logic gives an account of metalogical possibility, not metaphysical possibility
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II.C.0
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p.147
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9925
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Structuralism and nominalism are normally rivals, but might work together
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II.C.1.a
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p.150
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9926
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A relation is either a set of sets of sets, or a set of sets
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II.C.1.b
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p.153
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9927
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Mathematics has ascended to higher and higher levels of abstraction
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II.C.1.b
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p.156
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9928
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Mereology implies that acceptance of entities entails acceptance of conglomerates
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III.A.1.d
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p.179
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9929
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Much of what science says about concrete entities is 'abstraction-laden'
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III.B.2.c
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p.199
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9930
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Abstraction is on a scale, of sets, to attributes, to type-formulas, to token-formulas
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III.C.1.b
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p.223
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9932
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The paradoxes no longer seem crucial in critiques of set theory
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III.C.1.b
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p.224
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9933
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The paradoxes are only a problem for Frege; Cantor didn't assume every condition determines a set
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III.C.2.a
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p.228
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9934
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Number words became nouns around the time of Plato
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