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Ideas of René Descartes, by Text

[French, 1596 - 1650, Born at La Haye. Pupil at Jesuit College. Lived mostly in Holland. Died working for Queen Christina in Stockholm.]

1628 Rules for the Direction of the Mind
01 p.6 24018 One truth leads us to another
02 p.7 24019 If we accept mere probabilities as true we undermine our existing knowledge
03 p.11 24020 We all see intuitively that we exist, where intuition is attentive, clear and distinct rational understanding
04 p.13 24022 Our souls possess divine seeds of knowledge, which can bear spontaneous fruit
04 p.13 24021 The method starts with clear intuitions, followed by a process of deduction
04 p.16 24023 All the sciences searching for order and measure are related to mathematics
06 p.17 24024 The secret of the method is to recognise which thing in a series is the simplest
11 p.32 24025 Clear and distinct truths must be known all at once (unlike deductions)
12 p.34 24026 Our four knowledge faculties are intelligence, imagination, the senses, and memory
12 p.36 24027 Nerves and movement originate in the brain, where imagination moves them
12 p.36 24028 The force by which we know things is spiritual, and quite distinct from the body
12 p.39 24029 Among the simples are the graspable negations, such as rest and instants
12 p.39 24030 3+4=7 is necessary because we cannot conceive of seven without including three and four
12 p.40 24031 When Socrates doubts, he know he doubts, and that truth is possible
12 p.42 24032 Clever scholars can obscure things which are obvious even to peasants
13 p.46 24033 Most scholastic disputes concern words, where agreeing on meanings would settle them
14 p.49 24034 If someone had only seen the basic colours, they could deduce the others from resemblance
14 p.55 24035 Unity is something shared by many things, so in that respect they are equals
14 p.56 24036 I can only see the proportion of two to three if there is a common measure - their unity
Rule II p.8 9807 In pursuing truth, anything less certain than mathematics is a waste of time
1631 The World
p.18 22593 Our sensation of light may not be the same as what produces the sensation
p.234 20964 Descartes said there was conservation of 'quantity of motion' [Papineau]
9:25-6 p.10 16569 The Hot, Cold, Wet and Dry of the philosophers need themselves to be explained
1637 A Discourse on Method
§1.2 p.27 3600 Slow and accurate thought makes the greatest progress
§1.3 p.28 3601 Most things in human life seem vain and useless
§1.8 p.31 1581 Greeks elevate virtues enormously, but never explain them
§2.16 p.39 3602 Almost every daft idea has been expressed by some philosopher
§2.18 p.41 3603 Methodical thinking is cautious, analytical, systematic, and panoramic [PG]
§3.22 p.45 3604 When rebuilding a house, one needs alternative lodgings
§3.23 p.46 3605 We can believe a thing without knowing we believe it
§3.23 p.73 1583 In morals Descartes accepts the conventional, but rejects it in epistemology [Roochnik]
§3.29 p.50 3606 I was searching for reliable rock under the shifting sand
§4.32 p.53 3607 In thinking everything else false, my own existence remains totally certain
§4.32 p.54 3608 I can deny my body and the world, but not my own existence
§4.33 p.54 3610 Truth is clear and distinct conception - of which it is hard to be sure
§4.33 p.54 3609 I am a thinking substance, which doesn't need a place or material support
§4.37 p.58 3611 Understanding, rather than imagination or senses, gives knowledge
§4.38 p.58 3612 Clear and distinct conceptions are true because a perfect God exists
§5.56 p.74 3614 A machine could speak in response to physical stimulus, but not hold a conversation
§5.57 p.74 3613 Reason is universal in its responses, but a physical machine is constrained by its organs
§5.58 p.75 3615 Little reason is needed to speak, so animals have no reason at all
