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Ideas of Donald Davidson, by Text

[American, 1917 - 2003, Born at Springfield, Massachusetts. Pupil of Willard Quine. Professor at the University of Chicago.]

1963	Action, Reasons and Causes

	p.4	20020	If one action leads directly to another, they are all one action
			Full Idea: Davidson (1980 ess 1) agreed with Anscombe that if a person Fs by G-ing, then her act F = her act G. For example, if someone accidentally alerts a burglar, by deliberately turning on a light, by flipping a switch, these are all the same action.
			From: report of Donald Davidson (Action, Reasons and Causes [1963]) by Wilson,G/Schpall,S - Action 1.2
			A reaction: I would have thought there was obviously a strong conventional element in individuating actions, depending on interest. An electrician is only interest in whether the light worked. The police are only interested in the disturbance of the burglar.

	p.103	23734	The best explanation of reasons as purposes for actions is that they are causal
			Full Idea: Davidson argues that the best interpretation of the teleological character of reason explanations is an intepretation in causal terms.
			From: report of Donald Davidson (Action, Reasons and Causes [1963]) by Michael Smith - The Moral Problem 4.4
			A reaction: That is, this is the explanation of someone doing something 'because' they have this reason (rather than happening to have a reason). Smith observes that other mental states (such as beliefs) may also have this causal power.

	p.113	23737	Reasons can give purposes to actions, without actually causing them
			Full Idea: Only the Humean theory is able to make sense of reason explanation as a species of teleological explanation, and one may accept that reason explanations are teleological without accepting that they are causal.
			From: comment on Donald Davidson (Action, Reasons and Causes [1963]) by Michael Smith - The Moral Problem 4.6
			A reaction: That is, reasons can give a purpose to an action, and thereby motivate it, without actually causing it. I agree with Smith. I certainly don't (usually, at least) experience reasons as directly producing my actions. Hume says desires are needed.

	p.116	20072	We explain an intention by giving an account of acting with an intention
			Full Idea: The early Davidson championed the approach that we explain the idea of having an intention by providing an account of what it is to act with an intention.
			From: report of Donald Davidson (Action, Reasons and Causes [1963]) by Rowland Stout - Action 7 'Conclusion'
			A reaction: This eliminates the distinction between a prior intention, and the intention that maintains a process such as speech. It sounds almost behaviourist.

	p.123	20075	Early Davidson says intentional action is caused by reasons
			Full Idea: In Davidson's earlier approach, intentional action requires causation by reasons.
			From: report of Donald Davidson (Action, Reasons and Causes [1963]) by Rowland Stout - Action 8 'Weakness'
			A reaction: A very Kantian idea, and one that seems to bestow causal powers on something which I take to be highly abstract. Thus Davidson was wrong (but in a nice way).

	p.127	3395	Davidson claims that what causes an action is the reason for doing it
			Full Idea: Davidson defends the simple thesis that the reason for which an action is done is the one that causes it, …which means that agency is possible only if mental causation is possible.
			From: report of Donald Davidson (Action, Reasons and Causes [1963]) by Jaegwon Kim - Philosophy of Mind p.127

	p.185	7949	Varied descriptions of an event will explain varied behaviour relating to it
			Full Idea: Davidson points out that we can only make sense of patterns of behaviour such as excuses if events can have more than one description. So I flip the light switch, turn on the light, illuminate the room, and alert a prowler, but I do only one thing.
			From: report of Donald Davidson (Action, Reasons and Causes [1963]) by Cynthia Macdonald - Varieties of Things Ch.5
			A reaction: We can distinguish an event as an actual object, and as an intentional object. We can probably individuate intentional events quite well (according to our interests), but actual 'events' seem to flow into one another and overlap.

	p.259	6664	Reasons must be causes when agents act 'for' reasons
			Full Idea: It can be argued (by Davidson) that far from it being the case that reasons for and causes of action are quite distinct, reasons must be causes when agents act 'for' reasons.
			From: report of Donald Davidson (Action, Reasons and Causes [1963]) by E.J. Lowe - Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind Ch.9
			A reaction: Lowe argues against this view. The rival views to Davidson would be either that reasons are no more than desires-plus-beliefs in disguise, or that the will causes actions, and strong reasons carry a great weight with the will. I like the will.

p.3-4	p.34	20045	Acting for a reason is a combination of a pro attitude, and a belief that the action is appropriate
			Full Idea: Whenever someone does something for a reason he can be characterised as (a) having some sort of pro attitude towards action of a certain kind, and (b) believing (or knowing, perceiving, noticing, remembering) that his action is of that kind.
			From: Donald Davidson (Action, Reasons and Causes [1963], p.3-4), quoted by Rowland Stout - Action 3 'The belief-'
			A reaction: This is the earlier Davidson roughly endorsing the traditional belief-desire account of action. He is giving a reductive account of reasons. Deciding reasons were not reducible may have led him to property dualism.

1967	Causal Relations

	p.8	10371	Distinguish causation, which is in the world, from explanations, which depend on descriptions
			Full Idea: Davidson distinguishes between causation, an extensional relation that holds between coarse events, and explanation, which is an intensional relation that holds between the coarse events under a description.
			From: report of Donald Davidson (Causal Relations [1967]) by Jonathan Schaffer - The Metaphysics of Causation 1.2
			A reaction: I'm unclear why everything has to be so coarse, when reality and causal events seem to fine-grained, but the distinction strikes me as good. Explanations relate to human understanding and human interests. Cf. Anscombe's view.

	p.77	4778	A singular causal statement is true if it is held to fall under a law
			Full Idea: For Davidson, what makes singular causal statements true is the existence of some regularities or laws. All causal is nomological: c causes e iff there is a law that connects events like c with events like e.
			From: report of Donald Davidson (Causal Relations [1967]) by Stathis Psillos - Causation and Explanation §2.6
			A reaction: I wonder if the cart is before the horse here. Scriven says this is just a claim that there are "phantom laws". It is the Humean view of causation, but surely the laws come after the causation, so can't be used to explain it?

	p.440	8403	Either facts, or highly unspecific events, serve better as causes than concrete events
			Full Idea: It is best to avoid Davidson's view that only quite concrete events can serve as causes; we should either say that facts as well as events can serve as causes; or that the events can be highly unspecific, including 'omissions'.
			From: comment on Donald Davidson (Causal Relations [1967]) by Hartry Field - Causation in a Physical World 1
			A reaction: Something NOT happening might be the main cause of an effect (drought), or an effect may mainly result from a situation rather than an event (famine).

§3	p.157	8346	Full descriptions can demonstrate sufficiency of cause, but not necessity
			Full Idea: The fuller we make the description of a cause, the better our chances of demonstrating that it was sufficient (as described) to produce the effect, and the worse our chances of demonstrating that it was necessary. (For the effect, it is the opposite).
			From: Donald Davidson (Causal Relations [1967], §3)
			A reaction: If the fullness of description is relevant, this suggests that Davidson is focusing on human explanations, rather than on the ontology of causation. If the cause IS necessary, why wouldn't a better description make that clearer?

§4	p.161	8347	Explanations typically relate statements, not events
			Full Idea: Explanations typically relate statements, not events.
			From: Donald Davidson (Causal Relations [1967], §4)
			A reaction: An oddly linguistic way of putting our attempts to understand the world. Presumably the statements are supposed to be about the events (or whatever), and they are supposed to be true, so we are trying to relate features of the world.

§4	p.162	8349	The best way to do ontology is to make sense of our normal talk
			Full Idea: I do not know any better way of showing what there is than looking at the assumptions needed to make sense of our normal talk.
			From: Donald Davidson (Causal Relations [1967], §4)
			A reaction: Davidson was a pupil of Quine. This I take to be the last flowering of twentieth century linguistic philosophy. The ontology we deduce from talk in a children's playground might be very bizarre, but we are unlikely to endorse it. 'Honest, it's true!'

§4	p.162	8348	If we don't assume that events exist, we cannot make sense of our common talk
			Full Idea: The assumption, ontological and metaphysical, that there are events, is one without which we cannot make sense of much of our most common talk.
			From: Donald Davidson (Causal Relations [1967], §4)
			A reaction: He considers events to be unanalysable basics. Explanation of normal talk also needs ghosts, premonitions, telepathy and Father Christmas. It is extremely hard to individuate events, unless they are subatomic, and rather numerous.

1967	The Logical Form of Action Sentences

	p.122	15002	If the best theory of adverbs refers to events, then our ontology should include events
			Full Idea: Davidson argued that the best linguistic theory of adverbial modification assigns truth-conditions quantifying over events; thus we must embrace an ontology of events.
			From: report of Donald Davidson (The Logical Form of Action Sentences [1967]) by Theodore Sider - Writing the Book of the World 07.8
			A reaction: Sider is critical and I agree. This is just the sort of linguistic manoeuvre that gets philosophy a bad name. As Yablo remarks, we have a terrible tendency to want to thingify everything.

	p.144	7771	We need 'events' to explain adverbs, which are adjectival predicates of events
			Full Idea: To deal with the truth conditions for some adverbs, Davidson introduced a domain of 'events', and made adverbs into adjectival predicates of events.
			From: report of Donald Davidson (The Logical Form of Action Sentences [1967]) by William Lycan - Philosophy of Language Ch.9
			A reaction: This seems to be a striking case of a procedure of which I heartily disapprove - deriving you ontology from your semantics. Do all languages have adverbs?

§8	p.208	8860	Language-learning is not good enough evidence for the existence of events
			Full Idea: One needs a better reason for believing in events than the help they provide with language-learning.
			From: comment on Donald Davidson (The Logical Form of Action Sentences [1967], §8) by Stephen Yablo - Apriority and Existence §8
			A reaction: I can almost believe in micro-events at the quantum level, but I cannot believe that the Renaissance (made of events within events within events) is an event, even though I may 'quantify over it', and discuss its causes and effects.

