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Ideas of Jonathan Dancy, by Text

[British, fl. 1985, At Keel University, then Professor at Reading University.]

1985 Intro to Contemporary Epistemology
1.note p.22 2744 Verificationism (the 'verification principle') is an earlier form of anti-realism
1.3 p.17 2743 What is the point of arguing against knowledge, if being right undermines your own argument?
2.1 p.24 2745 A pupil who lacks confidence may clearly know something but not be certain of it
2.3 p.34 2746 How can a causal theory of justification show that all men die?
2.4 p.35 2747 Causal theories don't allow for errors in justification
3.5 p.47 2749 For internalists we must actually know that the fact caused the belief
4.1 p.54 2751 Probabilities can only be assessed relative to some evidence
4.1 p.56 2752 Foundationalism requires inferential and non-inferential justification
4.2 p.60 2753 Beliefs can only be infallible by having almost no content
4.3 p.63 2754 Foundations are justified by non-beliefs, or circularly, or they need no justification
4.3 p.64 2756 If basic beliefs can be false, falsehood in non-basic beliefs might by a symptom
4.3 p.64 2755 If senses are fallible, then being open to correction is an epistemological virtue
5.3 p.68 2757 The argument from analogy rests on one instance alone
5.3 p.69 2758 You can't separate mind and behaviour, as the analogy argument attempts
6.2 p.88 2760 Logical positivism implies foundationalism, by dividing weak from strong verifications
7.2 p.100 2761 If the meanings of sentences depend on other sentences, how did we learn language?
7.4 p.105 2762 Charity makes native beliefs largely true, and Humanity makes them similar to ours
7.4 p.107 2763 There is an indeterminacy in juggling apparent meanings against probable beliefs
8.1 p.112 2765 Rescher says that if coherence requires mutual entailment, this leads to massive logical redundancy
8.2 p.113 2766 Even with a tight account of coherence, there is always the possibility of more than one set of coherent propositions
8.2 p.114 2767 If it is empirical propositions which have to be coherent, this eliminates coherent fiction
8.2 p.115 2769 If one theory is held to be true, all the other theories appear false, because they can't be added to the true one
8.2 p.115 2768 The correspondence theory also has the problem that two sets of propositions might fit the facts equally well
8.3 p.117 2770 Internalists tend to favour coherent justification, but not the coherence theory of truth
8.3 p.118 2771 Foundationalists must accept not only the basic beliefs, but also rules of inference for further progress
8.3 p.119 2773 Coherentism gives a possible justification of induction, and opposes scepticism
8.3 p.119 2772 Coherentism moves us towards a more social, shared view of knowledge
8.5 p.123 2775 It is not clear from the nature of sense data whether we should accept them as facts
9.3 p.133 2776 Externalism could even make belief unnecessary (e.g. in animals)
9.5 p.136 2778 Phenomenalism includes possible experiences, but idealism only refers to actual experiences
9.5 p.136 2777 Extreme solipsism only concerns current experience, but it might include past and future
9.5 p.137 2779 Idealists must be coherentists, but coherentists needn't be idealists
10.2 p.144 2780 Perception is either direct realism, indirect realism, or phenomenalism
10.2 p.144 2781 Realism says that most perceived objects exist, and have some of their perceived properties
10.2 p.147 2782 We can be looking at distant stars which no longer actually exist
10.3 p.147 5677 Naïve direct realists hold that objects retain all of their properties when unperceived
10.3 p.148 5678 Scientific direct realism says we know some properties of objects directly
10.3 p.149 5679 We can't grasp the separation of quality types, or what a primary-quality world would be like
10.3 p.150 5680 For direct realists the secondary and primary qualities seem equally direct
10.3 p.151 5681 Maybe we are forced from direct into indirect realism by the need to explain perceptual error
10.4 p.152 5683 Indirect realism depends on introspection, the time-lag, illusions, and neuroscience [PG]
10.4 p.152 5682 Internal realism holds that we perceive physical objects via mental objects
10.6 p.156 5684 Eliminative idealists say there are no objects; reductive idealists say objects exist as complex experiences
11.4 p.173 2784 Appearances don't guarantee reality, unless the appearance is actually caused by the reality
11.5 p.178 2785 Perceptual beliefs may be directly caused, but generalisations can't be
11.6 p.180 2786 For coherentists justification and truth are not radically different things
12.2 p.184 2787 Memories aren't directly about the past, because time-lags and illusions suggest representation
12.2 p.184 2788 If perception and memory are indirect, then two things stand between mind and reality
12.3 p.188 2790 I can remember plans about the future, and images aren't essential (2+3=5)
12.4 p.190 2791 Phenomenalism about memory denies the past, or reduces it to present experience
14.3 p.215 2794 Knowing that a cow is not a horse seems to be a synthetic a priori truth
14.7 p.225 2797 As coherence expands its interrelations become steadily tighter, culminating only in necessary truth
1991 Intuitionism
p.414 7260 If there are intuited moral facts, why should we care about them?
p.415 7261 Internalists say that moral intuitions are motivating; externalist say a desire is also needed
p.415 7262 Obviously judging an action as wrong gives us a reason not to do it
p.418 7265 Moral facts are not perceived facts, but perceived reasons for judgements
2004 Ethics without Principles
p. 170-181 p.84 18681 The base for values has grounds, catalysts and intensifiers [Orsi]