| 1999 | Response to David Armstrong |
| p.42 | p.139 | 18398 | Space, time, and some other basics, are not causal powers |
| Full Idea: Spatial, temporal, and other primary properties and relationships are not causal powers. | |||
| From: Brian Ellis (Response to David Armstrong [1999], p.42), quoted by David M. Armstrong - Truth and Truthmakers 10.4 | |||
| A reaction: It is hard to see how time and space could actually be powers, but future results in physics (or even current results about 'fields') might change that. |
| 2001 | Scientific Essentialism |
| Intro | p.2 | 13566 | A proton must have its causal role, because without it it wouldn't be a proton |
| Full Idea: I assume it is metaphysically impossible for a proton to have a different causal role, ...which is plausible because a proton would appear to have no identity at all apart from its role in causal processes. | |||
| From: Brian Ellis (Scientific Essentialism [2001], Intro) | |||
| A reaction: This seems to be a key idea in scientific essentialism, which links essentialism of identity with essentialism in the laws of nature. Could a proton become not-quite-a-proton? |
| Intro | p.8 | 13567 | Ontology should give insight into or an explanation of the world revealed by science |
| Full Idea: A good ontology should provide insight into, or offer some kind of explanation of, the salient general features of the world that has been revealed to us by science. | |||
| From: Brian Ellis (Scientific Essentialism [2001], Intro) | |||
| A reaction: I think I agree with this. The difficulty is that the most fundamental level revealed by science is a quantum one, so if you take a reductionist view then your ontology is both crazy, and resting on things which are not understood. |
| Intro | p.10 | 13568 | Basic powers may not be explained by structure, if at the bottom level there is no structure |
| Full Idea: It may be that the most fundamental things have no structure, and therefore no structure in virtue of which they have the powers they have. | |||
| From: Brian Ellis (Scientific Essentialism [2001], Intro) | |||
| A reaction: Maybe the world has inexplicable powers, so there is a God? It seems obvious that there will be no explanation of the 'lowest level' of reality, and also obvious (to me and Leibniz, anyway) that this lowest level has to be active. |
| Intro | p.10 | 13569 | To give essentialist explanations there have to be natural kinds |
| Full Idea: There can be no essentialist explanations constructed in any field where the subject matter is not naturally divided into kinds. | |||
| From: Brian Ellis (Scientific Essentialism [2001], Intro) | |||
| A reaction: A crux. I like individual essences, such as the character of a particular person. However, Ellis may be right, since while we may identify an individual essence as the source of a behaviour, we may not then be able to give any 'explanation'. |
| Intro | p.11 | 13571 | Scientific essentialism doesn't really need Kripkean individual essences |
| Full Idea: My current view is that individual essences (about which Kripke's essentialism has a lot to say) do not matter much from the point of view of a scientific essentialist. | |||
| From: Brian Ellis (Scientific Essentialism [2001], Intro) | |||
| A reaction: [Kripke parenthesis on p.54] Presumably this is because science is only committed to dealing in generalities, and so natural kinds are needed for such things. I'm inclined to regard individual essences as prior in the pure ontology of the thing. |
| Intro | p.11 | 13570 | Individual essences necessitate that individual; natural kind essences necessitate kind membership |
| Full Idea: There are necessities grounded in the individual real essences of things, and necessities grounded in the natural kind essences of things. In the first case, without the property it isn't that individual, and in the second it isn't a member of that kind. | |||
| From: Brian Ellis (Scientific Essentialism [2001], Intro) | |||
| A reaction: This is the distinction we must hang onto to avoid a huge amount of confusion in this territory. I just say that ceasing to be that individual will presumably entail ceasing to be that kind, but not necessarily vice versa, so individual essences rule. |
| 1.01 | p.18 | 13572 | There are 'substantive' (objects of some kind), 'dynamic' (events of some kind) and 'property' universals |
| Full Idea: Three categories of universals: 'substantive' universals have instances that are members of natural kinds of objects or substances; 'dynamic' universals are kinds of events or processes; 'property' universals are tropes of real properties or relations. | |||
| From: Brian Ellis (Scientific Essentialism [2001], 1.01) | |||
| A reaction: I would want to distinguish real properties from relations. It is important to remember that an object can traditionally instantiate a universal, and that they aren't just properties. |
| 1.01 | p.19 | 13573 | Universals are all types of natural kind |
| Full Idea: The various kinds of universals are all natural kinds of one sort or another. | |||
| From: Brian Ellis (Scientific Essentialism [2001], 1.01) | |||
| A reaction: This doesn't sound right. What about the universals of mathematics, or universals which are a matter of social or linguistic convention? I think Ellis is trying to hijack the word 'universal' in response to Armstrong's more idealistic account. |
| 1.02 | p.21 | 13574 | Natural kinds are distinguished by resting on essences |
| Full Idea: Natural kinds are distinguished from other sorts of things by their associations with essential properties and real essences. | |||
