| 1954 | Essence and Accident |
| p.6 | 10937 | Essential properties are the 'deepest' ones which explain the others | |
| Full Idea: The 'explanatory characterization' says that the essential properties of an object are the object's deepest explanatory properties, which explain the other properties of the object - and which Copi claims is mind-independent. | |||
| From: report of Irving M. Copi (Essence and Accident [1954]) by Adolph Rami - Essential vs Accidental Properties §2 | |||
| A reaction: It is, of course, normal to see a good explanation as being dependent on the interests of the audience. Perhaps this account should be in terms of causal powers. See Shoemaker on properties. |
| p.707-8 | p.707 | 12303 | Within the four types of change, essential attributes are those whose loss means destruction |
| Full Idea: If we can distinguish the different kinds of change (alteration, locomotion, growth, diminution), then we can say that a given attribute is essential to an object if its loss would result in the destruction of that object. | |||
| From: Irving M. Copi (Essence and Accident [1954], p.707-8) | |||
| A reaction: As Copi is aware, this is a necessary condition for a property for essence, but not sufficient. If an attribute were necessary but non-essential, its loss would also be destruction. We say the essential attributes must also have some explanatory role. |
| p.715 | p.715 | 12307 | Modern science seeks essences, and is getting closer to them |
| Full Idea: Modern science seeks to know the real essences of things, and its increasing successes seem to be bringing it progressively nearer to that goal. | |||
| From: Irving M. Copi (Essence and Accident [1954], p.715) | |||
| A reaction: This is from a notable pioneering paper, which outlined scientific essentialism even before Marcus and Kripke began to offer a modern account of essence to give it backing. Compare Popper, who thinks essences are will-o-the-wisps. |
| p.716 | p.716 | 12308 | In modern science, nominal essence is intended to be real essence |
| Full Idea: In the sphere of scientific enquiry the distinction between real and nominal essence tends to disappear; the scientist's classification of things is intended to be in terms of their real essences. | |||
| From: Irving M. Copi (Essence and Accident [1954], p.716) | |||
| A reaction: Thus we have disputes over what is the 'real' classification of natural kinds such as animals. There is not much point in a classification system that does not at least reflect some aspects of reality. |
| p.717 | p.717 | 12310 | Real essences are scientifically knowable, but so are non-essential properties |
| Full Idea: Contrary to Locke, I should hold that real essences are in principle knowable, and contrary to Aristotle, I should hold that non-essential or accidental properties can also be objects of scientific knowledge. | |||
| From: Irving M. Copi (Essence and Accident [1954], p.717) | |||
| A reaction: Copi has just become my hero. Aristotle's account of definition is on the brink of allowing fine-tuned essences, but he thinks universal understanding blocks knowledge of individuals. But cross-referencing of universals pinpoints individuals. |
| p.718 | p.718 | 12312 | The real essence of a thing is its powers, or 'dispositional properties' |
| Full Idea: With respect to scientific usage, we can say that the real essence of a thing will consist very largely of powers or, in modern terms, dispositional properties. | |||
| From: Irving M. Copi (Essence and Accident [1954], p.718) | |||
| A reaction: Once again, Copi is a hero. I personally love the word 'powers' in metaphysics (and dislike the word 'properties', which is lost in a fog of confusion). See Molnar on 'powers' and Mumford on 'dispositions'. |