§5.59 p.76 3616 The soul must unite with the body to have appetites and sensations
§6.64 p.80 3617 I aim to find the principles and causes of everything, using the seeds within my mind
§6.65 p.81 3618 Only experiments can settle disagreements between rival explanations
pt 5 p.321 16686 God has established laws throughout nature, and implanted ideas of them within us
1640 Letters to Mersenne
1640.02.24 p.92 3652 I can't prove the soul is indestructible, only that it is separate from the mortal body
1641.01.28 p.96 3653 My Meditations are the complete foundation of my physics
1642 p.6 4736 Truth is such a transcendentally clear notion that it cannot be further defined
1640 Letters to Voetius
VIIIB:174 p.433 16712 Atheism is an atrocious and intolerable crime in any country
1641 Reply to First Objections
p.150 16634 I can't be unaware of anything which is in me
106 p.87 3634 We can't prove a first cause from our inability to grasp infinity
108 p.88 3635 Essence must be known before we discuss existence
1641 Reply to Second Objections
140 p.68 3622 The Cogito is not a syllogism but a self-evident intuition
1641 Reply to Fourth Objections
225 p.111 3643 The concept of mind excludes body, and vice versa
1641 Reply to Fifth Objections
360 p.72 3626 Knowing the attributes is enough to reveal a substance
362 p.79 3630 Our thinking about external things doesn't disprove the existence of innate ideas
363 p.79 3631 A blind man may still contain the idea of colour
383 p.97 3640 Possible existence is a perfection in the idea of a triangle
383 p.97 3639 Necessary existence is a property which is uniquely part of God's essence
1641 Reply to Sixth Objections
432 p.93 3637 Ideas in God's mind only have value if he makes it so
439 p.65 3621 Only judgement decides which of our senses are reliable
444 p.115 3644 Two things being joined together doesn't prove they are the same
1641 Meditations
p.-5 1569 Descartes impoverished the classical idea of logos, and it no longer covered human experience [Roochnik]
p.11 6153 Interaction between mental and physical seems to violate the principle of conservation of energy [Rowlands]
p.15 6490 For Descartes, objects have one primary quality, which is geometrical [Robinson,H]
p.55 6929 Modern philosophy set the self-conscious ego in place of God [Feuerbach]
p.96 2857 Since Plato all philosophers have followed the herd, except Descartes, stuck in superficial reason [Nietzsche]
p.156 4017 Descartes created the modern view of rationality, as an internal feature instead of an external vision [Taylor,C]
p.279 7504 Modern science comes from Descartes' view that knowledge doesn't need moral purity [Foucault]
p.362 17865 Descartes gives an essence by an encapsulating formula [Almog]
(VII:30-1) p.138 16631 If we remove surface qualities from wax, we have an extended, flexible, changeable thing
§1 p.6 6347 Descartes can't begin again, because sceptics doubt cognitive processes as well as beliefs [Pollock/Cruz]
§1 p.76 1585 Descartes tried to model reason on maths instead of 'logos' [Roochnik]
§1 p.110 10054 Arithmetic and geometry achieve some certainty without worrying about existence
§1.17 p.72 1582 Labelling slightly doubtful things as false is irrational [Roochnik]
§1.17 p.95 2247 To achieve good science we must rebuild from the foundations
§1.18 p.63 3619 The senses can only report, so perception errors are in the judgment [Gassendi]
§1.18 p.64 3620 We correct sense errors with other senses, not intellect [Mersenne]
§1.18 p.95 2248 Reason says don't assent to uncertain principles, just as much as totally false ones
§1.18 p.96 2249 It is prudent never to trust your senses if they have deceived you even once
§1.20 p.97 2251 Even if my body and objects are imaginary, there may be simpler things which are true
§1.20 p.98 2252 Surely maths is true even if I am dreaming?
