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Ideas of M. Tullius Cicero, by Text

[Roman, 106 - 43 BCE, Born at Arpinum. Studied in Rhodes. Taught by Philo of Larissa. Lawyer and orator. Murdered by supporters of Julius Caesar.]

46BCE On Divination ('De divinatione')
1.127 p.338 Whoever knows future causes knows everything that will be
     Full Idea: Whoever grasps the causes of future things must necessarily grasp all that will be.
     From: M. Tullius Cicero (On Divination ('De divinatione') [c.46 BCE], 1.127)
     A reaction: Laplace stated this idea in terms of Newtonian physics (Idea 3441), but the key idea is stated more simply and clearly here. God can know the future in this way, without actually seeing it happen now. I can't think why it should not be true.
45BCE Academica
I.viii.32 p.443 Dialectic is speech cast in the form of logical argument
     Full Idea: Dialectic is speech cast in the form of logical argument.
     From: M. Tullius Cicero (Academica [c.45 BCE], I.viii.32)
II.40 p.41 Every true presentation can have a false one of the same quality
     Full Idea: [The sceptical Academics say] what is false cannot be perceived, but every true presentation is such that there can be a false presentation of the same quality.
     From: M. Tullius Cicero (Academica [c.45 BCE], II.40)
     A reaction: It was the stoics who focused the discussion on 'presentations'. This claim is purely theoretical; no one has ever experienced a false presentation of talking to a family member that was as vivid as the real thing.
II.vii.19 p.493 If we have complete healthy senses, what more could the gods give us?
     Full Idea: If human nature were interrogated by some god as to whether it was content with its own senses in a sound and undamaged state or demanded something better, I cannot see what more it could ask for.
     From: M. Tullius Cicero (Academica [c.45 BCE], II.vii.19)
II.vii.22 p.497 How can there be a memory of what is false?
     Full Idea: How can there possibly be a memory of what is false?
     From: M. Tullius Cicero (Academica [c.45 BCE], II.vii.22)
II.xlvi.140 p.649 Virtues must be very detached, to avoid being motivated by pleasure
     Full Idea: None of the virtues can exist unless they are disinterested, for virtue driven to duty by pleasure as a sort of pay is not virtue at all but a deceptive sham and pretence of virtue.
     From: M. Tullius Cicero (Academica [c.45 BCE], II.xlvi.140)
II.xlviii.147 p.657 There cannot be more than one truth
     Full Idea: There cannot be more than one truth.
     From: M. Tullius Cicero (Academica [c.45 BCE], II.xlviii.147)
II.xxix.95 p.587 Dialectic assumes that all statements are either true or false, but self-referential paradoxes are a big problem
     Full Idea: It is a fundamental principle of dialectic that every statement is either true or false. So is this a true proposition or a false one: "If you say that you are lying and say it truly, you lie"?
     From: M. Tullius Cicero (Academica [c.45 BCE], II.xxix.95)
44BCE On Duties ('De Officiis')
1.110 p.424 The essence of propriety is consistency
     Full Idea: The whole essence of propriety is quite certainly consistency.
     From: M. Tullius Cicero (On Duties ('De Officiis') [c.44 BCE], 1.110)
     A reaction: This seems to me the key intuition on which Kant built his deontological ethical theory. However, opponents say the consistency requires principles, and these are the enemies of truly good human behaviour, which involves Aristotle's 'particulars'.
1.11-20 p.212 Cicero sees wisdom in terms of knowledge, but earlier Stoics saw it as moral
     Full Idea: Cicero (drawing on Panaetius) treats wisdom as if its province were primarily a disinterested pursuit of knowledge. But earlier Stoics gave purely moral definitions of wisdom.
     From: report of M. Tullius Cicero (On Duties ('De Officiis') [c.44 BCE], 1.11-20) by A.A. Long - Hellenistic Philosophy 5
     A reaction: I would have thought that after long discussion most ancient (and even modern) philosophers would conclude that it is both. The 'intellectualism' of Socrates hovers in the background, implying that healthy knowledge produces virtue.
1.117 p.163 Unfortunately we choose a way of life before we are old enough to think clearly
     Full Idea: At the beginning of adolescence when our deliberative capacities are weak we decide on the way of life that we find attractive. So one gets entangled in a definite manner and pattern of life before one is able to judge which one is best.
     From: M. Tullius Cicero (On Duties ('De Officiis') [c.44 BCE], 1.117)
     A reaction: Hence it is important to have lots of means for bailing out of education courses, jobs, and even marriage. At least university postpones the key life choices till the early twenties.
