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Ideas of Roderick Chisholm, by Text

[American, 1916 - 1999, Taught at Brown University, Long Island.]

1964 Human Freedom and the Self
p.93 If free will miraculously interrupts causation, animals might do that; why would we want to do it?
p.24 p.24 Responsibility seems to conflict with events being either caused or not caused
p.25 p.25 Desires may rule us, but are we responsible for our desires?
p.28 p.28 Causation among objects relates either events or states
p.28 p.28 If actions are not caused by other events, and are not causeless, they must be caused by the person
p.32 p.32 For Hobbes (but not for Kant) a person's actions can be deduced from their desires and beliefs
1964 The Myth of the Given
12 p.118 The 'doctrine of the given' is correct; some beliefs or statements are self-justifying
1966 Freedom and Action
p.83 If a desire leads to a satisfactory result by an odd route, the causal theory looks wrong
p.20 p.65 There has to be a brain event which is not caused by another event, but by the agent
1966 Theory of Knowledge (2nd ed 1977)
p.360 We have a basic epistemic duty to believe truth and avoid error
1967 Identity through Possible Worlds
p.81-2 p.81 Could possible Adams gradually transform into Noah, and vice versa?
p.85 p.85 If there are essential properties, how do you find out what they are?
1976 Person and Object
Intro 1 p.15 Many philosophers aim to understand metaphysics by studying ourselves
Intro 2 p.17 I use variables to show that each item remains the same entity throughout
Intro 4 p.20 Bad theories of the self see it as abstract, or as a bundle, or as a process
1.4 p.28 The property of being identical with me is an individual concept
1.4 p.28 If some dogs are brown, that entails the properties of 'being brown' and 'being canine'
1.4 p.29 A traditional individual essence includes all of a thing's necessary characteristics
1.4 p.29 Being the tallest man is an 'individual concept', but not a haecceity
1.4 p.29 A haecceity is a property had necessarily, and strictly confined to one entity
1.4 p.30 A state of affairs pertains to a thing if it implies that it has some property
1.5 p.31 Maybe we can only individuate things by relating them to ourselves
1.5 p.33 I am picked out uniquely by my individual essence, which is 'being identical with myself'
1.5 p.36 People use 'I' to refer to themselves, with the meaning of their own individual essence
1.6 p.38 A peach is sweet and fuzzy, but it doesn't 'have' those qualities
1.8 p.47 Sartre says the ego is 'opaque'; I prefer to say that it is 'transparent'
1.8 p.49 'I feel depressed' is more like 'he runs slowly' than like 'he has a red book'
1.8 p.50 So called 'sense-data' are best seen as 'modifications' of the person experiencing them
1.8 p.50 If we can say a man senses 'redly', why not also 'rectangularly'?
1.8 p.51 Do sense-data have structure, location, weight, and constituting matter?
2.2 p.58 A 'law of nature' is just something which is physically necessary
2.2 p.59 Determinism claims that every event has a sufficient causal pre-condition
2.3 p.60 The concept of physical necessity is basic to both causation, and to the concept of nature
2.5 p.69 Some propose a distinct 'agent causation', as well as 'event causation'
2.6 p.73 There are mere omissions (through ignorance, perhaps), and people can 'commit an omission'
3.2 p.92 There is 'loose' identity between things if their properties, or truths about them, might differ
3.4 p.100 Some properties, such as 'being a widow', can be seen as 'rooted outside the time they are had'
4.1 p.114 I propose that events and propositions are two types of states of affairs
4.2 p.117 The mark of a state of affairs is that it is capable of being accepted
4.2 p.119 Some properties can never be had, like being a round square
4.4 p.124 Explanations have states of affairs as their objects
4.6 p.127 Events are states of affairs that occur at certain places and times
p.149 p.189 If x is ever part of y, then y is necessarily such that x is part of y at any time that y exists
p.90 p.188 Intermittence is seen in a toy fort, which is dismantled then rebuilt with the same bricks
1996 A Realistic Theory of Categories
p.3 p.14 Chisholm divides things into contingent and necessary, and then individuals, states and non-states