| From: Brian Ellis (Scientific Essentialism [2001], 1.02) | |||
| A reaction: I don't think I agree with this. I rest my notion of natural kind on the elementary realising that to know all about this kind you only have to examine one sample of it, as in the Upanishads. The source of such a phenomenon is an open question. |
| 1.05 | p.31 | 13575 | If there are borderline cases between natural kinds, that makes them superficial |
| Full Idea: There cannot be any borderline cases between the real essences of different natural kinds because, if there were, the distinctions between the kinds would be superficial, like the blue/green distinction. | |||
| From: Brian Ellis (Scientific Essentialism [2001], 1.05) | |||
| A reaction: His particular target here is biological natural kinds, in which he doesn't believe, because they blur across time, in the evolutionary process. Personally I am inclined to relax the notion of a natural kind, otherwise they are too basic to explain. |
| 1.06 | p.33 | 13576 | Necessities are distinguished by their grounds, not their different modalities |
| Full Idea: Strictly speaking, the distinction between two brands of necessity is one of grounds, rather than modality. | |||
| From: Brian Ellis (Scientific Essentialism [2001], 1.06) | |||
| A reaction: This idea I associate with Kit Fine. I like it, because it allows 'necessity' to be a univocal concept, which seems right to me. The types of necessity arise from types of things which already occur in our ontology. |
| 1.09 | p.46 | 13577 | Typical 'categorical' properties are spatio-temporal, such as shape |
| Full Idea: The paradigmatically 'categorical' properties are spatio-temporal, depending on how things are distributed in space and time. Shape is the obvious example. ...Other examples are number, size and configuration. | |||
| From: Brian Ellis (Scientific Essentialism [2001], 1.09) | |||
| A reaction: I'm finding it very frustrating that this concept is much discussed in current philosophy of science (e.g. by Bird), but it is exceedingly hard to pin down any exact account of these 'categorical' properties, or even why they are so-called. |
| 1.10 | p.48 | 13578 | The old idea that identity depends on essence and behaviour is rejected by the empiricists |
| Full Idea: The old Aristotelian idea that the identity of a thing might depend on its essential nature, which would dispose it to behave in certain ways, is firmly rejected by empiricists. | |||
| From: Brian Ellis (Scientific Essentialism [2001], 1.10) | |||
| A reaction: Ellis is accusing empiricists of having a falsely passive concept of objects. This dispute is best captured in the disagreement between Locke and Leibniz on the subject. |
| 1.11 | p.50 | 13579 | What is most distinctive of scientific essentialism is regarding processes as natural kinds |
| Full Idea: What is most distinctive of the scientific version of essentialism is that scientific essentialists are realists about natural kinds of processes, as well as natural kinds of objects and substances. | |||
| From: Brian Ellis (Scientific Essentialism [2001], 1.11) | |||
| A reaction: I'm not sure whether other scientific essentialists would agree with this, but I am happy to go along with it. A process like melting or sublimation seems to be a standard widespread phenomenon which is always intrinsically the same, as kinds must be. |
| 1.12 | p.53 | 13580 | Causal powers must necessarily act the way they do |
| Full Idea: There can be no question of a causal power's acting one way in one world and another way in a different world. | |||
| From: Brian Ellis (Scientific Essentialism [2001], 1.12) | |||
| A reaction: Perhaps the very core idea of scientific essentialism. It doesn't feel quite right that when you ask for the source of this necessity, you are only told that it is necessary for the very identity of a power. The truth is that it is a primitive of nature. |
| 1.12 | p.55 | 13581 | Scientific essentialism is more concerned with explanation than with identity (Locke, not Kripke) |
| Full Idea: Scientific essentialism is less concerned with questions of identity, and more with questions of explanation, than is the essentialism of Aristotle or of Kripke. It is closest to the kind of essentialism described by Locke. | |||
| From: Brian Ellis (Scientific Essentialism [2001], 1.12) | |||
| A reaction: Locke is popularly held to be anti-essentialist, but that is only because of his epistemological problems. I think Ellis is here misreading Aristotle, and I would ally Aristotle, Locke (cautiously), Leibniz, Ellis and Fine against Kripkeans on this one. |
| 2.03 | p.68 | 13582 | 'Being a methane molecule' is not a property - it is just a predicate |
| Full Idea: In my view 'being a methane molecule' is not a property name, but a predicate that is constructed out of a natural kind name, and so pretends to name a property. | |||
| From: Brian Ellis (Scientific Essentialism [2001], 2.03) | |||
| A reaction: I can't tell you how strongly I agree with this. How long have you got? This is so incredibly right that... You get the idea. He observes that such properties cannot be instantiated 'in' anything. |
| 2.05 | p.81 | 13583 | There might be uninstantiated natural kinds, such as transuranic elements which have never occurred |
| Full Idea: There are reasons to believe that there are natural kinds that might never be instantiated, such as a transuranic element, capable of existing for some fraction of a second, but which has never actually existed anywhere. | |||
| From: Brian Ellis (Scientific Essentialism [2001], 2.05) | |||