1967	Truth and Meaning

	p.82	6179	Should we assume translation to define truth, or the other way around?
			Full Idea: The concern of some philosophers has been expressed by saying that whereas Tarski took translation for granted, and sought to understand truth, Davidson takes truth for granted, and seeks to understand translation.
			From: comment on Donald Davidson (Truth and Meaning [1967]) by Simon Blackburn - Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy p.82
			A reaction: We can just say that the two concepts are interdependent, but my personal intuitions side with Davidson. If you are going to take something as fundamental and axiomatic, truth looks a better bet than translation.

	p.142	7769	You can state truth-conditions for "I am sick now" by relativising it to a speaker at a time
			Full Idea: Davidson's response to the problem of how you would state truth conditions for "I am sick now" ...is to relativize its truth to a particular speaker and a time.
			From: report of Donald Davidson (Truth and Meaning [1967]) by William Lycan - Philosophy of Language Ch.9
			A reaction: Lycan is not happy with this, but it seems a reasonable way to treat the truth of any statement containing indexicals. Never mind the 'truth conditions theory of meaning' - just ask whether "I am sick now" is true.

	p.146	7772	Compositionality explains how long sentences work, and truth conditions are the main compositional feature
			Full Idea: Davidson's main argument in favour of his truth conditions theory of meaning is that compositionality is needed to account for our understanding of long, novel sentences, and a sentence's truth condition is its most obviously compositional feature.
			From: report of Donald Davidson (Truth and Meaning [1967]) by William Lycan - Philosophy of Language Ch.9
			A reaction: This seems to me exactly right. As we hear a new long sentence unfold, we piece together the meaning. At the end we may spot that the meaning is silly, or an unverifiable speculation, or not what the speaker intended - but it is too late! It means.

	p.246	7327	Davidson thinks Frege lacks an account of how words create sentence-meaning
			Full Idea: Davidson thinks that Frege's model for a theory of semantic value (and thereby for a systematic theory of sense) is unsatisfactory, because it provides no useful or explanatory account of how sentence-meaning can be a function of word-meaning.
			From: report of Donald Davidson (Truth and Meaning [1967]) by Alexander Miller - Philosophy of Language 8.1
			A reaction: Put like that, it is not clear to me how you could even start to explain how word-meaning contributes to sentence meaning. Try speaking any sentence slowly, and observe how the sentence meaning builds up. Truth is, of course, relevant.

p.35	p.35	7332	There is a huge range of sentences of which we do not know the logical form
			Full Idea: We do not know the logical form of sentences about counterfactuals, probabilities, causal relations, belief, perception, intention, purposeful action, imperatives, optatives, or interrogatives, or the role of adverbs, adjectives or mass terms.
			From: Donald Davidson (Truth and Meaning [1967], p.35)
			A reaction: [compressed] This is the famous 'Davidson programme', where teams of philosophers work out the logical forms for this lot, thus unravelling the logic of the world. If they are beavering away, some sort of overview should have emerged by now...

1969	The Individuation of Events

	p.38	18914	Davidson controversially proposed to quantify over events
			Full Idea: An alternative, and still controversial, extension of first-order logic is due to Donald Davidson, who allows for quantification over events.
			From: report of Donald Davidson (The Individuation of Events [1969]) by George Engelbretsen - Trees, Terms and Truth 3
			A reaction: I'm suddenly thinking this is quite an attractive proposal. We need to quantify over facts, or states of affairs, or events, or some such thing, to talk about the world properly. Objects, predicates and sets/parts is too sparse. I like facts.

	p.113	9843	You can't identify events by causes and effects, as the event needs to be known first
			Full Idea: Davidson's criterion for the identity of events is a mistake, because we cannot know the causes and effects of an event until we know what that event comprises.
			From: comment on Donald Davidson (The Individuation of Events [1969]) by Michael Dummett - Frege philosophy of mathematics Ch.10
			A reaction: How many attempts by analytical philosophers to give necessary and sufficient conditions for things seem to founder in this way. Their predecessor is at the end of 'Theaetetus'; you have to know what the sun is before you can define it.

	p.163	8278	The claim that events are individuated by their causal relations to other events is circular
			Full Idea: Davidson has urged that events are individuated by the causal relations which they bear to one another, in accordance with the principle that events are identical just in case they have the same causes and effects. But the principle is viciously circular.
			From: comment on Donald Davidson (The Individuation of Events [1969]) by E.J. Lowe - The Possibility of Metaphysics 7.4
			A reaction: You wouldn't want to identify a person just by their relationships, even though those will certainly be unique. Generally it is what I am (right now) naming as the Functional Fallacy: believing that specifying the function of x explains x.

3	p.87	14602	Events can only be individuated causally
			Full Idea: Davidson claims that events can only be individuated causally.
			From: report of Donald Davidson (The Individuation of Events [1969], 3) by Jonathan Schaffer - Causation and Laws of Nature 3
			A reaction: Schaffer rejects this in favour of individuating events by their spatiotemporal locations and intrinsic natures (which seem to be property instantiations, a la Kim). Schaffer was a pupil of David Lewis.

Intro IIb	p.7	14004	We need events for action statements, causal statements, explanation, mind-and-body, and adverbs
			Full Idea: Davidson claims that we require the existence of events in order to make sense of a) action statements, b) causal statements, c) explanation, d) the mind-body problem, and e) the logic of adverbial modification.
			From: report of Donald Davidson (The Individuation of Events [1969], Intro IIb) by Craig Bourne - A Future for Presentism
			A reaction: Events are a nice shorthand, but I don't like them in a serious ontology. Prior says there objects and what happens to them; Kim reduces events to other things. Processes are more clearly individuated than events.

1969	True to the Facts

	p.2	8188	Davidson takes truth to attach to individual sentences
			Full Idea: Davidson, by contrast to Frege, has taken truth as attaching to linguistic items, that is, to actual or hypothetical token sentences.
			From: report of Donald Davidson (True to the Facts [1969]) by Michael Dummett - Truth and the Past 1
			A reaction: My personal notion of truth is potentially applicable to animals, so this doesn't appeal to me. I am happy to think of animals as believing simple propositions that never get as far as language, and being right or wrong about them.

1970	Mental Events

	p.5	2307	Anomalous monism says nothing at all about the relationship between mental and physical
			Full Idea: Davidson's anomalous monism says no more about the relationship between the mental and the physical than the claim that all objects with a colour have a shape says about the relationship between colours and shapes.
			From: report of Donald Davidson (Mental Events [1970]) by Jaegwon Kim - Mind in a Physical World §1 p.005
			A reaction: Indeed, I find the enthusiasm for property dualism etc. quite baffling, given that we are merely told that mind is 'an anomaly'. I take it to be old fashioned dualism in trendy clothes.

	p.8	5497	Mind is outside science, because it is humanistic and partly normative
			Full Idea: For Davidson, mental types are individuated by considerations that are nonscientific, distinctly humanistic, and part normative, so will not coincide with any types that are designated in scientific terms.
			From: report of Donald Davidson (Mental Events [1970]) by William Lycan - Introduction - Ontology p.8
			A reaction: I just don't believe this, mainly because I don't accept that there is a category called 'nonscientific'. All we are saying is that a brain is a hugely complicated object, and we don't properly understand its operations, though we relate to it very well.

	p.33	6620	Davidson sees identity as between events, not states, since they are related in causation
			Full Idea: Davidson's version of the identity theory is couched in terms of events rather than states, because he regards causation as a relation between events.
			From: report of Donald Davidson (Mental Events [1970]) by E.J. Lowe - Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind Ch.2 n12
			A reaction: I think it may be more to the point that the mind is a dynamic thing, and so it consists of events rather than states, and hence we want to know what those events are made up from. I think my chair is causing me to rest above the floor…

	p.62	4081	Anomalous monism says causes are events, so the mental and physical are identical, without identical properties
			Full Idea: Davidson's anomalous monism says that events are causes, so we can identify mental and physical events without having to identify their properties.
			From: report of Donald Davidson (Mental Events [1970]) by Tim Crane - Elements of Mind 2.18
			A reaction: As Fodor insists, a thing like a mountain has properties at different levels of description. We can have 'property dualism' and full-blown reductive identity.

	p.92	2321	If rule-following and reason are 'anomalies', does that make reductionism impossible?
			Full Idea: Davidson takes mental anomalism (that the mind exhibits normativity and rationality), and in particular his claim that there are no laws connecting mental and physical properties, to undermine mind-body reductionism.
			From: report of Donald Davidson (Mental Events [1970]) by Jaegwon Kim - Mind in a Physical World §4 p.092
			A reaction: A nice summary of the core idea of property dualism. Personally I expect the whole lot to be reducible, and to follow laws, but the sheer complexity of the brain permanently bars us from actually doing the reduction.

	p.137	3404	Davidson claims that mental must be physical, to make mental causation possible
			Full Idea: Davidson's thesis is that if mental events of a particular kind cause physical events of a particular kind, and the two kinds are connected by a law, then they must both be physical kinds.
			From: report of Donald Davidson (Mental Events [1970]) by Jaegwon Kim - Philosophy of Mind p.137
			A reaction: Davidson would pretty obviously be right. The whole problem here is the idea of a 'law'. You can only have strict law for simple entities, like particles and natural kinds. The brain is a mess, like weather or explosions.

	p.138	3405	If mental causation is lawless, it is only possible if mental events have physical properties
			Full Idea: Since no laws exist connecting mental and physical properties, purely physical laws must do the causal work, which means mental events enter into causal relations only because they possess physical properties that figure in laws.
			From: report of Donald Davidson (Mental Events [1970]) by Jaegwon Kim - Philosophy of Mind p.138
			A reaction: Surely no such laws exist 'yet'? I can see no plausible argument that psycho-physical laws are impossible. However, the conclusion of this remark seems right. Interaction requires some sort of equality.

