| 1991 | The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap |
| p.196 | 18279 | Relativity is as absolutist about space-time as Newton was about space | |
| Full Idea: If the theory of relativity might be thought to support an idealist construal of space and time, it is no less absolutistic about space-time than Newton's theory was about space. | |||
| From: J. Alberto Coffa (The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap [1991]) | |||
| A reaction: [He cites Minkowski, Weyl and Cartan for this conclusion] Coffa is clearly a bit cross about philosophers who draw naive idealist and relativist conclusions from relativity. |
| 2 Intro | p.22 | 18263 | The semantic tradition aimed to explain the a priori semantically, not by Kantian intuition |
| Full Idea: The semantic tradition's problem was the a priori; its enemy, Kantian pure intuition; its purpose, to develop a conception of the a priori in which pure intuition played no role; its strategy, to base that theory on a development of semantics. | |||
| From: J. Alberto Coffa (The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap [1991], 2 Intro) | |||
| A reaction: It seems to me that intuition, in the modern sense, has been unnecessarily demonised. I would define it as 'rational insights which cannot be fully articulated'. Sherlock Holmes embodies it. |
| 4 'The conc' | p.69 | 18266 | Mathematics generalises by using variables |
| Full Idea: The instrument of generality in mathematics is the variable. | |||
| From: J. Alberto Coffa (The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap [1991], 4 'The conc') | |||
| A reaction: I like the idea that there are variables in ordinary speech, pronouns being the most obvious example. 'Cats' is a variable involving quantification over a domain of lovable fluffy mammals. |
| 7 'Log' | p.114 | 18270 | Choice suggests that intensions are not needed to ensure classes |
| Full Idea: The axiom of choice was an assumption that implicitly questioned the necessity of intensions to guarantee the presence of classes. | |||
| From: J. Alberto Coffa (The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap [1991], 7 'Log') | |||
| A reaction: The point is that Choice just picks out members for no particular reason. So classes, it seems, don't need a reason to exist. |
| 7 'What' | p.126 | 18272 | Platonism defines the a priori in a way that makes it unknowable |
| Full Idea: The trouble with Platonism had always been its inability to define a priori knowledge in a way that made it possible for human beings to have it. | |||
| From: J. Alberto Coffa (The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap [1991], 7 'What') | |||
| A reaction: This is the famous argument of Benacerraf 1973. |