| 2012 | Philosophy without Intuitions |
| 04.1 | p.64 | 20182 | The word 'intuitive' often plays not role at all in arguments, and can be removed |
| Full Idea: Careful study of uses of 'intuitive' will reveal that it often plays no significant argumentative role, and that removal will improve overall argumentative transparency. | |||
| From: Herman Cappelen (Philosophy without Intuitions [2012], 04.1) | |||
| A reaction: This is a key part of Cappelen's argument that 'intuition' is a rather empty concept, and that philosophers do not really rely on it. In effect, he is consigning it to mere rhetoric. He gives lots of examples in support. |
| 11.3 | p.225 | 20183 | So-called 'though experiments' are just philosophers observing features of the world |
| Full Idea: What are called 'thought experiments' in philosophy are in effect just philosophers drawing our attention to interesting features of the world. | |||
| From: Herman Cappelen (Philosophy without Intuitions [2012], 11.3) | |||
| A reaction: Thought experiments are said to rely (perhaps excessively) on 'intuition', but Cappelen says intuition is irrelevant, because we are merely making judgements. It think they ARE experiments, if one feature varies while the rest is held steady. |