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Ideas of Albert Casullo, by Text

[American, fl. 1992, At the University of Nebraska, Lincoln.]

1992 A priori/A posteriori
p.1 p.1 Maybe imagination is the source of a priori justification
     Full Idea: Some maintain that experiments in imagination are the source of a priori justification.
     From: Albert Casullo (A priori/A posteriori [1992], p.1)
     A reaction: What else could assessments of possibility and necessity be based on except imagination?
2002 A Priori Knowledge
2 p.98 Epistemic a priori conditions concern either the source, defeasibility or strength
     Full Idea: There are three suggested epistemic conditions on a priori knowledge: the first regards the source of justification, the second regards the defeasibility of justification, and the third appeals to the strength of justification.
     From: Albert Casullo (A Priori Knowledge [2002], 2)
     A reaction: [compressed] He says these are all inspired by Kant. The non-epistemic suggested condition involve necessity or analyticity. The source would have to be entirely mental; the defeasibly could not be experiential; the strength would be certainty.
2.1 p.99 Analysis of the a priori by necessity or analyticity addresses the proposition, not the justification
     Full Idea: There is reason to view non-epistemic analyses of a priori knowledge (in terms of necessity or analyticity) with suspicion. The a priori concerns justification. Analysis by necessity or analyticity concerns the proposition rather than the justification.
     From: Albert Casullo (A Priori Knowledge [2002], 2.1)
     A reaction: [compressed] The fact that the a priori is entirely a mode of justification, rather than a type of truth, is the modern view, influenced by Kripke. Given that assumption, this is a good objection.
3.2 p.112 Maybe modal sentences cannot be true or false
     Full Idea: Some people claim that modal sentences do not express truths or falsehoods.
     From: Albert Casullo (A Priori Knowledge [2002], 3.2)
     A reaction: I can only imagine this coming from a narrow hardline empiricist. It seems to me obvious that we make true or false statements about what is possible or impossible.
3.2 p.113 If the necessary is a priori, so is the contingent, because the same evidence is involved
     Full Idea: If one can only know a priori that a proposition is necessary, then one can know only a priori that a proposition is contingent. The evidence relevant to determining the latter is the same as that relevant to determining the former.
     From: Albert Casullo (A Priori Knowledge [2002], 3.2)
     A reaction: This seems a telling point, but I suppose it is obvious. If you see that the cat is on the mat, nothing in the situation tells you whether this is contingent or necessary. We assume it is contingent, but that may be an a priori assumption.
5 p.135 The main claim of defenders of the a priori is that some justifications are non-experiential
     Full Idea: The leading claim of proponents of the a priori is that sources of justification are of two significantly different types: experiential and nonexperiential. Initially this difference is marked at the phenomenological level.
     From: Albert Casullo (A Priori Knowledge [2002], 5)
     A reaction: He cites Plantinga and Bealer for the phenomenological starting point (that some knowledge just seems rationally obvious, certain, and perhaps necessary).
n 40 p.140 'Overriding' defeaters rule it out, and 'undermining' defeaters weaken in
     Full Idea: A justified belief that a proposition is not true is an 'overriding' defeater, ...and the belief that a justification is inadequate or defective is an 'undermining' defeater.
     From: Albert Casullo (A Priori Knowledge [2002], n 40)
     A reaction: Sounds more like a sliding scale than a binary option. Quite useful, though.