	p.196	3524	Causation is either between events, or between descriptions of events
			Full Idea: According to Davidson analyses of causality proceed at two different levels: at the lower level it holds between events regardless of how they are described; higher level explanations hold between descriptions of events, which pick out properties.
			From: report of Donald Davidson (Mental Events [1970]) by Keith T. Maslin - Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind 7.4

	p.198	3526	Whether an event is a causal explanation depends on how it is described
			Full Idea: Davidson says causal explanations hold between descriptions of events and not between the events themselves, so the possibility of events as explanations depends on how they are described (e.g. a wind collapsing a bridge).
			From: report of Donald Davidson (Mental Events [1970]) by Keith T. Maslin - Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind 7.4

	p.202	3529	Reduction is impossible because mind is holistic and brain isn't
			Full Idea: Davidson rejects ontological reduction of mental to physical because propositional attitudes are holistic; there must be extensive coherence among someone's attitudes to treat them as a rational person, and this has no counterpart in physical theory.
			From: report of Donald Davidson (Mental Events [1970]) by Keith T. Maslin - Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind 7.5
			A reaction: I don't find this view persuasive. We treat the weather in simple terms, even though it is almost infinitely complex. Davidson has a Kantian overconfidence in our rationality. A coherence among the parts is needed to be a tree.

	p.218	3429	Multiple realisability was worse news for physicalism than anomalous monism was
			Full Idea: Davidson's argument about psychophysical anomalism has not been embraced by everyone; multiple realisability of mental properties has had a much greater impact in undermining reductionism (and hence type physicalism).
			From: report of Donald Davidson (Mental Events [1970]) by Jaegwon Kim - Philosophy of Mind p.218
			A reaction: My view is that functional states are multiply realisable, but phenomenal states aren't. Fear functions in frogs much as it does in us, but being a frightened frog is nothing like being a frightened human. Their brains are different!

I	p.214	16041	Supervenience of the mental means physical changes mental, and mental changes physical
			Full Idea: The supervenience [of mental characteristics on the physical] might be taken to mean that there cannot be two events alike in all physical respects but differing in some mental respect, or an object cannot differ mentally without altering physically.
			From: Donald Davidson (Mental Events [1970], I)
			A reaction: This is the first occasion on which Davidson introduced his notion of supervenience. Supervenience is often taken to be one-way. The first implies physical causing mental; his second implies that mental causes physical.

p.217	p.217	4983	There are no rules linking thought and behaviour, because endless other thoughts intervene
			Full Idea: We know too much about thought and behaviour to trust exact and universal statements linking them. Beliefs and desires issue in behaviour only as modified and mediated by further beliefs and desires, attitudes and attendings, without limit.
			From: Donald Davidson (Mental Events [1970], p.217)
			A reaction: Now seen as a key objection to behaviourism, and rightly so. However, I am not sure about "without limit", which implies an implausible absolute metaphysical freedom. Davidson goes too far in denying any nomological link between thought and brain.

1970	Semantics for Natural Languages

	p.45	15160	Davidson rejected ordinary meaning, and just used truth and reference instead
			Full Idea: Davidson held that knowledge of truth and reference could give us a notion of meaning. He embraced Quine's rejection of analyticity, synonymy and ordinary meaning, and substituted truth and reference, when there was something genuine to capture.
			From: report of Donald Davidson (Semantics for Natural Languages [1970]) by Scott Soames - Philosophy of Language 2.3
			A reaction: I always get a warm glow when anyone suggests that the concept of meaning involves the concept of truth. I largely reject Quine. Davidson made a helpful suggestion!

2	p.229	14612	Davidson aimed to show that language is structured by first-order logic
			Full Idea: Davidson's program was to show the underlying structure of natural languages as that of first-order logic.
			From: report of Donald Davidson (Semantics for Natural Languages [1970], 2) by J.J.C. Smart - The Tenseless Theory of Time 2
			A reaction: First order logic just reasons about a domain of objects with predicates attached to them. Language appears to refer to properties and relations as well as objects.

1973	In Defence of Convention T

	p.276	7331	A theory of meaning comes down to translating sentences into Fregean symbolic logic
			Full Idea: For a theory of meaning for a fragment of natural language, what Davidson requires, in effect, is that the sentences be translatable into the language of Frege's symbolic logic.
			From: report of Donald Davidson (In Defence of Convention T [1973]) by David Macey - Penguin Dictionary of Critical Theory
			A reaction: This assumes the adequacy of Fregean logic, which seems unlikely. Is this the culmination of Leibniz's dream of a fully logical language - so that anything that won't fit into our logical form is ruled (logical positivist style) as meaningless?

1973	Freedom to Act

	p.112	19698	Deviant causal chain: a reason causes an action, but isn't the reason for which it was performed
			Full Idea: A 'deviant causal chain' is when an agent has a reason for performing an action, and for the reason to cause the performance, without that being the reason for which the agent performed it.
			From: report of Donald Davidson (Freedom to Act [1973]) by Ram Neta - The Basing Relation II
			A reaction: Davidson's thesis is that 'reasons are causes'. This was a problem he faced. I think this discussion is now obscured by the complex and multi-layered account of action which is emerging from neuroscience.

1973	The Material Mind

p.259	p.259	6386	In no important way can psychology be reduced to the physical sciences
			Full Idea: There is no important sense in which psychology can be reduced to the physical sciences.
			From: Donald Davidson (The Material Mind [1973], p.259)
			A reaction: In no 'important' way can the beauty of the Lake District be reduced to geology - but it is geology. 'Important' to whom? To a metaphysician, I would say psychology does reduce to physics, and that is important, but it is not important to a psychologist.

1974	The Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme

p.11	p.39	19044	Saying truths fit experience adds nothing to truth; nothing makes sentences true
			Full Idea: The notion of fitting the totality of experience ...adds nothing intelligible to the simple concept of being true. ....Nothing, ...no thing, makes sentences and theories true: not experience, not surface irritations, not the world.
			From: Donald Davidson (The Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme [1974], p.11), quoted by Willard Quine - On the Very Idea of a Third Dogma p.39
			A reaction: If you don't have a concept of what normally makes a sentence true, I don't see how you go about distinguishing what is true from what is false. You can't just examine the sentence to see if it has the 'primitive' property of truth. Holism is involved....

p.184	p.184	6398	Different points of view make sense, but they must be plotted on a common background
			Full Idea: Different points of view make sense, but only if there is a common co-ordinate system on which to plot them.
			From: Donald Davidson (The Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme [1974], p.184)
			A reaction: This seems right to me. I am very struck by the close similarities between people from wildly differing cultural backgrounds, as seen, for example, at the Olympic Games.

p.184	p.184	6399	Criteria of translation give us the identity of conceptual schemes
			Full Idea: Studying the criteria of translation is a way of focusing on criteria of identity for conceptual schemes.
			From: Donald Davidson (The Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme [1974], p.184)
			A reaction: This is why it was an inspired idea of Quine's to make translation a central topic in philosophy. We must be cautious, though, about saying that the language is the conceptual scheme, as that leaves animals with no scheme at all.

p.189	p.189	6400	Without the dualism of scheme and content, not much is left of empiricism
			Full Idea: The third dogma of empiricism is the dualism of scheme and content, of organizing system and something waiting to be organized, which cannot be made intelligible and defensible. If we give it up, it is not clear that any distinctive empiricism remains.
			From: Donald Davidson (The Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme [1974], p.189)
			A reaction: The first two dogmas were 'analyticity' and 'reductionism', as identified by Quine in 1953. Presumably Hume's Principles of Association (Idea 2189) would be an example of a scheme. A key issue is whether there is any 'pure' content.

1975	Thought and Talk

p.14	p.14	6394	The pattern of sentences held true gives sentences their meaning
			Full Idea: Although most utterances are not concerned with truth, it is the pattern of sentences held true that gives sentences their meaning.
			From: Donald Davidson (Thought and Talk [1975], p.14)
			A reaction: Davidson's distinctive version of meaning holism, as opposed to Quine's rather behaviouristic version. I agree that we relate to people through the pattern of sentences they hold true, but I am unconvinced that this 'gives sentences their meaning'.

p.17	p.17	6395	An understood sentence can be used for almost anything; it isn't language if it has only one use
			Full Idea: Once a sentence is understood, an utterance of it may be used to serve almost any extra-linguistic purpose; an instrument that could be put to only one use would lack autonomy of meaning, which means it should not be counted as language.
			From: Donald Davidson (Thought and Talk [1975], p.17)
			A reaction: I find this point very appealing, in opposition to the Wittgenstein view of meaning as use. Passwords seem to me a striking case of the separation of meaning and use. I like the phrase 'autonomy of meaning'. Random sticks can form a word.

p.170	p.170	11144	Concepts are only possible in a language community
			Full Idea: A private attitude is not intelligible except as an adjustment to the public norms provided by language. It follows that a creature must be a member of speech community if it is to have the concept of belief.
			From: Donald Davidson (Thought and Talk [1975], p.170)
			A reaction: This obviously draws on Wittgenstein's private language argument, and strikes me as blatantly wrong, because I take higher animals to have concepts without language. Pure vision gives rise to concepts. I don't even think they are necessarily conscious.

p.170	p.170	11145	Having a belief involves the possibility of being mistaken
			Full Idea: Someone cannot have a belief unless he understands the possibility of being mistaken.
			From: Donald Davidson (Thought and Talk [1975], p.170)
			A reaction: If you pretend to throw a ball for a dog, but don't release it, the dog experiences being mistaken very dramatically.