44BCE On Fate ('De fato')
02.03 p.195 Oratory and philosophy are closely allied; orators borrow from philosophy, and ornament it
     Full Idea: There is a close alliance between the orator and the philosophical system of which I am a follower, since the orator borrows subtlely from the Academy, and repays the loan by giving to it a copious and flowing style and rhetorical ornament.
     From: M. Tullius Cicero (On Fate ('De fato') [c.44 BCE], 02.03)
     A reaction: It is a misundertanding to think that rhetoric and philosophy are seen as in necessary opposition. Philosophers just seemed to think that oratory works a lot better if it is truthful.
16.38 p.235 How can the not-true fail to be false, or the not-false fail to be true?
     Full Idea: How can something that is not true not be false, or how can something that is not false not be true?
     From: M. Tullius Cicero (On Fate ('De fato') [c.44 BCE], 16.38)
     A reaction: We must at least distinguish between whether the contrary thing is not actually true, or whether we are prepared to assert that it is not true. The disjunction may seem to be a false dichotomy. 'He isn't good' may not entail 'he is evil'.
17.40 p.237 If desire is not in our power then neither are choices, so we should not be praised or punished
     Full Idea: If the cause of desire is not situated within us, even desire itself is also not in our power. ...It follows that neither assent nor action is in our power. Hence there is no justice in either praise or blame, either honours or punishments.
     From: M. Tullius Cicero (On Fate ('De fato') [c.44 BCE], 17.40)
     A reaction: This is the view of 'old philosophers', but I'm unsure which ones. Cicero spurns this view. It is obvious that the causes of our desires are largely out of our control. Responsibility seems to concern what we do about our desires.
44BCE On the Nature of the Gods ('De natura deorum')
2.147 p.76 Eloquence educates, exhorts, comforts, distracts and unites us, and raises us from savagery
     Full Idea: How wonderful is the power of eloquence! It enables us to learn and to teach. We use it to exhort and persuade, to comfort the unfortunate, to distract the timid and calm the passionate. It unites us in law and society, and raises us from savagery.
     From: M. Tullius Cicero (On the Nature of the Gods ('De natura deorum') [c.44 BCE], 2.147)
     A reaction: [compressed] Cicero would have been well aware of the doubts about rhetoric felt by Socrates (and possibly Plato). Cicero was probably the greatest Roman orator.
I.114 p.116 Why shouldn't the gods fear their own destruction?
     Full Idea: Why should the gods not be apprehensive of their own possible dissolution?
     From: M. Tullius Cicero (On the Nature of the Gods ('De natura deorum') [c.44 BCE], I.114)
I.24 p.80 Why would mind mix with matter if it didn't need it?
     Full Idea: If the gods have no need of the sensible world, why mix up mind with water and water with mind, if mind can exist by itself without any need of matter?
     From: M. Tullius Cicero (On the Nature of the Gods ('De natura deorum') [c.44 BCE], I.24)
     A reaction: This question migrates into our puzzles about why a separate mental substance would be produced by evolution. If it is device physical systems use to promote themselves, mental substance is reduced to an inferior and dependent role.
I.3 p.70 I wonder whether loss of reverence for the gods would mean the end of all virtue
     Full Idea: I do not know whether, if our reverence for the gods were lost, we should not also see the end of good faith, of human brotherhood, and even of justice itself, which is the keystone of all the virtues.
     From: M. Tullius Cicero (On the Nature of the Gods ('De natura deorum') [c.44 BCE], I.3)
I.44 p.88 It seems clear to me that we have an innate idea of the divine
     Full Idea: Let us take it as agreed that we have a preconception or "an innate idea" (as I have called it) or a prior knowledge of the divine.
     From: M. Tullius Cicero (On the Nature of the Gods ('De natura deorum') [c.44 BCE], I.44)
I.48 p.89 The gods are happy, so virtuous, so rational, so must have human shape
     Full Idea: We agree the gods are happy, and no happiness is possible without virtue: there is no virtue without reason: and reason is associated only with the human form: then it must follow that the gods themselves have human shape.
     From: M. Tullius Cicero (On the Nature of the Gods ('De natura deorum') [c.44 BCE], I.48)
I.62 p.94 Many primitive people know nothing of the gods
     Full Idea: There must be many wild and primitive peoples who have no idea of the gods at all.
     From: M. Tullius Cicero (On the Nature of the Gods ('De natura deorum') [c.44 BCE], I.62)
I.80 p.102 Either the gods are identical, or one is more beautiful than another
     Full Idea: Are the gods all exactly the same? If not, then one must be more beautiful than another.
     From: M. Tullius Cicero (On the Nature of the Gods ('De natura deorum') [c.44 BCE], I.80)
I.86 p.104 We have the death penalty, but still have thousands of robbers
     Full Idea: We have robbers by the thousand, although they have the penalty of death before their eyes.