§1.21 p.98 2253 God may have created nothing, but made his creation appear to me as it does now
§1.22 p.100 2254 To achieve full scepticism, I imagine a devil who deceives me about the external world and my own body and senses
§2 p.44 3849 "I think therefore I am" is the absolute truth of consciousness [Sartre]
§2 p.45 3850 We discovers others as well as ourselves in the Cogito [Sartre]
§2.24 p.102 2255 Only one certainty is needed for progress (like a lever's fulcrum)
§2.24 p.102 2256 Maybe there is only one certain fact, which is that nothing is certain
§2.24 p.103 2257 I myself could be the author of all these self-delusions
§2.25 p.103 2259 "I am, I exist" is necessarily true every time I utter it or conceive it in my mind
§2.25 p.103 2258 I must even exist if I am being deceived by something
§2.26 p.8 1117 The Cogito proves subjective experience is basic, but makes false claims about the Self [Russell]
§2.26 p.8 5360 The thing which experiences may be momentary, and change with the next experience [Russell]
§2.26 p.28 2870 'I think' assumes I exist, that thinking is known and caused, and that I am doing it [Nietzsche]
§2.26 p.50 1369 It is a precondition of the use of the word 'I' that I exist [Ayer]
§2.26 p.62 2873 Maybe 'I' am not the thinker, but something produced by thought [Nietzsche]
§2.26 p.63 5188 A thought doesn't imply other thoughts, or enough thoughts to make up a self [Ayer]
§2.26 p.69 3623 The Cogito only works if you already understand what thought and existence are [Mersenne]
§2.26 p.70 3624 That I perform an activity (thinking) doesn't prove what type of thing I am [Hobbes]
§2.26 p.78 3160 The Cogito is a transcendental argument, not a piece of a priori knowledge [Rey]
§2.26 p.109 3120 Autistic children seem to use the 'I' concept without seeing themselves as thinkers [Segal]
§2.26 p.268 4526 The Cogito assumes a priori the existence of substance, when actually it is a grammatical custom [Nietzsche]
§2.26 p.414 5579 How can we infer that all thinking involves self-consciousness, just from my own case? [Kant]
§2.26 p.419 5580 My self is not an inference from 'I think', but a presupposition of it [Kant]
§2.26 p.440 5587 We cannot give any information a priori about the nature of the 'thing that thinks' [Kant]
§2.26 p.446 5588 The fact that I am a subject is not enough evidence to show that I am a substantial object [Kant]
§2.27 p.70 3625 The 'thinking thing' may be the physical basis of the mind [Hobbes]
§2.27 p.105 2260 If I don't think, there is no reason to think that I exist
§2.29 p.107 2261 My perceiving of things may be false, but my seeming to perceive them cannot be false
§2.31 p.77 3628 Substance cannot be conceived or explained to others [Gassendi]
§2.31 p.110 2263 The wax is not perceived by the senses, but by the mind alone
§2.32 p.77 3627 Dogs can make the same judgements as us about variable things [Gassendi]
§2.32 p.110 2264 We don't 'see' men in heavy clothes, we judge them to be men
§2.34 p.112 2265 We perceive objects by intellect, not by senses or imagination
§3.35 p.113 2266 My general rule is that everything that I perceive clearly and distinctly is true
§3.36 p.49 4301 Someone may think a thing is 'clear and distinct', but be wrong [Leibniz]
§3.37 p.114 5685 True ideas are images, such as of a man, a chimera, or God
§3.37 p.114 5686 In some thoughts I grasp a subject, but also I will or fear or affirm or deny it
§3.38 p.78 3629 All ideas are adventitious, and come from the senses [Gassendi]
§3.42 p.120 2268 One idea leads to another, but there must be an initial idea that contains the reality of all the others
§3.44 p.123 2430 I can learn the concepts of duration and number just from observing my own thoughts
§3.45 p.123 2269 God the creator is an intelligent, infinite, powerful substance
§3.49 p.127 1400 Some cause must unite the separate temporal sections of a person
§3.49 p.128 2272 There must be at least as much in the cause as there is in the effect
§3.51 p.130 2274 The idea of God in my mind is like the mark a craftsman puts on his work
§3.51 p.130 2273 The ideas of God and of my self are innate in me
§3.52 p.131 2275 It is self-evident that deception is a natural defect, so God could not be a deceiver
§4.53 p.132 2276 The mind is a non-extended thing which thinks
§4.54 p.133 2277 Since God does not wish to deceive me, my judgement won't make errors if I use it properly
§4.54 p.134 2278 Error arises because my faculty for judging truth is not infinite
§4.55 p.135 2280 Many causes are quite baffling, so it is absurd to deduce causes from final purposes
§4.55 p.135 2281 If we ask whether God's works are perfect, we must not take a narrow viewpoint, but look at the universe as a whole
§4.56 p.136 2282 My capacity to make choices with my free will extends as far as any faculty ever could
§4.57 p.136 2283 Our 'will' just consists of the feeling that when we are motivated to do something, there are no external pressures
§4.58 p.91 3636 God didn't give us good judgement even about our own lives [Gassendi]
§4.58 p.137 2284 I make errors because my will extends beyond my understanding
§5.64 p.143 2285 I can think of innumerable shapes I have never experienced