p.20	p.20	6396	A sentence is held true because of a combination of meaning and belief
			Full Idea: A sentence is held true because of two factors: what the holder takes the sentence to mean, and what he believes.
			From: Donald Davidson (Thought and Talk [1975], p.20)
			A reaction: A key question is whether a belief (e.g. an imagistic one, or one held by an animal) could be true, even though no sentence is involved. Linguistic philosophers tend to avoid this question, or assume the answer is 'no'.

p.22	p.22	6397	The concept of belief can only derive from relationship to a speech community
			Full Idea: We have the idea of belief from its role in the interpretation of language; as a private attitude it is not intelligible except in relation to public language. So a creature must be a member of a speech community to have the concept of belief.
			From: Donald Davidson (Thought and Talk [1975], p.22)
			A reaction: This shows how Wittgenstein's Private Language Argument (e.g. Idea 4152) hovers behind Davidson's philosophy. The idea is quite persuasive. A solitary creature just follows its mental states. The question of whether it believes them is a meta-thought.

p.8	p.8	6392	Thought depends on speech
			Full Idea: The thesis I want to refine and then argue for is that thought depends on speech.
			From: Donald Davidson (Thought and Talk [1975], p.8)
			A reaction: This has the instant and rather implausible implication that animals don't think. He is not, of course, saying that all thought is speech, which would leave out thinking in images. You can't do much proper thought without concepts and propositions.

p.9	p.9	6393	A creature doesn't think unless it interprets another's speech
			Full Idea: A creature cannot have a thought unless it is an interpreter of the speech of another.
			From: Donald Davidson (Thought and Talk [1975], p.9)
			A reaction: His use of the word 'creature' shows that he is perfectly aware of the issue of whether animals think, and he is, presumably, denying it. At first glance this sounds silly, but maybe animals don't really 'think', in our sense of the word.

1977	The Method of Truth in Metaphysics

§II	p.295	4041	Sentences held true determine the meanings of the words they contain
			Full Idea: Sentences held true (the linguistic representatives of beliefs) determine the meanings of the words they contain.
			From: Donald Davidson (The Method of Truth in Metaphysics [1977], §II)
			A reaction: Maybe. Historically, truth and belief presumably precede words and sentences. But words separate off from beliefs very easily. I'm not convinced. Words initiate language, not beliefs?

§III	p.303	4042	Metaphysics requires the idea of people (speakers) located in space and time
			Full Idea: An intelligible metaphysics will assign a central place to the idea of people (= speakers) with a location in public space and time.
			From: Donald Davidson (The Method of Truth in Metaphysics [1977], §III)
			A reaction: The 'location' is the interesting bit, requiring people to be bodies, not abstractions. A big, plausible claim, but hard to prove.

1977	Reality without Reference

p.132	p.132	6387	A minimum requirement for a theory of meaning is that it include an account of truth
			Full Idea: Whatever else it embraces, a theory of meaning must include an account of truth - a statement of the conditions under which an arbitrary sentence of the language is true.
			From: Donald Davidson (Reality without Reference [1977], p.132)
			A reaction: It is a moot point whether we can define meaning if we assume truth, or if we can define truth by assuming meaning. Tarski seems to presuppose meaning when he defines truth (Idea 2345). I like Davidson's taking of truth as basic.

p.134	p.134	6388	Is reference the key place where language and the world meet?
			Full Idea: The essential question is whether reference is the, or at least one, place where there is direct contact between linguistic theory and events, actions, or objects described in nonlinguistic terms.
			From: Donald Davidson (Reality without Reference [1977], p.134)
			A reaction: How do you 'describe objects in nonlinguistic terms'? The causal theory of reference (e.g. Idea 4957) is designed to plug language straight into the world via reference. It simplifies things nicely, but I don't quite believe it.

p.135	p.135	6389	To explain the reference of a name, you must explain its sentence-role, so reference can't be defined nonlinguistically
			Full Idea: It is inconceivable that one should be able to explain the relationship between 'Kilimanjiro' and Kilimanjiro without first explaining the role of the word in sentences; hence there is no chance of explaining reference directly in nonlinguistic terms.
			From: Donald Davidson (Reality without Reference [1977], p.135)
			A reaction: I point at the mountain, and a local says 'Kilimanjiro'? There is a 'gavagai'-type problem with that. The prior question might be 'what is it about this word that enables it to have a role in sentences?' Unlike whimpering or belching.

p.136	p.136	6390	With a holistic approach, we can give up reference in empirical theories of language
			Full Idea: I defend a version of the holistic approach, and urge that we must give up the concept of reference as basic to an empirical theory of language.
			From: Donald Davidson (Reality without Reference [1977], p.136)
			A reaction: He proposes to connect language to the world via the concept of truth, rather than of reference. It is a brilliant idea, and is the key issue in philosophy of language. I go back to animals, which seem to care about situations rather than things.

p.137	p.137	6391	A theory of truth tells us how communication by language is possible
			Full Idea: A theory of truth lets us answer the underlying question how communication by language is possible.
			From: Donald Davidson (Reality without Reference [1977], p.137)
			A reaction: If, instead, you explain communication by understood intentions (á la Grice), you have to say more about what sort of intentions are meant. If you use reference, you still have more to say about the meaning of sentences. Davidson looks good.

1978

Intending

	p.8	20024	Davidson gave up reductive accounts of intention, and said it was a primitive
			Full Idea: Later Davidson dropped his reductive treatment of intentions (in terms of 'pro-attitudes' and other beliefs), and accepted that intentions are irreducible, and distinct from pro-attitudes.
			From: report of Donald Davidson (Intending [1978]) by Wilson,G/Schpall,S - Action 2
			A reaction: Only a philosopher would say that intentions cannot be reduced to something else. Since I have a very physicalist view of the mind, I incline to reduce them to powers and dispositions of physical matter.

p.99	p.120	20076	An intending is a judgement that the action is desirable
			Full Idea: We can identify an intentional action ...with an all-out conditional judgement that the action is desirable. ...In the case of pure intending, I now suggest that the intention simply is an all-out judgement.
			From: Donald Davidson (Intending [1978], p.99), quoted by Rowland Stout - Action 8 'Davidson's'
			A reaction: 'Pure' intending seems to be what Stout calls 'prior' intending, which is clearer. This still strikes me as obviously false. I judge that it is desirable that I make a cup of coffee, but secretly I'm hoping someone else will make it for me.

1978	What Metaphors Mean

p.29	p.29	7775	Understanding a metaphor is a creative act, with no rules
			Full Idea: Understanding a metaphor is as much a creative endeavour as making a metaphor, and as little guided by rules.
			From: Donald Davidson (What Metaphors Mean [1978], p.29)
			A reaction: This is good news for literature studies courses. Davidson's point is that the metaphor itself only gives you a literal meaning, so it doesn't tell you how to interpret it. It seems an attractive proposal.

p.30	p.30	7776	Metaphors just mean what their words literally mean
			Full Idea: Metaphors mean what the words, in their most literal interpretation, mean, and nothing more.
			From: Donald Davidson (What Metaphors Mean [1978], p.30)
			A reaction: This pronouncement must be the result of Davidson anguishing over the truth conditions for metaphors, which are usually either taken to have a 'metaphorical meaning', or to be abbreviated similes. He solved his problem at a stroke! Plausible.

p.40	p.40	7777	We accept a metaphor when we see the sentence is false
			Full Idea: It is only when a sentence is taken to be false that we accept it as a metaphor.
			From: Donald Davidson (What Metaphors Mean [1978], p.40)
			A reaction: This strikes me as a very nice and true generalisation, even though Davidson mentions "no man is an island" as a counterexample. We thirst for meaning, and switch to a second meaning when the first one looks peculiar.

1980	Intro to 'Essays on Actions and Events'

p.xi	p.-6	6384	The notion of cause is essential to acting for reasons, intentions, agency, akrasia, and free will
			Full Idea: My thesis is that the ordinary notion of cause is essential to understanding what it is to act with a reason, to have an intention to act, to be an agent, to act counter to one's own best judgement, or to act freely.
			From: Donald Davidson (Intro to 'Essays on Actions and Events' [1980], p.xi)
			A reaction: I cautiously agree, particularly with idea that causation is essential to acting as an agent. Since I believe 'free will' to be a complete delusion, that part of his thesis doesn't interest me. The hard part is understanding acting for a reason.

p.xi	p.-6	6383	Cause unites our picture of the universe; without it, mental and physical will separate
			Full Idea: The concept of cause is what holds together our picture of the universe, a picture that would otherwise disintegrate into a diptych of the mental and the physical.
			From: Donald Davidson (Intro to 'Essays on Actions and Events' [1980], p.xi)
			A reaction: Davidson seems to be the one who put mental causation at the centre of philosophy. By then denying that there are any 'psycho-physical' laws, he seems to me to have re-opened the metaphysical gap he says he was trying to close.

p.xii	p.-5	6385	The causally strongest reason may not be the reason the actor judges to be best
			Full Idea: I defend my causal view of action by arguing that a reason that is causally strongest need not be a reason deemed by the actor to provide the strongest (best) grounds for acting.
			From: Donald Davidson (Intro to 'Essays on Actions and Events' [1980], p.xii)
			A reaction: If I smoke a cigarette against my better judgement, it is not clear to me how the desire to smoke it, which overcomes my judgement not to smoke it, counts as the causally strongest 'reason'. We seem to have two different senses of 'reason' here.

