| 2004 | First Things First |
| 'Circles' | p.27 | 19522 | More than actual reliability is needed, since I may mistakenly doubt what is reliable |
| Full Idea: Sheer reliability does not justify belief. ...It may be, for instance, that we have strong though misleading reason to deny the method's reliability. | |||
| From: Earl Conee (First Things First [2004], 'Circles') | |||
| A reaction: That is, we accept a justification if we judge the method to be reliable, not if it IS reliable. I can disbelieve all the reliable information that arrives in my mind. People do that all the time! Hatred of experts! Support for internalism? |
| 'Getting' | p.19 | 19520 | Evidentialism is not axiomatic; the evidence itself inclines us towards evidentialism |
| Full Idea: Evidentialism does not support beginning epistemology by taking for granted that evidentialism is true. ...Rather, what potentially justifies belief in intial epistemic data and initial procedures of inquiry is the evidence itself. | |||
| From: Earl Conee (First Things First [2004], 'Getting') | |||
| A reaction: This sounds good. I much prefer talk of 'evidence' to talk of 'perceptions', because evidence has been licked into shape, and its significance has been clarified. That is the first step towards the coherence we seek. |
| 'Getting' | p.20 | 19521 | If pure guesses were reliable, reliabilists would have to endorse them |
| Full Idea: Reliabilism would count pure guesses as good reasons if guessing were properly reliable. | |||
| From: Earl Conee (First Things First [2004], 'Getting') | |||
| A reaction: See D.H. Lawrence's short story 'The Rocking Horse Winner'. This objection strikes me as being so devastating that it is almost conclusive. Except that pure guesses are never ever reliable, over a decent period of time. |
| 'Stroud's' | p.34 | 19523 | Reliabilism is poor on reflective judgements about hypothetical cases |
| Full Idea: An unrefined reliability theory does a poor job at capturing reflective judgements about hypothetical cases | |||
| From: Earl Conee (First Things First [2004], 'Stroud's') | |||
| A reaction: Reliability can only be a test for tried and tested ways. No one can say whether imagining a range of possibilities is reliable or not. Is prediction a reliable route to knowledge? |
| 2005 | Contextualism Contested (and reply) |
| 'Epistemic' | p.65 | 19555 | People begin to doubt whether they 'know' when the answer becomes more significant |
| Full Idea: Fluent speakers typically become increasingly hesitant about 'knowledge' attributions as the practical significance of the right answer increases. | |||
| From: Earl Conee (Contextualism Contested (and reply) [2005], 'Epistemic') | |||
| A reaction: The standard examples of this phenomenon are in criminal investigations, and in philosophical discussions of scepticism. Simple observations I take to have maximum unshakable confidence, except in extreme global scepticism contexts. |
| 'Loose' | p.65 | 19557 | Maybe low knowledge standards are loose talk; people will deny that it is 'really and truly' knowledge |
| Full Idea: Maybe variable knowledge ascriptions are just loose talk. This is shown when we ask whether weakly supported knowledge is 'really' or 'truly' or 'really and truly' known. Fluent speakers have a strong inclination to doubt or deny that it is. | |||
| From: Earl Conee (Contextualism Contested (and reply) [2005], 'Loose') | |||
| A reaction: [bit compressed] Conee is suggesting the people are tacitly invariantist about knowledge (they have a fixed standard). But it may be that someone who asks 'do you really and truly know?' is raising the contextual standard. E.g. a barrister. |
| 'Loose' | p.65 | 19556 | Maybe knowledge has fixed standards (high, but attainable), although people apply contextual standards |
| Full Idea: It may be that all 'knowledge' attributions have the same truth conditions, but people apply contextually varying standards. The most plausible standard for truth is very high, but not unreachably high. | |||
| From: Earl Conee (Contextualism Contested (and reply) [2005], 'Loose') | |||
| A reaction: This is the 'invariantist' alternative to contextualism about knowledge. Is it a standard 'for truth'? Either it is or it isn't true, so there isn't a standard. I take the standard to concern the justification. |
| 2005 | Contextualism Contested |
| p.51 | p.51 | 12890 | That standards vary with context doesn't imply different truth-conditions for judgements |
| Full Idea: The fact that different standards are routinely applied in making an evaluative judgement does not imply the correctness of semantic contextualism about the contents of judgements. ..We can't infer different truth conditions from differing standards. | |||
| From: Earl Conee (Contextualism Contested [2005], p.51) | |||
| A reaction: This is the basic objection to contextualism from the 'invariantist' camp, which says there are facts about good judgement and justification, despite contextual shifts. My sympathies are with the contextualists (on this one). |
| p.53 | p.53 | 12892 | Maybe there is only one context (the 'really and truly' one) for serious discussions of knowledge |
| Full Idea: Maybe every issue about knowledge (Gettier problem, scientific knowledge, justification, scepticism) has been discussed solely in the single 'really and truly' context. | |||
| From: Earl Conee (Contextualism Contested [2005], p.53) | |||
| A reaction: This seems not to be true, if we contrast Descartes' desire for total certainty with Peirce's fallibilism. It seems to me that modern philosophy has deliberately relaxed the standard, in order to make some sort of knowledge possible. Cf. Idea 12894. |