§5.64 p.143 2279 A triangle has a separate non-invented nature, shown by my ability to prove facts about it
§5.65 p.80 3632 We mustn't worship God as an image because we have no idea of him [Hobbes]
§5.65 p.81 3633 We can never conceive of an infinite being [Gassendi]
§5.65 p.144 2286 The idea of a supremely perfect being is within me, like the basic concepts of mathematics
§5.66 p.145 2287 Existence and God's essence are inseparable, like a valley and a mountain, or a triangle and its properties
§5.67 p.76 5036 Descartes cannot assume that a most perfect being exists without contradictions [Leibniz]
§5.67 p.96 3638 Existence is not a perfection; it is what makes perfection possible [Gassendi]
§5.67 p.145 2288 I cannot think of a supremely perfect being without the supreme perfection of existence
§5.68 p.147 2289 Nothing apart from God could have essential existence, and such a being must be unique and eternal
§5.70 p.149 2290 Once it is clear that there is a God who is no deceiver, I conclude that clear and distinct perceptions must be true
§5.71 p.106 3641 It is circular to make truth depend on believing God's existence is true [Arnauld]
§5.71 p.240 4524 Descartes is right that in the Christian view only God can guarantee the reliability of senses [Nietzsche]
§6.73 p.151 1399 Imagination and sensation are non-essential to mind
§6.75 p.153 2294 I can only sense an object if it is present, and can't fail to sense it when it is
§6.76 p.154 2295 Why does pain make us sad?
§6.77 p.155 2296 If pain is felt in a lost limb, I cannot be certain that a felt pain exists in my real limbs
§6.78 p.29 2552 Knowing different aspects of brain/mind doesn't make them different [Rorty]
§6.78 p.86 4305 Descartes gives no clear criterion for individuating mental substances [Cottingham]
§6.78 p.109 3642 Pythagoras' Theorem doesn't cease to be part of the essence of triangles just because we doubt it [Arnauld]
§6.78 p.156 2297 If I can separate two things in my understanding, then God can separate them in reality
§6.78 p.156 1401 Since I only observe myself to be thinking, I conclude that that is my essence
§6.78 p.156 2298 Mind is not extended, unlike the body
§6.78 p.157 2299 I can exist without imagination and sensing, but they can't exist without me
§6.78 p.211 3423 Descartes is a substance AND property dualist [Kim]
§6.82 p.160 2301 We know by thought that what is done cannot be undone
§6.82 p.246 4862 Can the pineal gland be moved more slowly or quickly by the mind than by animal spirits? [Spinoza]
§6.82 p.246 4861 Does Descartes have a clear conception of how mind unites with body? [Spinoza]
§6.85 p.164 2303 The mind is utterly indivisible
§6.86 p.164 2302 Faculties of the mind aren't parts, as one mind uses them
§6.89 p.168 2305 Waking actions are joined by memory to all our other actions, unlike actions of which we dream
2 p.26 6907 For Descartes a person's essence is the mind because objects are perceived by mind, not senses [Feuerbach]
2 p.31 6914 Descartes transformed 'God is thinkable, so he exists' into 'I think, so I exist' [Feuerbach]
2 p.40 13923 Descartes' claim to know his existence before his essence is misleading or absurd [Lowe]
2 p.55 6930 Modern self-consciousness is a doubtful abstraction; only senses and feelings are certain [Feuerbach]
2 p.67 3151 Descartes put thought at the centre of the mind problem, but we put sensation [Rey]
2 p.116 4641 In the Meditations version of the Cogito he says "I am; I exist", which avoids presenting it as an argument [Baggini /Fosl]
4 p.159 21800 Descartes mentions many cognitive faculties, but reduces them to will and intellect [Schmid]
6 p.51 6540 Even Descartes may concede that mental supervenes on neuroanatomical [Lycan]
IV p.63 20190 Belief is not an intellectual state or act, because propositions are affirmed or denied by the will [Zagzebski]
p.156 p.55 7733 Superman's strength is indubitable, Clark Kent's is doubtful, so they are not the same? [Maslin]
1642 Letter to Mersenne
p.20 3789 The more reasons that compel me, the freer I am
1642 Letters to Regius
1642.01 p.267 12251 Substantial forms are not understood, and explain nothing
III:493 p.601 16772 An angelic mind would not experience pain, even when connected to a human body [Pasnau]
1643 works
p.18 13445 Descartes showed a one-one order-preserving match between points on a line and the real numbers [Hart,WD]
p.21 7400 Descartes said images can refer to objects without resembling them (as words do) [Tuck]
p.124 19676 Nature is devoid of thought [Meillassoux]
p.131 6553 Descartes discussed the interaction problem, and compared it with gravity [Lycan]
p.160 4310 We have inner awareness of our freedom
p.219 6518 Matter can't just be Descartes's geometry, because a filler of the spaces is needed [Robinson,H]
p.604 16774 Descartes thinks distinguishing substances from aggregates is pointless [Pasnau]
1644 Comments on a Certain Broadsheet
p.365 p.365 2600 The mind's innate ideas are part of its capacity for thought
p.365 p.365 2601 Qualia must be innate, because physical motions do not contain them
p.366 p.366 2602 What experience could prove 'If a=c and b=c then a=b'?