1983	Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge

	p.3	19081	Coherence with a set of propositions suggests we can know the proposition corresponds
			Full Idea: Davidson argues that the coherence of a set of propositions with a set of beliefs is a good indication that the proposition corresponds to objective facts and that we can know that propositions correspond.
			From: report of Donald Davidson (Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge [1983]) by Keith Donnellan - Putting Humpty Dumpty Together Again §2.2
			A reaction: Young calls this an 'epistemological route to coherentism'. Davidson is sometimes cited as a fan of the coherence theory of truth, but this just seems to accept Russell's point that coherence is a good test for truth.

	p.34	8255	Davidson says the world influences us causally; I say it influences us rationally
			Full Idea: Davidson urges that we should hold that the world exerts a merely causal influence on our thinking, but I am trying to describe a way in which the world exerts a rational influence on our thinking.
			From: comment on Donald Davidson (Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge [1983]) by John McDowell - Mind and World II.5
			A reaction: McDowell seems to be fighting for the existence of 'pure' reason in a way that is hard to defend with a thoroughly materialist view of human brains. If the world is coherent, then maybe it is rational, and so has reasons to offer us?

16.6	p.171	18703	Davidson's Cogito: 'I think, therefore I am generally right'
			Full Idea: Davidson's Cogito has the form 'I think, therefore I am generally right'.
			From: report of Donald Davidson (Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge [1983], 16.6) by Tim Button - The Limits of Reason
			A reaction: On the whole I would subscribe to this Cogito (as Button calls it), from an evolutionary perspective. There would just be no point in thought if it wasn't generally right in everyday activity.

I.6	p.14	8252	Davidson believes experience is non-conceptual, and outside the space of reasons
			Full Idea: Davidson thinks that experience can be nothing but an extra-conceptual impact on sensibility. So he concludes that experience must be outside the space of reasons.
			From: report of Donald Davidson (Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge [1983], I.6) by John McDowell - Mind and World I
			A reaction: McDowell's challenge to the view that experience is extra-conceptual seems to be the key debate among modern empiricists. My only intuition in this area is that we should beware of all-or-nothing solutions to such problems.

p.156	p.156	8801	Coherent justification says only beliefs can be reasons for holding other beliefs
			Full Idea: What distinguishes a coherence theory of justification is simply the claim that nothing can count as a reason for holding a belief except another belief.
			From: Donald Davidson (Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge [1983], p.156)
			A reaction: I think I agree fully with this. Red patches and headaches I count as evidence rather than as reasons. Since a red patch can be hallucinatory, and a headache can be dreamed, they can't possibly embody true propositions without critical evaluation.

p.157	p.157	8802	Sensations lack the content to be logical; they cause beliefs, but they cannot justify them
			Full Idea: The relation between a sensation and a belief cannot be logical, since sensations are not beliefs or propositional attitudes. The relation must be causal. Sensations cause some beliefs, but they do not show why the belief is justified.
			From: Donald Davidson (Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge [1983], p.157)
			A reaction: This is, I am beginning to think, the single most important idea in the whole of modern epistemology. Animals have beliefs caused in this way, and because they only have simple beliefs about immediate things, most of their beliefs are true.

p.158	p.158	8804	Reasons for beliefs are not the same as evidence
			Full Idea: We must find a reason for supposing most of our beliefs are true that is not a form of evidence.
			From: Donald Davidson (Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge [1983], p.158)
			A reaction: This simple observation strikes me as being a key truth in epistemology. It is the same confusion that creates Jackson's Knowledge Argument (Idea 7377) against physicalism (that experiencing red can be thought to be knowledge).

p.161	p.161	8805	Skepticism is false because our utterances agree, because they are caused by the same objects
			Full Idea: What stands in the way of global skepticism of the senses is the fact that we must take the objects of a belief to be the causes of that belief. And our utterances mean the same thing because belief in their truth is caused by the same objects.
			From: Donald Davidson (Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge [1983], p.161)
			A reaction: This is hardly a knock-down argument against scepticism, but it builds a nice picture. The second half extends the Private Language Argument (e.g. Idea 4158). But I still have non-existent conversations about non-existent things in my dreams.

p.162	p.162	8806	The concepts of belief and truth are linked, since beliefs are meant to fit reality
			Full Idea: Knowing what a belief is brings with it the concept of objective truth, for the notion of a belief is the notion of a state that may or may not jibe with reality.
			From: Donald Davidson (Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge [1983], p.162)
			A reaction: I find any discussion of belief that makes no reference to truth (as in Hume) quite puzzling. I can understand it when a belief is just triggered by a sensation ('this is hot'), but not when a belief arrives after careful comparison of reasons.

1987	Knowing One's Own Mind

	p.144	6175	External identification doesn't mean external location, as with sunburn
			Full Idea: Davidson observes that the inference from a thought being identified by a relation to something outside the head does not entail that the thought is not wholly in the head, just as sunburn is identified by external factors, but is still in the skin.
			From: report of Donald Davidson (Knowing One's Own Mind [1987]) by Mark Rowlands - Externalism Ch.8
			A reaction: Rowlands (an externalist) agrees, and this strikes me as correct, and it needs to be one of the fixed points in any assessment of externalism.

1987	Problems in the Explanation of Action

	p.120	20074	We can keep Davidson's account of intentions in action, by further explaining prior intentions
			Full Idea: Davidson's original account of intentions might still stand if we could accept that prior intentions are different in kind from intentions with which one acts.
			From: report of Donald Davidson (Problems in the Explanation of Action [1987]) by Rowland Stout - Action 8 'Davidson's'
			A reaction: Davidson says prior intention is all-out judgement of desirability. Prior intentions are more deliberate, with the other intentions as a presumed background to action. Compare Sartre's dual account of the self.

1990	Epistemology Externalized

p.197	p.197	8872	It is widely supposed that externalism cannot be reconciled with first-person authority
			Full Idea: It has been widely supposed that externalism, which holds that the contents of a person's propositional attitudes are partly determined by factors of which the person may be ignorant, cannot be reconciled with first-person authority.
			From: Donald Davidson (Epistemology Externalized [1990], p.197)
			A reaction: It is certainly a bit puzzling if you go around saying 'Actually, people don't know their own thoughts'. Davidson aims to defend first-person authority. The full story is developed in Tyler Burge's views on 'anti-individualism'.

p.198	p.198	8873	The cause of a usage determines meaning, but why is the microstructure of water relevant?
			Full Idea: While I agree that the usual cause of the use of the word determines what it means, I do not see why sameness of microstructure is necessarily the relevant similarity that determines my reference of the word 'water'.
			From: Donald Davidson (Epistemology Externalized [1990], p.198)
			A reaction: This is a problem for essentialists who build their views on semantic considerations. But the stability of what causes 'water' thoughts is the microstructure of water. However, that is an explantion of meaning, not a definition of it.

p.199	p.199	8874	It is hard to interpret a speaker's actions if we take a broad view of the content
			Full Idea: It will explain a speaker's actions far better if we interpret him as he intended to be interpreted, than if we suppose he means and thinks what someone else might mean and think who used the same words 'correctly'.
			From: Donald Davidson (Epistemology Externalized [1990], p.199)
			A reaction: This comes down to the fact that our actions have to be motivated by internal meanings. If I defer to experts on the essence of gold, I still buy gold according to how I myself understand it. So meaning has two components?

1990	The Structure and Content of Truth

p.304	p.23	18902	Correspondence theories can't tell you what truths correspond to
			Full Idea: The real objection to correspondence theories is that such theories fail to provide entities to which truth vehicles (as statements, sentence, or utterances) can be said to correspond.
			From: Donald Davidson (The Structure and Content of Truth [1990], p.304), quoted by Fred Sommers - Intellectual Autobiography Notes 23
			A reaction: This is the remark which provoked Sommers to come out with Idea 18901, which strikes me as rather profound.

1991	Three Varieties of Knowledge

	p.124	10346	Knowing other minds rests on knowing both one's own mind and the external world
			Full Idea: Davidson argues that knowledge of other minds presupposes knowledge of one's own mind, and that there is no knowledge of other minds without knowledge of the external world.
			From: report of Donald Davidson (Three Varieties of Knowledge [1991]) by Michael Dummett - Common Sense and Physics Ch.10
			A reaction: Davidson't argument is actually hard to swallow because it is so long and complex. Compressing the point makes it begin to sound like a variant of the argument from analogy.

	p.127	10347	Objectivity is intersubjectivity
			Full Idea: An entity is objective in so far as it is intersubjective.
			From: Donald Davidson (Three Varieties of Knowledge [1991]), quoted by Martin Kusch - Knowledge by Agreement Ch.10
			A reaction: This thought baffled me until I saw it in the context of socialised epistemology. Effectively objectivity is subsumed under justification, which in turn is seen in a social context, not private to individuals.

p.207	p.207	8866	If we know other minds through behaviour, but not our own, we should assume they aren't like me
			Full Idea: If the mental states of others are known only through their behavioral and other outward manifestations, while this is not true of our own mental states, why should we think our own mental states are anything like those of others?
			From: Donald Davidson (Three Varieties of Knowledge [1991], p.207)
			A reaction: His point is that if you seriously doubt other minds, you should follow through on the implications. But that is to treat it as a theory about other minds, rather an a sceptical worry. Descartes didn't walk into walls while writing Meditation 1.

p.209	p.209	8867	A belief requires understanding the distinctions of true-and-false, and appearance-and-reality
			Full Idea: Having a belief demands in addition appreciating the contrast between true belief and false, between appearance and reality, mere seeming and being.
			From: Donald Davidson (Three Varieties of Knowledge [1991], p.209)
			A reaction: This sets the bar very high for belief (never mind knowledge), and seems to imply that animals don't have beliefs. How should we describe their cognitive states then? I would say these criteria only apply to actual knowledge.

p.209	p.209	8868	Objective truth arises from interpersonal communication
			Full Idea: The source of the concept of objective truth is interpersonal communication.
			From: Donald Davidson (Three Varieties of Knowledge [1991], p.209)
			A reaction: This is a distinctively Davidsonian idea, arising out of Wittgenstein's Private Language Argument. We could go a step further, and just say that 'objectivity is a social concept'. Davidson more or less pleads guilty to pragmatism in this essay.

p.211	p.211	8869	The principle of charity attributes largely consistent logic and largely true beliefs to speakers
			Full Idea: Concerning charity, the Principle of Coherence seeks logical consistency in the thought of the speaker, and the Principle of Correspondence seeks a similar response to features of the world to that of an interpreter. The speaker has logic and true belief.
			From: Donald Davidson (Three Varieties of Knowledge [1991], p.211)
			A reaction: Davidson adds a Kantian commitment to pure and universal reason to the very sceptical framework created by Quine. I agree with Davidson, but it seems more like faith than like an argument or an empirical observation.

p.213	p.213	8870	Content of thought is established through communication, so knowledge needs other minds
			Full Idea: Until a baseline has been established by communication with someone else, there is no point is saying one's own thoughts have a propositional content. Hence knowledge of another mind is essential all thought and all knowledge.
			From: Donald Davidson (Three Varieties of Knowledge [1991], p.213)
			A reaction: This really is building a skyscraper on the slightly shaky claims of the Private Language Argument (e.g. Idea 4158). Animals are so important in discussions of this kind. Is an albatross more or less devoid of thought and belief?

