| 1985 | Evidentialism |
| 'Doxastic' | p.86 | 19524 | We don't have the capacity to know all the logical consequences of our beliefs |
| Full Idea: Our limited cognitive capacities lead Goldman to deny a principle instructing people to believe all the logical consequences of their beliefs, since they are unable to have the infinite number of beliefs that following such a principle would require. | |||
| From: E Conee / R Feldman (Evidentialism [1985], 'Doxastic') | |||
| A reaction: This doesn't sound like much of an objection to epistemic closure, which I took to be the claim that you know the 'known' entailments of your knowledge. |
| 'Justification' | p.88 | 19525 | If the only aim is to believe truths, that justifies recklessly believing what is unsupported (if it is right) |
| Full Idea: If it is intellectually required that one try to believe all and only truths (as Chisholm says), ...then it is possible to believe some unsubstantiated proposition in a reckless endeavour to believe a truth, and happen to be right. | |||
| From: E Conee / R Feldman (Evidentialism [1985], 'Justification') | |||
| A reaction: This implies doxastic voluntarism. Sorry! I meant, this implies that we can control what we believe, when actually we believe what impinges on us as facts. |
| 2004 | Introduction to 'Evidentialism' |
| p.1 | p.1 | 19518 | Evidentialism says justifications supervene on the available evidence |
| Full Idea: Fundamentally Evidentialism is a supervenience thesis, according to which facts about whether or not a person is justified in believing a proposition supervene on facts describing the evidence the person has. | |||
| From: E Conee / R Feldman (Introduction to 'Evidentialism' [2004], p.1) | |||
| A reaction: If facts 'describe', does that make them linguistic? That's not how I use 'facts'. A statement of a fact is not the same as the fact. An ugly fact can be beautifully expressed. I am, however, in favour of evidence. |
| p.3 | p.3 | 19519 | Rational decisions are either taken to be based on evidence, or to be explained causally |
| Full Idea: In decision theory, there is a view according to which the rational basis for all decisions is evidential. This kind of decision theory is typically contrasted with causal decision theory. | |||
| From: E Conee / R Feldman (Introduction to 'Evidentialism' [2004], p.3) | |||
| A reaction: Your Kantian presumably likes rational reflection on evidence, and your modern reductive scientist prefers causality (which doesn't really sound very rational). |