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Ideas of David E. Cooper, by Text
[British, fl. 1973, Professor at the University of Durham.]
1973
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Philosophy and the Nature of Language
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§2.3
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p.31
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4561
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Many sentences set up dispositions which are irrelevant to the meanings of the sentences
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§2.4
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p.39
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4562
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Most people know how to use the word "Amen", but they do not know what it means
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§2.4
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p.40
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4563
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'How now brown cow?' is used for elocution, but this says nothing about its meaning
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§3.1
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p.50
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4564
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I can meaningfully speculate that humans may have experiences currently impossible for us
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§3.1
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p.52
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4565
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The verification principle itself seems neither analytic nor verifiable
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§4
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p.70
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4566
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Any thesis about reference is also a thesis about what exists to be referred to
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§4.1
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p.73
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4568
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If 'Queen of England' does not refer if there is no queen, its meaning can't refer if there is one
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§4.2
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p.85
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4571
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Reference need not be a hit-or-miss affair
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§4.4
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p.93
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4572
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If predicates name things, that reduces every sentence to a mere list of names
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§5.1
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p.105
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4573
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If it is claimed that language correlates with culture, we must be able to identify the two independently
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§5.2
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p.114
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4574
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If some peoples do not have categories like time or cause, they can't be essential features of rationality
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§5.2
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p.115
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4575
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A person's language doesn't prove their concepts, but how are concepts deduced apart from language?
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§7.1
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p.165
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4576
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An analytic truth is one which becomes a logical truth when some synonyms have been replaced
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