1994	Davidson on himself

p.231	p.231	3966	The correct conclusion is ontological monism combined with conceptual dualism
			Full Idea: My basic premises lead to the conclusion of ontological monism coupled with conceptual dualism (like Spinoza, except that he denied mental causation).
			From: Donald Davidson (Davidson on himself [1994], p.231)
			A reaction: 'Conceptual dualism' implies no real difference, but 'property dualism' is better, suggesting different properties when viewed from different angles.

p.231	p.231	3963	There are no strict psychophysical laws connecting mental and physical events
			Full Idea: There are no strict psychophysical laws (that is, laws connecting mental events under their mental descriptions with physical events under their physical descriptions).
			From: Donald Davidson (Davidson on himself [1994], p.231)
			A reaction: This is clearly open to question. It may be just that no human mind could ever grasp such laws, given their probable complexity.

p.231	p.231	3960	There are no such things as minds, but people have mental properties
			Full Idea: There are no such things as minds, but people have mental properties.
			From: Donald Davidson (Davidson on himself [1994], p.231)
			A reaction: I think this is right. It fits with Searle's notion of consciousness as a property, like the liquidity of water. I don't panic if I think "I have no mind, but I have extraordinary properties".

p.231	p.231	3965	Mental entities do not add to the physical furniture of the world
			Full Idea: Mental entities do not add to the physical furniture of the world.
			From: Donald Davidson (Davidson on himself [1994], p.231)
			A reaction: This seems to me clearly true, however we propose to characterise mental events.

p.231	p.231	3964	If the mind is an anomaly, this makes reduction of the mental to the physical impossible
			Full Idea: If there are no strict psychophysical laws, this rules out reductionism, either by definition of mental predicates in physical terms, or by way of bridging laws.
			From: Donald Davidson (Davidson on himself [1994], p.231)
			A reaction: But it is by no means clear that there are no psycho-physical laws. How could this be known a priori?

p.231	p.231	3961	Obviously all mental events are causally related to physical events
			Full Idea: All mental events are causally related to physical events. ..This seems obvious.
			From: Donald Davidson (Davidson on himself [1994], p.231)
			A reaction: All mental events are physically caused. Some bodily physical events result from mental events. Probably all mental events have some effect of other mental events (all of which are in some sense physical).

p.231	p.231	3962	Cause and effect relations between events must follow strict laws
			Full Idea: If two events are related as cause and effect, there is a strict law under which they may be subsumed.
			From: Donald Davidson (Davidson on himself [1994], p.231)
			A reaction: Davidson admits that this is open to challenge (though Hume and Kant supported it). It does seem to be central to our understanding of nature.

p.232	p.232	3969	There are no ultimate standards of rationality, since we only assess others by our own standard
			Full Idea: It makes no sense to speak of comparing or agreeing on ultimate standards of rationality, since it is our own standards in each case to which we must turn in interpreting others. This is not a failure of objectivity, but where 'questions come to an end'.
			From: Donald Davidson (Davidson on himself [1994], p.232)
			A reaction: This seems wrong, given the commitment to truth and charity in interpretation. He could have said the same about perception, but I doubt if he would.

p.232	p.232	3967	Absence of all rationality would be absence of thought
			Full Idea: To imagine a totally irrational animal is to imagine an animal without thought.
			From: Donald Davidson (Davidson on himself [1994], p.232)
			A reaction: This wouldn't be so clear without the theory of evolution, which suggests that only the finders of truth last long enough to breed.

p.232	p.232	3968	Propositions explain nothing without an explanation of how sentences manage to name them
			Full Idea: The idea of a proposition is unhelpful, until it is explained how exactly the words in the contained sentence manage to name or describe a proposition (which even Frege failed to achieve).
			From: Donald Davidson (Davidson on himself [1994], p.232)
			A reaction: It seems obvious to me that there are brain events best labelled as propositions, even if their fit with language is puzzling.

p.233	p.233	3970	Thought is only fully developed if we communicate with others
			Full Idea: We would have no fully-fledge thoughts if we were not in communication with others.
			From: Donald Davidson (Davidson on himself [1994], p.233)
			A reaction: This seems a plausible empirical observation, though I would doubt any a priori proof of it. If animals could speak, they would become intellectuals?

p.233	p.233	3971	There is simply no alternative to the 'principle of charity' in interpreting what others do
			Full Idea: The 'principle of charity' is a misleading term, since there is no alternative if we want to make sense of the attitudes and actions of the agents around us.
			From: Donald Davidson (Davidson on himself [1994], p.233)
			A reaction: I suppose so, but only with a background of evolutionary theory. I would necessarily assume charity if a robot spoke to me.

p.233	p.233	3972	Truth and objectivity depend on a community of speakers to interpret what they mean
			Full Idea: The basis on which the concepts of truth and objectivity depend for application is a community of understanding, agreement among speakers on how each is to be understood.
			From: Donald Davidson (Davidson on himself [1994], p.233)
			A reaction: Obviously all understanding is, in practice, an interpretation by a community, but that isn't what 'truth' means. We mean 'true independently of any community'.

p.234	p.234	3973	Without a teacher, the concept of 'getting things right or wrong' is meaningless
			Full Idea: Without a 'teacher', nothing would give content to the idea that there is a difference between getting things right and getting them wrong.
			From: Donald Davidson (Davidson on himself [1994], p.234)
			A reaction: Seems right. A group of speculators with no one in the role of 'teacher' would seem to be paralysed with uncertain (except where judgements are very obvious).

p.235	p.235	3974	Our meanings are partly fixed by events of which we may be ignorant
			Full Idea: What we mean by what we say is partly fixed by events of which we may be ignorant.
			From: Donald Davidson (Davidson on himself [1994], p.235)
			A reaction: There is 'strict and literal meaning', which is fixed by the words, even if I don't know what I am saying. But 'speaker's meaning' is surely a pure matter of a state of mind?

1997	Truth Rehabilitated

p.10	p.10	23287	Disquotation only accounts for truth if the metalanguage contains the object language
			Full Idea: Disquotation cannot pretend to give a complete account of the concept of truth, since it works only in the special case where the metalanguage contains the object language. Neither can contain their own truth predicate.
			From: Donald Davidson (Truth Rehabilitated [1997], p.10)
			A reaction: Presumably more sophisticated and complete accounts would need a further account of translation between languages - which explains Quine's interest in that topic. […see this essay, p.12]

P.11	p.11	23288	When Tarski defines truth for different languages, how do we know it is a single concept?
			Full Idea: We have to wonder how we know that it is some single concept which Tarski indicates how to define for each of a number of well-behaved languages.
			From: Donald Davidson (Truth Rehabilitated [1997], P.11)
			A reaction: Davidson says that Tarski makes the assumption that it is a single concept, but fails to demonstrate the fact. This resembles Frege's Julius Caesar problem - of how you know whether your number definition has defined a number.

p.13	p.13	23289	Knowing the potential truth conditions of a sentence is necessary and sufficient for understanding
			Full Idea: It is clear that someone who knows under what conditions a sentence would be true understands that sentence, …and if someone does not know under what conditions it would be true then they do not understand it.
			From: Donald Davidson (Truth Rehabilitated [1997], p.13)
			A reaction: I've always subscribed to this view. Langauge is meaningless if you can't relate it to reality, and I don't think there could be a language without an intuitive notion of truth.

p.13	p.13	23290	It could be that the use of a sentence is explained by its truth conditions
			Full Idea: It may be that sentences are used as they are because of their truth conditions, and they have the truth conditions they do because of how they are used.
			From: Donald Davidson (Truth Rehabilitated [1997], p.13)
			A reaction: I've always taken the attempt to explain meaning by use as absurd. It is similar to trying to explain mind in terms of function. In each case, what is the intrinsic nature of the thing, which makes that use or that function possible?

p.16	p.16	23292	Correspondence can't be defined, but it shows how truth depends on the world
			Full Idea: Correspondence, while it is empty as a definition, does capture the thought that truth depends on how the world is.
			From: Donald Davidson (Truth Rehabilitated [1997], p.16)
			A reaction: Just don't try to give a precise account of the correspondence between two things (thoughts and facts) which are so utterly different in character.

p.16	p.16	23291	Without truth, both language and thought are impossible
			Full Idea: Without a grasp of the concept of truth, not only language, but thought itself, is impossible.
			From: Donald Davidson (Truth Rehabilitated [1997], p.16)
			A reaction: Davidson never mentions animals, but I like this idea because it points to importance of truth for animals as well. I say that truth is relevant to any mind that makes judgements - and quite small animals (e.g. ants and spiders) make judgements.

p.3	p.3	23284	Plato's Forms confused truth with the most eminent truths, so only Truth itself is completely true
			Full Idea: Plato's conflation of abstract universals with entities of supreme value reinforced the confusion of truth with the most eminent truths. …The only perfect exemplar of a Form is the Form itself, …and only truth itself is completely true.
			From: Donald Davidson (Truth Rehabilitated [1997], p.3)
			A reaction: Even non-subscribers to Plato often talk as if there were some grand thing called the Truth with a capital T, quite often used in a religious context. Truth is the hallmark of successful (non-fanciful) thought.

p.5	p.5	23285	If we try to identify facts precisely, they all melt into one (as the Slingshot Argument proves)
			Full Idea: If we try to provide a serious semantics for reference to facts, we discover that they melt into one; there is no telling them apart. The relevant argument (the 'Slingshot') was credited to Frege by Alonso Church.
			From: Donald Davidson (Truth Rehabilitated [1997], p.5)
			A reaction: This sounds like good grounds for not attempting to be too precise. 'There are bluebells in my local wood' identifies a fact by words, but even an animal can distinguish this fact. Only a logician dreams of making its content precise.

