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Ideas of Diodorus Cronus, by Text

[Greek, 340 - 284 BCE, Born at Iasos in Caria (in Ionia). Head of the Dialecticians school. Taught Zeno of Citium, who founded Stoicism.]

300BCE fragments/reports
p.45 Conditionals are true when the antecedent is true, and the consequent has to be true
     Full Idea: The connected (proposition) is true when it begins with true and neither could nor can end with false.
     From: Diodorus Cronus (fragments/reports [c.300 BCE]), quoted by Stephen Mumford - Dispositions 03.4
     A reaction: [Mumford got the quote from Bochenski] This differs from the truth-functional account because it says nothing about when the antecedent is false, which fits in also with the 'supposition' view, where A is presumed. This idea adds necessity.
p.102 The Master Argument seems to prove that only what will happen is possible
     Full Idea: The Master Argument: these conflict 1) what is past and true is necessary, 2) the impossible does not follow from the possible, 3) something possible neither is nor will be true. Hence only that which is or will be true is possible.
     From: report of Diodorus Cronus (fragments/reports [c.300 BCE]) by Epictetus - The Discourses 2.19.1
     A reaction: [Epictetus goes on to discuss views about which of the three should be given up] It is possible there will be a sea fight tomorrow; tomorrow comes, and no sea fight; so there was necessarily no sea fight; so the impossible followed from the possible.
p.185 From the necessity of the past we can infer the impossibility of what never happens
     Full Idea: Diodorus' Master Argument inferred that since what is past (i.e. true in the past) is necessary, and the impossible cannot follow from the possible, that therefore if something neither is nor ever will be the case, then it is impossible.
     From: report of Diodorus Cronus (fragments/reports [c.300 BCE]) by Michael J. White - Diodorus Cronus
     A reaction: The argument is, apparently, no longer fully clear, but it seems to imply determinism, or at least a rejection of the idea that free will and determinism are compatible. (Epictetus 2.19)
p.227 Thought is unambiguous, and you should stick to what the speaker thinks they are saying
     Full Idea: No one says or thinks anything ambiguous, and nothing should be held to be being said beyond what the speaker thinks he is saying.
     From: report of Diodorus Cronus (fragments/reports [c.300 BCE]) by Aulus Gellius - Noctes Atticae 11.12.2
     A reaction: A key argument in favour of propositions, implied in this remark, is that propositions are never ambiguous, though the sentences expressing them may be