     From: M. Tullius Cicero (On the Nature of the Gods ('De natura deorum') [c.44 BCE], I.86)
I.88 p.105 Why believe in gods if you have never seen them?
     Full Idea: Did you ever actually see a god? Then why do you believe that gods exist?
     From: M. Tullius Cicero (On the Nature of the Gods ('De natura deorum') [c.44 BCE], I.88)
II.15 p.129 It is obvious from order that someone is in charge, as when we visit a gymnasium
     Full Idea: If one comes into a gymnasium and sees everything properly arranged and carried on in order, one does not imagine these arrangements to be accidental, but infers that there is someone in command whose orders are obeyed.
     From: M. Tullius Cicero (On the Nature of the Gods ('De natura deorum') [c.44 BCE], II.15)
II.55 p.145 If a person cannot feel the power of God when looking at the stars, they are probably incapable of feeling
     Full Idea: If any man cannot feel the power of God when he looks upon the stars, then I doubt whether he is capable of any feeling at all.
     From: M. Tullius Cicero (On the Nature of the Gods ('De natura deorum') [c.44 BCE], II.55)
II.77 p.155 God doesn't obey the laws of nature; they are subject to the law of God
     Full Idea: God is not subject to obey the laws of nature. It is nature that is subject to the laws of God.
     From: M. Tullius Cicero (On the Nature of the Gods ('De natura deorum') [c.44 BCE], II.77)
II.81 p.156 Some regard nature simply as an irrational force that imparts movement
     Full Idea: Some regard nature as an irrational force which merely imparts a mechanical motion to material bodies.
     From: M. Tullius Cicero (On the Nature of the Gods ('De natura deorum') [c.44 BCE], II.81)
II.86 p.158 If the parts of the universe are subject to the law of nature, the whole universe must also be subject to it
     Full Idea: If the parts of the universe are subject to the law of nature, then the universe itself must be subject to this law.
     From: M. Tullius Cicero (On the Nature of the Gods ('De natura deorum') [c.44 BCE], II.86)
II.88 p.159 If the barbarians of Britain saw a complex machine, they would be baffled, but would know it was designed
     Full Idea: If someone were to take the celestial globe of Posidonius and show it to the people of Britain, would a single one of those barbarians fail to see that it was the product of a conscious intelligence?
     From: M. Tullius Cicero (On the Nature of the Gods ('De natura deorum') [c.44 BCE], II.88)
II.93 p.161 Chance is no more likely to create the world than spilling lots of letters is likely to create a famous poem
     Full Idea: If someone thinks chance made the world, he should also think that if an infinite number of the letters of the alphabet were shaken together and poured out on the ground it would be possible for them to spell out the whole 'Annals' of Ennius.
     From: M. Tullius Cicero (On the Nature of the Gods ('De natura deorum') [c.44 BCE], II.93)
III.24 p.202 If everything with regular movement and order is divine, then recurrent illnesses must be divine
     Full Idea: Are we to find a divinity in every regular movement and in everything which happens in a constant order? If so, we shall have to say that tertian and quartan agues are divine because their course and recurrence is absolutely uniform.
     From: M. Tullius Cicero (On the Nature of the Gods ('De natura deorum') [c.44 BCE], III.24)
III.76 p.226 The gods blame men for having vices, but they could have given us enough reason to avoid them
     Full Idea: You gods say that the fault lies in the vices of mankind. But you could have endowed men with reason in a form which would exclude all vice and crime.
     From: M. Tullius Cicero (On the Nature of the Gods ('De natura deorum') [c.44 BCE], III.76)
III.80 p.228 The lists of good men who have suffered and bad men who have prospered are endless
     Full Idea: Time would fail me if I tried to list all the good men for whom things have turned out badly. So it would if I tried to mention all the wicked who have prospered.
     From: M. Tullius Cicero (On the Nature of the Gods ('De natura deorum') [c.44 BCE], III.80)
44BCE Tusculan Disputations
I.ix.17-19 p.23 The soul is the heart, or blood in the heart, or part of the brain, of something living in heart or brain, or breath
     Full Idea: Some think the soul is the heart; Empedocles holds that the soul is blood in the heart; others said one part of the brain claimed the primacy of soul; others say the heart or brain are habitations of the soul; while others identify soul and breath.
     From: M. Tullius Cicero (Tusculan Disputations [c.44 BCE], I.ix.17-19)
     A reaction: A nice survey of views. Note that many of them identify the psuché/anima with physical parts of the body; only the fourth option seems to be dualist. This is despite the contemptuous response to Democritus' atomist theory of soul.
I.xx.47 p.57 How can one mind perceive so many dissimilar sensations?
     Full Idea: Why is it that, using the same mind, we have perception of things so utterly unlike as colour, taste, heat, smell and sound?
