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Ideas of Fred Dretske, by Text

[American, b.1932, Professor at Stanford University and the University of Wisconsin.]

1970 Epistemic Operators
p.14 6445 You have knowledge if you can rule out all the relevant alternatives to what you believe [DeRose]
1997 Naturalizing the Mind
§1.3 p.9 5801 A mouse hearing a piano played does not believe it, because it lacks concepts and understanding
§1.6 p.38 5802 Representations are in the head, but their content is not, as stories don't exist in their books
§2 p.40 5803 In a representational theory of mind, introspection is displaced perception
§2 p.40 5804 A representational theory of the mind is an externalist theory of the mind
§2 p.41 5805 Introspection does not involve looking inwards
§2.3 p.53 5806 Belief is the power of metarepresentation
§2.4 p.62 5807 Introspection is the same as the experience one is introspecting
§3.2 p.73 5808 Qualia are just the properties objects are represented as having
Ch.4 n16 p.182 5809 Some activities are performed better without consciousness of them
Prol p.-4 5800 All mental facts are representation, which consists of informational functions
2005 The Case against Closure (and reply)
p.25 p.25 19544 Closure says if you know P, and also know P implies Q, then you must know Q
p.28 p.28 19545 We needn't regret the implications of our regrets; regretting drinking too much implies the past is real
p.29 p.29 19546 Knowing by visual perception is not the same as knowing by implication
p.29 p.29 19547 Reasons for believing P may not transmit to its implication, Q
p.32 p.32 19548 The only way to preserve our homely truths is to abandon closure
p.33 p.33 19549 P may imply Q, but evidence for P doesn't imply evidence for Q, so closure fails
p.35 p.35 19550 We know past events by memory, but we don't know the past is real (an implication) by memory