1645 Letters to Antoine Arnauld
p.33 21963 It is possible that an omnipotent God might make one and two fail to equal three
1646 Principles of Philosophy
Pref p.222 5004 We can know basic Principles without further knowledge, but not the other way round
Pref p.223 3656 The greatest good for a state is true philosophers
Pref p.226 3658 Total doubt can't include your existence while doubting
§28 p.238 12730 We will not try to understand natural or divine ends, or final causes
2.4 p.74 16601 Matter is not hard, heavy or coloured, but merely extended in space
2.64 p.164 15987 Physics only needs geometry or abstract mathematics, which can explain and demonstrate everything
I.07 p.232 5005 I think, therefore I am, because for a thinking thing to not exist is a contradiction
I.09 p.232 5006 'Thought' is all our conscious awareness, including feeling as well as understanding
I.33 p.239 5007 Most errors of judgement result from an inaccurate perception of the facts
I.37 p.240 5008 The greatest perfection of man is to act by free will, and thus merit praise or blame
I.37 p.240 5009 We do not praise the acts of an efficient automaton, as their acts are necessary
I.39 p.241 5010 Our free will is so self-evident to us that it must be a basic innate idea
I.48 p.243 5011 There are two ultimate classes of existence: thinking substance and extended substance
I.49 p.243 5012 'Nothing comes from nothing' is an eternal truth found within the mind
I.51 p.244 5013 A substance needs nothing else in order to exist
I.52 p.136 16630 If we perceive an attribute, we infer the existence of some substance
I.53 p.145 16633 A substance has one principal property which is its nature and essence
I.53 p.245 5014 We can understand thinking occuring without imagination or sensation
I.59 p.246 5016 Five universals: genus, species, difference, property, accident
I.59 p.246 5015 A universal is a single idea applied to individual things that are similar to one another
I.60 p.247 5017 In thinking we shut ourselves off from other substances, showing our identity and separateness
I.60 p.247 5018 Even if tightly united, mind and body are different, as God could separate them
IV.187 p.540 16744 All powers can be explained by obvious features like size, shape and motion of matter
1647 Preface to 'Principles of Philosophy'
p.28 21962 Metaphysics is the roots of the tree of science
p.177 p.177 3657 Understanding, not the senses, gives certainty
p.180 p.180 3659 I know the truth that God exists and is the author of truth
p.180 p.180 3660 Atheism arises from empiricism, because God is intangible
1649 unfinished dialogue
p.7 4298 All items of possible human knowledge are interconnected, and can be reached by inference
1649 Two letters on mind
Feb 1649 p.157 16635 Incorporeal substances are powers or forces [Pasnau]
More, Apr 1649 p.318 16684 Impenetrability only belongs to the essence of extension
1649 The Passions of the Soul
p.150 4015 For Descartes passions are God-given preservers of the mind-body union [Taylor,C]
p.153 4016 Descartes makes strength of will the central virtue [Taylor,C]
p.172 4313 Are there a few primary passions (say, joy, sadness and desire)? [Cottingham]
§31 p.307 3654 The pineal gland links soul to body, and unites the two symmetrical sides of the body [PG]
18 p.8 20037 Merely willing to walk leads to our walking
353 p.87 23989 There are six primitive passions: wonder, love, hatred, desire, joy and sadness [Goldie]
I.5 p.572 16763 We don't die because the soul departs; the soul departs because the organs cease functioning