P.6	p.6	23286	Truth can't be a goal, because we can neither recognise it nor confim it
			Full Idea: Since it is neither visible as a target, nor recognisable when achieved, there is no point in calling truth a goal. We should only aim at increasing confidence in our beliefs, by collecting further evidence or checking our calculations.
			From: Donald Davidson (Truth Rehabilitated [1997], P.6)
			A reaction: This is mainly aimed at pragmatists, but Davidson obviously subscribes (as do I) to their fallibilist view of knowledge.

1998	Replies to Critics

p.323	p.323	18702	Names, descriptions and predicates refer to things; without that, language and thought are baffling
			Full Idea: The simple thesis that names and descriptions often refer to things, and that predicates often have an extension in the world of things, is obvious, and essential to the most elementary appreciation of both language and the thoughts we express.
			From: Donald Davidson (Replies to Critics [1998], p.323)
			A reaction: In 1983 Davidson had been a rare modern champion of the coherence theory of truth, but this is his clearest later renunciation of that view (and quite right too).

1999	The Folly of Trying to Define Truth

p.20	p.20	23294	It is common to doubt truth when discussing it, but totally accept it when discussing knowledge
			Full Idea: You are following Plato's lead if you worry about the concept of truth when it is the focus of your attention, but you pretend you understand it when trying to cope with knowledge (or belief, memory, perception etc.).
			From: Donald Davidson (The Folly of Trying to Define Truth [1999], p.20)
			A reaction: Nice to find someone pointing out this absurdity. He says Hume does the same with doubts about the external world, which he ignores when discussing other minds. Belief is holding true; only truths are actually remembered….

p.21	p.21	23296	We can elucidate indefinable truth, but showing its relation to other concepts
			Full Idea: We can still say revealing things about truth, by relating it to other concepts like belief, desire, cause and action.
			From: Donald Davidson (The Folly of Trying to Define Truth [1999], p.21)
			A reaction: The trickiest concept to link it to is meaning. I think Davidson's view points to the Axiomatic account of truth, which flourished soon after Davidson wrote this. We can give rules for the correct use of 'true'.

p.21	p.21	23295	Truth cannot be reduced to anything simpler
			Full Idea: We cannot hope to underpin the concept of truth with something more transparent or easier to grasp.
			From: Donald Davidson (The Folly of Trying to Define Truth [1999], p.21)
			A reaction: I suppose precise accounts of correspondence or coherence are offered as replacements for truth, but neither of those ever seem to be possible. I agree with accepting truth as a primitive.

p.23	p.23	23297	The language to define truth needs a finite vocabulary, to make the definition finite
			Full Idea: If the definition of the truth predicate is to be finite (Tarski insisted on this), the definition must take advantage of the fact that sentences, though potentially infinite in number, are constructed from a finite vocabulary.
			From: Donald Davidson (The Folly of Trying to Define Truth [1999], p.23)
			A reaction: Not sure whether this is in the object language or the meta-language, though I guess the former.

p.25	p.25	23298	Neither Aristotle nor Tarski introduce the facts needed for a correspondence theory
			Full Idea: Neither Aristotle's formula nor Tarski's truth definitions are sympathetic to the correspondence theory, because they don't introduce entities like facts or states of affairs for sentences to correspond.
			From: Donald Davidson (The Folly of Trying to Define Truth [1999], p.25)
			A reaction: This seems convincing, although it is often claimed that both theories offer a sort of correspondence.

2005	Truth and Predication

Intro	p.1	19131	We recognise sentences at once as linguistic units; we then figure out their parts
			Full Idea: Our interest in the parts of sentences is derivative; we recognise at once that sentences are effective linguistic units, while we must figure out or decide what constitutes the meaningful words and particles.
			From: Donald Davidson (Truth and Predication [2005], Intro)
			A reaction: It depends on whether linguistic priority goes to complete thoughts that require expression, or to naming and ostensive definition to relate to elements of the environment. I find it hard to have a strong view on this one. Just So stories?

Intro	p.2	19132	Top-down semantic analysis must begin with truth, as it is obvious, and explains linguistic usage
			Full Idea: Truth is the essential semantic concept with which to begin a top-down analysis of sentences, since truth, or lack of it, is the most obvious semantic property of sentences, and provides the clearest explanation of judging and conveying information.
			From: Donald Davidson (Truth and Predication [2005], Intro)
			A reaction: [a bit compressed] Presumably this goes with giving sentences semantic priority. The alternative approach is compositional, and is likely to give reference of terms priority over truth of the sentence. But accurate reference is a sort of truth.

Intro	p.4	19133	If you assign semantics to sentence parts, the sentence fails to compose a whole
			Full Idea: The puzzle is that once plausible assignments of semantic roles have been made to parts of sentences, the parts do not seem to compose a united whole.
			From: Donald Davidson (Truth and Predication [2005], Intro)
			A reaction: It's not clear to me that a sentence does compose a 'whole', given that you can often add or remove bits from sentences, sometimes without changing the meaning. We often, in speech, assemble sentences before we have thought of their full meaning.

1	p.17	19136	Many say that Tarski's definitions fail to connect truth to meaning
			Full Idea: It is complained that Tarski's definitions do not establish the connection between truth and meaning that many philosophers hold to be essential.
			From: Donald Davidson (Truth and Predication [2005], 1)
			A reaction: This, of course, was Davidson's big mission - to build on Tarski's theory a view of truth which dovetailed it with theories of meaning and reference.

1	p.27	19139	Tarski does not tell us what his various truth predicates have in common
			Full Idea: There is no indication in Tarski's formal work of what it is that his various truth predicates have in common, and this is part of the content of the concept.
			From: Donald Davidson (Truth and Predication [2005], 1)
			A reaction: This seems like a good question to raise. If I list all the 'red' things, I can still ask what qualifies them to all appear on the same list.

2	p.30	19140	'Satisfaction' is a generalised form of reference
			Full Idea: We can think of 'satisfaction' as a generalised form of reference.
			From: Donald Davidson (Truth and Predication [2005], 2)
			A reaction: Just the sort of simple point we novices need from the great minds, to help us see what is going on. One day someone is going to explain Tarski's account of truth in plain English, but probably not in my lifetime.

2	p.32	19142	Probability can be constrained by axioms, but that leaves open its truth nature
			Full Idea: Kolmogorov's axiomatisation of probability puts clear constraints on the concept of probability, but leaves open whether probability is further characterised as relative frequency, degree of belief, or something else.
			From: Donald Davidson (Truth and Predication [2005], 2)
			A reaction: Davidson cites this to show the limitations of axiomatic approaches to any topic (e.g. sets, truth, arithmetic). The item in question must be treated as a 'primitive'. This always has the feeling of second-best.

2	p.33	19144	'Epistemic' truth depends what rational creatures can verify
			Full Idea: The 'epistemic' view of truth asserts an essential tie to epistemology, and introduces a dependence of truth on what can somehow be verified by finite rational creatures.
			From: Donald Davidson (Truth and Predication [2005], 2)
			A reaction: This view, which seems to be widely held, strikes me as an elementary confusion. I take truth to be fully successful belief. If you say belief can never be fully successful, then we can't know the truth - but that doesn't destroy the concept of truth.

2	p.34	19146	Satisfaction is a sort of reference, so maybe we can define truth in terms of reference?
			Full Idea: That the truth of sentences is defined by appeal to the semantic properties of words suggests that, if we could give an account of the semantic properties of words (essentially, of reference or satisfaction), we would understand the concept of truth.
			From: Donald Davidson (Truth and Predication [2005], 2)
			A reaction: If you thought that words were prior to sentences, this might be the route to go. Davidson gives priority to sentences, and so prefers to work from the other end, which treats truth as primitive, and then defines reference and meaning.

2	p.34	19145	We can explain truth in terms of satisfaction - but also explain satisfaction in terms of truth
			Full Idea: Truth is easily defined in terms of satisfaction (as Tarski showed), but, alternatively, satisfaction can be taken to be whatever relation yields a correct account of truth.
			From: Donald Davidson (Truth and Predication [2005], 2)
			A reaction: Davidson is assessing which is the prior 'primitive' concept, and he votes for truth. A perennial problem in philosophy, and very hard to find reasons for a preference. The axiomatic approach grows from taking truth as primitive. Axioms for satisfaction?

2	p.35	19147	Truth is the basic concept, because Convention-T is agreed to fix the truths of a language
			Full Idea: The key role of Convention-T in determining that truth, as characterised by the theory, has the same extension as the intuitive concept of truth makes it seem that it is truth rather than reference that is the basic primitive.
			From: Donald Davidson (Truth and Predication [2005], 2)
			A reaction: The key strength of Tarski's account is that it specifies the extension of 'true' for a given language (as expressed in a richer meta-language).

