green numbers give full details.
|
back to list of philosophers
|
expand these ideas
Ideas of Keith Campbell, by Text
[Australian, fl. 1990, At Sydney University.]
1981
|
The Metaphysic of Abstract Particulars
|
§1
|
p.126
|
8513
|
Two red cloths are separate instances of redness, because you can dye one of them blue
|
§1
|
p.126
|
8512
|
Abstractions come before the mind by concentrating on a part of what is presented
|
§1
|
p.127
|
8514
|
Red could only recur in a variety of objects if it was many, which makes them particulars
|
§2
|
p.128
|
8515
|
Tropes are basic particulars, so concrete particulars are collections of co-located tropes
|
§3
|
p.129
|
8518
|
Events are trope-sequences, in which tropes replace one another
|
§3
|
p.129
|
8516
|
Davidson can't explain causation entirely by events, because conditions are also involved
|
§3
|
p.129
|
8517
|
Causal conditions are particular abstract instances of properties, which makes them tropes
|
§5
|
p.132
|
8519
|
Bundles must be unique, so the Identity of Indiscernibles is a necessity - which it isn't!
|
§5
|
p.132
|
4033
|
Two pure spheres in non-absolute space are identical but indiscernible
|
§6
|
p.133
|
8521
|
Nominalism has the problem that without humans nothing would resemble anything else
|
§6
|
p.134
|
8522
|
Tropes solve the Companionship Difficulty, since the resemblance is only between abstract particulars
|
§6
|
p.135
|
8523
|
Tropes solve the Imperfect Community problem, as they can only resemble in one respect
|
§7
|
p.136
|
8524
|
Trope theory makes space central to reality, as tropes must have a shape and size
|
§8
|
p.138
|
8525
|
Relations need terms, so they must be second-order entities based on first-order tropes
|