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Ideas of Jonathan Dancy, by Text

[British, fl. 1985, At Keel University, then Professor at Reading University.]

1985 Intro to Contemporary Epistemology
1.note p.22 Verificationism (the 'verification principle') is an earlier form of anti-realism
1.3 p.17 What is the point of arguing against knowledge, if being right undermines your own argument?
2.1 p.24 A pupil who lacks confidence may clearly know something but not be certain of it
2.3 p.34 How can a causal theory of justification show that all men die?
2.4 p.35 Causal theories don't allow for errors in justification
3.5 p.47 For internalists we must actually know that the fact caused the belief
4.1 p.54 Probabilities can only be assessed relative to some evidence
4.1 p.56 Foundationalism requires inferential and non-inferential justification
4.2 p.60 Beliefs can only be infallible by having almost no content
4.3 p.63 Foundations are justified by non-beliefs, or circularly, or they need no justification
4.3 p.64 If senses are fallible, then being open to correction is an epistemological virtue
4.3 p.64 If basic beliefs can be false, falsehood in non-basic beliefs might by a symptom
5.3 p.68 The argument from analogy rests on one instance alone
5.3 p.69 You can't separate mind and behaviour, as the analogy argument attempts
6.2 p.88 Logical positivism implies foundationalism, by dividing weak from strong verifications
7.2 p.100 If the meanings of sentences depend on other sentences, how did we learn language?
7.4 p.105 Charity makes native beliefs largely true, and Humanity makes them similar to ours
7.4 p.107 There is an indeterminacy in juggling apparent meanings against probable beliefs
8.1 p.112 Rescher says that if coherence requires mutual entailment, this leads to massive logical redundancy
8.2 p.113 Even with a tight account of coherence, there is always the possibility of more than one set of coherent propositions
8.2 p.114 If it is empirical propositions which have to be coherent, this eliminates coherent fiction
8.2 p.115 If one theory is held to be true, all the other theories appear false, because they can't be added to the true one
8.2 p.115 The correspondence theory also has the problem that two sets of propositions might fit the facts equally well
8.3 p.117 Internalists tend to favour coherent justification, but not the coherence theory of truth
8.3 p.118 Foundationalists must accept not only the basic beliefs, but also rules of inference for further progress
8.3 p.119 Coherentism moves us towards a more social, shared view of knowledge
8.3 p.119 Coherentism gives a possible justification of induction, and opposes scepticism
8.5 p.123 It is not clear from the nature of sense data whether we should accept them as facts
9.3 p.133 Externalism could even make belief unnecessary (e.g. in animals)
9.5 p.136 Phenomenalism includes possible experiences, but idealism only refers to actual experiences
9.5 p.136 Extreme solipsism only concerns current experience, but it might include past and future
9.5 p.137 Idealists must be coherentists, but coherentists needn't be idealists
10.2 p.144 Perception is either direct realism, indirect realism, or phenomenalism
10.2 p.144 Realism says that most perceived objects exist, and have some of their perceived properties
10.2 p.147 We can be looking at distant stars which no longer actually exist
10.3 p.147 Na´ve direct realists hold that objects retain all of their properties when unperceived
10.3 p.148 Scientific direct realism says we know some properties of objects directly
10.3 p.149 We can't grasp the separation of quality types, or what a primary-quality world would be like
10.3 p.150 For direct realists the secondary and primary qualities seem equally direct
10.3 p.151 Maybe we are forced from direct into indirect realism by the need to explain perceptual error
10.4 p.152 Internal realism holds that we perceive physical objects via mental objects
10.4 p.152 Indirect realism depends on introspection, the time-lag, illusions, and neuroscience
10.6 p.156 Eliminative idealists say there are no objects; reductive idealists say objects exist as complex experiences
11.4 p.173 Appearances don't guarantee reality, unless the appearance is actually caused by the reality
11.5 p.178 Perceptual beliefs may be directly caused, but generalisations can't be
11.6 p.180 For coherentists justification and truth are not radically different things
12.2 p.184 If perception and memory are indirect, then two things stand between mind and reality
12.2 p.184 Memories aren't directly about the past, because time-lags and illusions suggest representation
12.3 p.188 I can remember plans about the future, and images aren't essential (2+3=5)
12.4 p.190 Phenomenalism about memory denies the past, or reduces it to present experience
14.2 p.213 It is unclear how identity, equality, perfection, God, power and cause derive from experience
14.3 p.215 Knowing that a cow is not a horse seems to be a synthetic a priori truth
14.6 p.222 For Quine the only way to know a necessity is empirically
14.7 p.225 As coherence expands its interrelations become steadily tighter, culminating only in necessary truth
1991 Intuitionism
p.414 If there are intuited moral facts, why should we care about them?
p.415 Internalists say that moral intuitions are motivating; externalist say a desire is also needed
p.415 Obviously judging an action as wrong gives us a reason not to do it
p.418 Moral facts are not perceived facts, but perceived reasons for judgements
2004 Ethics without Principles
p. 170-181 p.84 The base for values has grounds, catalysts and intensifiers