2	p.39	19148	There is nothing interesting or instructive for truths to correspond to
			Full Idea: The real objection to the correspondence theory of truth is that there is nothing interesting or instructive to which true sentences correspond. (C.I. Lewis challenged defenders to locate the fact or part of reality to which a truth corresponded).
			From: Donald Davidson (Truth and Predication [2005], 2)
			A reaction: Davidson defended a correspondence view in 'True to the Facts'. Davidson evidently also thinks the same objection applies to claims about truthmakers. If you say 'gold is shiny', the gold is very dispersed, but it is still there.

2	p.41	19149	If we reject corresponding 'facts', we should also give up the linked idea of 'representations'
			Full Idea: If we give up facts that make entities true, we ought to give up representations at the same time, for the legitimacy of each depends on the legitimacy of the other.
			From: Donald Davidson (Truth and Predication [2005], 2)
			A reaction: Not sure about this, because I'm not sure I know what he means by 'representations'. Surely every sentence is 'about' something? Is that just the references within the sentence, but not the sentence as a whole?

2	p.43	19150	Coherence truth says a consistent set of sentences is true - which ties truth to belief
			Full Idea: A pure coherence theory of truth says that all sentences in a consistent set of sentences are true. ...I class this with epistemic views, because it ties truth directly to what is believed.
			From: Donald Davidson (Truth and Predication [2005], 2)
			A reaction: [He cites Neurath] I would have thought that coherence is rather more than mere consistency. Truths which have nothing whatever in common can be consistent with one another. [but see his p.43 n14]

2	p.48	19151	Antirealism about truth prevents its use as an intersubjective standard
			Full Idea: Antirealism, with its limitations of truth to what can be ascertained, deprives truth of its role as an intersubjective standard.
			From: Donald Davidson (Truth and Predication [2005], 2)
			A reaction: I like this, because it lifts truth out of individual minds. I take truth to be an ideal - a simple one with little content, which is thus fairly uncontroversial. Truth is the main general purpose of thinking.

3	p.50	19152	Utterances have the truth conditions intended by the speaker
			Full Idea: An utterance has certain truth conditions only if the speaker intends it to be interpreted as having those truth conditions.
			From: Donald Davidson (Truth and Predication [2005], 3)
			A reaction: This seems to be a concession to the rather sensible things that Grice said about meaning. What about malapropisms? Surely there the speaker does not understand the truth conditions of her own utterance? Truth conditions are in the head?

3	p.55	19153	Truth is basic and clear, so don't try to replace it with something simpler
			Full Idea: Truth is one of the clearest and most basic concepts we have, so it is fruitless to dream of eliminating it in favor of something simpler or more fundamental.
			From: Donald Davidson (Truth and Predication [2005], 3)
			A reaction: For redundancy theorists, I suppose, truth would be eliminated in favour of 'assertion'. Replacing it with 'satisfaction' doesn't seem very illuminating. Davidson would say 'reference' is more tricky and elusive than truth.

3	p.62	19154	The principle of charity says an interpreter must assume the logical constants
			Full Idea: The principle of charity says that it is unavoidable that the pattern of sentences to which a speaker assents reflects the semantics of the logical constants.
			From: Donald Davidson (Truth and Predication [2005], 3)
			A reaction: That is not all the principle says, of course. Davidson seems to assume classical logic here, with a bivalent semantics. I wonder if all speakers use 'false' in the normal way, as well as 'true'? Do all languages even contain 'true'?

4	p.96	19156	Modern predicates have 'places', and are sentences with singular terms deleted from the places
			Full Idea: The notion of 'places' in a predicate is the key to the modern concept of a predicate. Any expression obtained from a sentence by deleting one or more singular terms from the sentence counts as a predicate.
			From: Donald Davidson (Truth and Predication [2005], 4)

5	p.102	19158	'Humanity belongs to Socrates' is about humanity, so it's a different proposition from 'Socrates is human'
			Full Idea: The sentence 'Humanity belongs to Socrates' is about the concept of humanity, unlike the "equivalent" 'Socrates is human', so they express different propositions.
			From: Donald Davidson (Truth and Predication [2005], 5)
			A reaction: [compressed] I like this a lot, because it shows why we should focus on propositions rather than on sentences, or even utterances. And asking what the sentence is 'about' focuses us on the underlying proposition or thought.

6	p.121	19160	A comprehensive theory of truth probably includes a theory of predication
			Full Idea: Theories of truth and theories of predication are closely related: it seems probable that any comprehensive theory of truth will include a theory of predication.
			From: Donald Davidson (Truth and Predication [2005], 6)
			A reaction: Davidson defends the view that it is this way round. It is tempting to label them both as 'primitive'. Davidson distinguishes a 'theory' about truth from a 'definition'.

6	p.123	19161	We indicate use of a metaphor by its obvious falseness, or trivial truth
			Full Idea: The sentences that contain metaphors are typically obviously false or trivially true, because these are typically indications that something is intended as a metaphor.
			From: Donald Davidson (Truth and Predication [2005], 6)
			A reaction: A nice point which sounds correct. Metaphors are famous being false, but the 'obvious' falseness signals the metaphor. If a metaphor is only obscurely false, that makes it difficult to read.

6	p.123	19162	Meaning involves use, but a sentence has many uses, while meaning stays fixed
			Full Idea: Meaning depends on use, but it is not easy to say how, for uses to which we may put the utterance of a sentence are endless while its meaning remains fixed.
			From: Donald Davidson (Truth and Predication [2005], 6)
			A reaction: Quite so. The password is 'Swordfish' (or 'Sweet marjoram', if you prefer).

6	p.124	19163	You only understand an order if you know what it is to obey it
			Full Idea: We understand an imperative if and only if we know under what conditions what it orders or commands is obeyed.
			From: Donald Davidson (Truth and Predication [2005], 6)
			A reaction: How could this be wrong? 'Do you understand the order?' 'Yes sir!' 'Well do it then!' 'Do what sir?'

6	p.128	19167	Two sentences can be rephrased by equivalent substitutions to correspond to the same thing
			Full Idea: Slingshot: 'Scott is the author of Waverley' and 'The number of counties in Utah is twenty-nine' can be rephrased by substitution so that they are both about the number twenty-nine, and are thus correspond to the same thing.
			From: Donald Davidson (Truth and Predication [2005], 6)
			A reaction: [my paraphrase of Davidson's quote from Church 1956:24] These sentences clearly do not correspond to the same thing, so something has gone wrong with the idea that logically equivalent sentences have identical correspondents.

6	p.128	19166	The Slingshot assumes substitutions give logical equivalence, and thus identical correspondence
			Full Idea: The Slingshot argument (of Frege, Church and Gödel) assumes that if two sentences are logically equivalent, they correspond to the same thing, and what a sentence corresponds to is not changed if a singular term is replaced by a coreferring term.
			From: Donald Davidson (Truth and Predication [2005], 6)
			A reaction: This obviously won't work for 'Oedipus thinks he ought to marry Jocasta'. Sentences correspond, I presume, to what they are about, which is often a matter of emphasis or phrasing. Hence the Slingshot sounds like nonsense to me.

7	p.145	19169	Predicates are a source of generality in sentences
			Full Idea: Predicates introduce generality into sentences.
			From: Donald Davidson (Truth and Predication [2005], 7)
			A reaction: Not sure about this. Most words introduce generality. 'From' is a very general word about direction. 'Dogs bark' is as generally about dogs as it is generally about barking.

7	p.150	19170	Tarski is not a disquotationalist, because you can assign truth to a sentence you can't quote
			Full Idea: It is clearly a mistake to call Tarski a disquotationalist. ...We say of a sentence not at hand (such as 'You gave the right answer to this question last night, but I can't remember what you said') that it is true or false.
			From: Donald Davidson (Truth and Predication [2005], 7)

7	p.153	19172	To define a class of true sentences is to stipulate a possible language
			Full Idea: When we enquire whether a truth definition defines the class of true sentences in a particular language, we are thinking of the truth definition as stipulating a possible language.
			From: Donald Davidson (Truth and Predication [2005], 7)
			A reaction: Thus I might say "Nij wonk yang" is true if and only if snow is white, and make my first step towards a new language. An interesting way of looking at Tarski's project.

7	p.158	19173	Treating predicates as sets drops the predicate for a new predicate 'is a member of', which is no help
			Full Idea: 'Theaetetus is a member of the set of seated objects' doesn't mention the predicate 'sits', but has a new predicate 'is a member of', with no given semantic role. We are back with Plato's problem with the predicate 'instantiates'.
			From: Donald Davidson (Truth and Predication [2005], 7)
			A reaction: Plato's problem is the 'third man' problem - a regress in the explanation. In other words, if we are trying to explain predication, treating predicates as sets gets us nowhere. Just as I always thought. But you have to want explanations.

7	p.160	19174	Axioms spell out sentence satisfaction. With no free variables, all sequences satisfy the truths
			Full Idea: Axioms specify how each unstructured predicate is satisfied by a particular sequence. Then recursive axioms characterise complex sentences built from simpler ones. Closed sentences have no free variables, so true sentences are satisfied by all sequences.
			From: Donald Davidson (Truth and Predication [2005], 7)
			A reaction: I take 'all sequences' to mean all combinations of objects in the domain. Thus nothing in domain contradicts the satisfied sentences. Hence Tarski's truth is said to be 'true in a model', where the whole system vouches for the sentence.

7	p.161	19176	The concept of truth can explain predication
			Full Idea: My strategy is to show how our grasp of the concept of truth can explain predication.
			From: Donald Davidson (Truth and Predication [2005], 7)
			A reaction: His account of the concept of truth centres on Tarski's theory, but he clearly thinks more is needed than the bare bones offered by Tarski. The point, I think, is that predication is what makes a sentence 'truth-apt'.