| 1985 | Intro to Contemporary Epistemology |
| 1.note | p.22 | 2744 | Verificationism (the 'verification principle') is an earlier form of anti-realism |
| 1.3 | p.17 | 2743 | What is the point of arguing against knowledge, if being right undermines your own argument? |
| 2.1 | p.24 | 2745 | A pupil who lacks confidence may clearly know something but not be certain of it |
| 2.3 | p.34 | 2746 | How can a causal theory of justification show that all men die? |
| 2.4 | p.35 | 2747 | Causal theories don't allow for errors in justification |
| 3.5 | p.47 | 2749 | For internalists we must actually know that the fact caused the belief |
| 4.1 | p.54 | 2751 | Probabilities can only be assessed relative to some evidence |
| 4.1 | p.56 | 2752 | Foundationalism requires inferential and non-inferential justification |
| 4.2 | p.60 | 2753 | Beliefs can only be infallible by having almost no content |
| 4.3 | p.63 | 2754 | Foundations are justified by non-beliefs, or circularly, or they need no justification |
| 4.3 | p.64 | 2756 | If basic beliefs can be false, falsehood in non-basic beliefs might by a symptom |
| 4.3 | p.64 | 2755 | If senses are fallible, then being open to correction is an epistemological virtue |
| 5.3 | p.68 | 2757 | The argument from analogy rests on one instance alone |
| 5.3 | p.69 | 2758 | You can't separate mind and behaviour, as the analogy argument attempts |
| 6.2 | p.88 | 2760 | Logical positivism implies foundationalism, by dividing weak from strong verifications |
| 7.2 | p.100 | 2761 | If the meanings of sentences depend on other sentences, how did we learn language? |
| 7.4 | p.105 | 2762 | Charity makes native beliefs largely true, and Humanity makes them similar to ours |
| 7.4 | p.107 | 2763 | There is an indeterminacy in juggling apparent meanings against probable beliefs |
| 8.1 | p.112 | 2765 | Rescher says that if coherence requires mutual entailment, this leads to massive logical redundancy |
| 8.2 | p.113 | 2766 | Even with a tight account of coherence, there is always the possibility of more than one set of coherent propositions |
| 8.2 | p.114 | 2767 | If it is empirical propositions which have to be coherent, this eliminates coherent fiction |
| 8.2 | p.115 | 2769 | If one theory is held to be true, all the other theories appear false, because they can't be added to the true one |
| 8.2 | p.115 | 2768 | The correspondence theory also has the problem that two sets of propositions might fit the facts equally well |
| 8.3 | p.117 | 2770 | Internalists tend to favour coherent justification, but not the coherence theory of truth |
| 8.3 | p.118 | 2771 | Foundationalists must accept not only the basic beliefs, but also rules of inference for further progress |
| 8.3 | p.119 | 2772 | Coherentism moves us towards a more social, shared view of knowledge |
| 8.3 | p.119 | 2773 | Coherentism gives a possible justification of induction, and opposes scepticism |
| 8.5 | p.123 | 2775 | It is not clear from the nature of sense data whether we should accept them as facts |
| 9.3 | p.133 | 2776 | Externalism could even make belief unnecessary (e.g. in animals) |
| 9.5 | p.136 | 2777 | Extreme solipsism only concerns current experience, but it might include past and future |
| 9.5 | p.136 | 2778 | Phenomenalism includes possible experiences, but idealism only refers to actual experiences |
| 9.5 | p.137 | 2779 | Idealists must be coherentists, but coherentists needn't be idealists |
| 10.2 | p.144 | 2780 | Perception is either direct realism, indirect realism, or phenomenalism |
| 10.2 | p.144 | 2781 | Realism says that most perceived objects exist, and have some of their perceived properties |
| 10.2 | p.147 | 2782 | We can be looking at distant stars which no longer actually exist |
| 10.3 | p.147 | 5677 | Naïve direct realists hold that objects retain all of their properties when unperceived |
| 10.3 | p.148 | 5678 | Scientific direct realism says we know some properties of objects directly |
| 10.3 | p.149 | 5679 | We can't grasp the separation of quality types, or what a primary-quality world would be like |
| 10.3 | p.150 | 5680 | For direct realists the secondary and primary qualities seem equally direct |
| 10.3 | p.151 | 5681 | Maybe we are forced from direct into indirect realism by the need to explain perceptual error |
| 10.4 | p.152 | 5682 | Internal realism holds that we perceive physical objects via mental objects |
| 10.4 | p.152 | 5683 | Indirect realism depends on introspection, the time-lag, illusions, and neuroscience |
| 10.6 | p.156 | 5684 | Eliminative idealists say there are no objects; reductive idealists say objects exist as complex experiences |
| 11.4 | p.173 | 2784 | Appearances don't guarantee reality, unless the appearance is actually caused by the reality |
| 11.5 | p.178 | 2785 | Perceptual beliefs may be directly caused, but generalisations can't be |
| 11.6 | p.180 | 2786 | For coherentists justification and truth are not radically different things |
| 12.2 | p.184 | 2788 | If perception and memory are indirect, then two things stand between mind and reality |
| 12.2 | p.184 | 2787 | Memories aren't directly about the past, because time-lags and illusions suggest representation |
| 12.3 | p.188 | 2790 | I can remember plans about the future, and images aren't essential (2+3=5) |
| 12.4 | p.190 | 2791 | Phenomenalism about memory denies the past, or reduces it to present experience |
| 14.2 | p.213 | 2793 | It is unclear how identity, equality, perfection, God, power and cause derive from experience |
| 14.3 | p.215 | 2794 | Knowing that a cow is not a horse seems to be a synthetic a priori truth |
| 14.6 | p.222 | 2796 | For Quine the only way to know a necessity is empirically |
| 14.7 | p.225 | 2797 | As coherence expands its interrelations become steadily tighter, culminating only in necessary truth |
| 1991 | Intuitionism |
| p.414 | 7260 | If there are intuited moral facts, why should we care about them? |
| p.415 | 7261 | Internalists say that moral intuitions are motivating; externalist say a desire is also needed |
| p.415 | 7262 | Obviously judging an action as wrong gives us a reason not to do it |
| p.418 | 7265 | Moral facts are not perceived facts, but perceived reasons for judgements |
| 2004 | Ethics without Principles |
| p. 170-181 | p.84 | 18681 | The base for values has grounds, catalysts and intensifiers |