| 2011 | Reliabilism |
| 4.1 | p.178 | 19725 | In a sceptical scenario belief formation is unreliable, so no beliefs at all are justified? |
| Full Idea: If the processes of belief-formation are unreliable (perhaps in a sceptical scenario), then reliabilism has the consequence that those victims can never have justified beliefs (which Sosa calls the 'new evil demon problem'). | |||
| From: Juan Comesaña (Reliabilism [2011], 4.1) | |||
| A reaction: That may be the right outcome. Could you have mathematical knowledge in a sceptical scenario? But that would be different processes. If I might be a brain in a vat, then it's true that I have no perceptual knowledge. |
| 4.3 | p.182 | 19726 | How do we decide which exact process is the one that needs to be reliable? |
| Full Idea: The reliabilist has the problem of finding a principled way of selecting, for each token-process of belief formation, the type whose reliability ratio must be high enough for the belief to be justified. | |||
| From: Juan Comesaña (Reliabilism [2011], 4.3) | |||
| A reaction: The question is which exact process I am employing for some visual knowledge (and how the process should be described). Seeing, staring, squinting, glancing.... This seems to be called the 'generality problem'. |
| 4.4 | p.185 | 19727 | Reliabilist knowledge is evidence based belief, with high conditional probability |
| Full Idea: The best definition of reliabilism seems to be: the agent has evidence, and bases the belief on the evidence, and the actual conditional reliability of the belief on the evidence is high enough. | |||
| From: Juan Comesaña (Reliabilism [2011], 4.4) | |||
| A reaction: This is Comesaña's own theory, derived from Alston 1998, and based on conditional probabilities. |