     From: M. Tullius Cicero (Tusculan Disputations [c.44 BCE], I.xx.47)
     A reaction: This leaves us with the 'binding problem', of how the dissimilar sensations are pulled together into one field of experience. It is a nice simple objection, though, to anyone who simplistically claims that the mind is self-evidently unified.
I.xxix.71 p.83 The soul has a single nature, so it cannot be divided, and hence it cannot perish
     Full Idea: In souls there is no mingling of ingredients, nothing of two-fold nature, so it is impossible for the soul to be divided; impossible, therefore, for it to perish either; for perishing is like the separation of parts which were maintained in union.
     From: M. Tullius Cicero (Tusculan Disputations [c.44 BCE], I.xxix.71)
     A reaction: Cicero knows he is pushing his luck in asserting that perishing is a sort of division. Why can't something be there one moment and gone the next? He appears to be in close agreement with Descartes about being a 'thinking thing'.
I.xxvi.66 p.77 Souls contain no properties of elements, and elements contain no properties of souls
     Full Idea: No beginnings of souls can be found on earth; there is no combination in souls that could be born from earth, nothing that partakes of moist or airy or fiery; for in those elements there is nothing to possess the power of memory, thought, or reflection.
     From: M. Tullius Cicero (Tusculan Disputations [c.44 BCE], I.xxvi.66)
     A reaction: Interesting, but I think magnetism is an instructive analogy, which has weird properties which we never perceive in elements (though it is there, buried deep - suggesting panpsychism). Cicero would be disconcerted to find that fire isn't an element.
I.xxvii p.79 Like the eye, the soul has no power to see itself, but sees other things
     Full Idea: The soul has not the power of itself to see itself, but, like the eye, the soul, though it does not see itself, yet discerns other things.
     From: M. Tullius Cicero (Tusculan Disputations [c.44 BCE], I.xxvii)
     A reaction: The soul is a complex item which contributes many layers of interpretation to what it sees, so there is scope for parts of the soul seeing other parts. Somewhere in the middle Cicero seems to be right - there is an elusive something we can't get at.
IV.xxvi.56 p.391 We should not share the distress of others, but simply try to relieve it
     Full Idea: We ought not to share distresses ourselves for the sake of others, but we ought to relieve others of their distress if we can.
     From: M. Tullius Cicero (Tusculan Disputations [c.44 BCE], IV.xxvi.56)
     A reaction: This strikes me as a sensible and balanced attitude. Some people, particularly in a Christian culture, urge that feeling strong and painful compassion for others is an intrinsic good, but the commonsense view is that that just increases human suffering.
IV.xxxviii.84 p.423 Philosophy is the collection of rational arguments
     Full Idea: Philosophy consists in the collection of rational arguments. [Philosophia ex rationum collatione constet]
     From: M. Tullius Cicero (Tusculan Disputations [c.44 BCE], IV.xxxviii.84)
     A reaction: A nice epigraph for this database. Philosophy is, I trust, a little more than that, because you don't just hide them away in a drawer. But if you arrange them nicely in a museum (a website, for example), not a lot more can be done.
V.xxviii p.509 A wise man has integrity, firmness of will, nobility, consistency, sobriety, patience
     Full Idea: The wise man does nothing of which he can repent, nothing against his will, does everything nobly, consistently, soberly, rightly, not looking forward to anything as bound to come, is not astonished at any novel occurrence, abides by his own decisions.
     From: M. Tullius Cicero (Tusculan Disputations [c.44 BCE], V.xxviii)
     A reaction: Notice that the wise man never exhibits weakness of will (an Aristotelian virtue), and is consistent (as Kant proposed), and is patient (as the Stoics proposed). But Cicero doesn't think he should busy himself maximising happiness.
V.xxxi.88 p.517 All men except philosophers fear poverty
     Full Idea: All men are afraid of poverty, but not a single philosopher is so.
     From: M. Tullius Cicero (Tusculan Disputations [c.44 BCE], V.xxxi.88)
     A reaction: Not a thought which is encountered very often in modern philosophy journals. If a person is to be 'philosophical' in the way they live, calm endurance of the vicissitudes and hardships of life has to be a key prerequisite.
V.xxxvi.104 p.531 If one despises illiterate mechanics individually, they are not worth more collectively
     Full Idea: Can anything be more foolish than to suppose that those, whom individually one despises as illiterate mechanics, are worth anything collectively?
     From: M. Tullius Cicero (Tusculan Disputations [c.44 BCE], V.xxxvi.104)
     A reaction: Aristotle disagrees (Idea 2823). In 1906 a huge number of people guessed the weight of a cow at a fair, and the average was within one pound of the truth. In our world the healthy workings of the group are warped by the mass media.