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Ideas of John Duns Scotus, by Text
[Scottish, 1266 - 1308, Born at Duns, Scotland. Taught at the University of Paris. Known as 'Doctor Subtilis'.]
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I.17.2.4
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p.208
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16650
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'Unity' is a particularly difficult word, because things can have hidden unity
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15.1
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p.607
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16776
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Substance is an intrinsic thing, so parts of substances can't also be intrinsic things
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1301
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Oxford Commentary on Sentences
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II.12.1.14
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p.101
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16614
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Matter and form give true unity; subject and accident is just unity 'per accidens'
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p.205
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22122
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Being (not sensation or God) is the primary object of the intellect [Dumont]
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p.205
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22121
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The concept of being has only one meaning, whether talking of universals or of God [Dumont]
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p.206
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22129
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Certainty comes from the self-evident, from induction, and from self-awareness [Dumont]
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p.206
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22128
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Augustine's 'illumination' theory of knowledge leads to nothing by scepticism [Dumont]
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p.206
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22125
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Duns Scotus was a realist about universals [Dumont]
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p.206
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22126
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Avicenna and Duns Scotus say essences have independent and prior existence [Dumont]
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p.206
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22127
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Scotus said a substantial principle of individuation [haecceitas] was needed for an essence [Dumont]
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p.206
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22130
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Scotus defended direct 'intuitive cognition', against the abstractive view [Dumont]
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p.206
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22131
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The will retains its power for opposites, even when it is acting [Dumont]
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p.206
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22123
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The concept of God is the unique first efficient cause, final cause, and most eminent being [Dumont]
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p.206
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22124
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We can't infer the infinity of God from creation ex nihilo [Dumont]
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p.53
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15386
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If only the singular exists, science is impossible, as that relies on true generalities [Panaccio]
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p.53
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15387
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If things were singular they would only differ numerically, but horse and tulip differ more than that [Panaccio]
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p.222
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13094
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The haecceity is the featureless thing which gives ultimate individuality to a substance [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
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II d3 p1 q2 n48
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p.
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10919
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What prevents a stone from being divided into parts which are still the stone?
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III.2.2
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p.591
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16770
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It is absurd that there is no difference between a genuinely unified thing, and a mere aggregate
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IV.11.3
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p.139
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16632
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We distinguish one thing from another by contradiction, because this is, and that is not
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IV.11.3
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p.582
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16768
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Two things are different if something is true of one and not of the other
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IV.12.1
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p.196
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16648
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Accidents must have formal being, if they are principles of real action, and of mental action and thought
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III n. 116
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p.125
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16626
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Substance is only grasped under the general heading of 'being'
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V.5-6 n91
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p.241
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16660
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Are things distinct if they are both separate, or if only one of them can be separate? [Pasnau]
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