| A reaction: He cautiously claims that kinds are ontologically prior to their individual members. I would say that there is no natural kind of the type that he describes. He says you have at least some grounds for predicting what kinds are possible. |
| 2.07 | p.87 | 13584 | The extension of a property is a contingent fact, so cannot be the essence of the property |
| Full Idea: The extension of a property in any given world is just a contingent fact about that world; its extension is not the essence of the property. | |||
| From: Brian Ellis (Scientific Essentialism [2001], 2.07) | |||
| A reaction: The Quinean idea, common among logicians, that a predicate is just a set defined for some model, may be useful in the logic, but is preposterous as an account of what a property actually is in nature, even if the set covers possible worlds. |
| 3.05 | p.115 | 13585 | The most fundamental properties of nature (mass, charge, spin ...) all seem to be dispositions |
| Full Idea: The properties of the most fundamental things in nature, including mass, charge, spin, and the like, would all appear to be dispositional. | |||
| From: Brian Ellis (Scientific Essentialism [2001], 3.05) | |||
| A reaction: This goes with the Leibnizian claim that the most fundamental features of nature must be active in character. |
| 3.06 | p.119 | 13586 | Maybe dispositions can be explained by intrinsic properties or structures |
| Full Idea: One view is that there must be an intrinsic property or structure in virtue of which a given thing has the behavioural disposition in question. | |||
| From: Brian Ellis (Scientific Essentialism [2001], 3.06) | |||
| A reaction: [He cites Prior, Pargetter,Jackson 1982] A key question in the metaphysics of nature - whether dispositions should be taken as primitive, or whether we should try to explain them in other terms. I take powers and dispositions to be prior to properties. |
| 3.06 | p.120 | 13587 | There is no property of 'fragility', as things are each fragile in a distinctive way |
| Full Idea: There is no natural property of 'fragility'; glasses, parchments, ecosystems and spiders' webs are fragile in their own ways, but they have nothing intrinsic or structural in common. | |||
| From: Brian Ellis (Scientific Essentialism [2001], 3.06) | |||
| A reaction: This is important (and, I think, correct) because we are inclined to say that something is 'intrinsically' fragile, but that still isn't enough to identify a true property. Ellis wants universals to be involved, and even a nominalist must sort-of agree. |
| 3.09 | p.127 | 13594 | The ontological fundamentals are dispositions, and also categorical (spatio-temporal and structural) properties |
| Full Idea: We do not claim, as some do, that fundamental dispositional properties are the ontological basis of all properties. On the contrary, there are equally fundamental categorical properties - for example, spatio-temporal relations and structures. | |||
| From: Brian Ellis (Scientific Essentialism [2001], 3.09) | |||
| A reaction: The source of disagreement between Bird and Ellis. Bird denies the existence of 'categorical properties'. I think I am with Bird. Space and time are as much part of the given as the elements, and then categorical properties result from dispositions. |
| 3.09 | p.128 | 13595 | Laws don't exist in the world; they are true of the world |
| Full Idea: Laws are not things that exist in the world; they are things that are true of the world. | |||
| From: Brian Ellis (Scientific Essentialism [2001], 3.09) | |||
| A reaction: I'm happy with this formulation. The one to get rid of is the idea of laws which could precede creation of the universe, and survive its demise. That might be possible, but we have absolutely no grounds for the claim. Humeans ought to agree. |
| 3.09 | p.128 | 13596 | A causal power is a disposition to produce forces |
| Full Idea: A causal power is a disposition of something to produce forces of a certain kind. | |||
| From: Brian Ellis (Scientific Essentialism [2001], 3.09) | |||
| A reaction: Hence when Leibniz was putting all his emphasis on the origin of the forces in nature, he was referring to exactly what we mean by 'powers'. From Ellis's formulation, I take powers to be more basic than dispositions. Does he realise this? |
| 3.11 | p.132 | 13598 | Causal powers are often directional (e.g. centripetal, centrifugal, circulatory) |
| Full Idea: Causal powers are often directional. For example, they may be centripetal, centrifugal, or circulatory. | |||
| From: Brian Ellis (Scientific Essentialism [2001], 3.11) | |||
| A reaction: The examples all seem to raise a few questions, about whether the directionality arises from the context, rather than from the intrinsic power. |
| 3.11 | p.132 | 13597 | Good explanations unify |
| Full Idea: An acceptable explanation must have some unifying power. | |||
| From: Brian Ellis (Scientific Essentialism [2001], 3.11) | |||
| A reaction: There is a tension here, between the particular and the general. If I say 'why did the building collapse' and you say 'gravity', you have certainly got a unifying explanation, but we want something narrower. |
| 3.11 | p.135 | 13599 | Powers are dispositions of the essences of kinds that involve them in causation |
| Full Idea: The causal powers of an object are the dispositional properties of that object that are the real essences of the natural kinds of processes that involve that object in the role of cause. | |||
| From: Brian Ellis (Scientific Essentialism [2001], 3.11) | |||
| A reaction: This is Ellis's formal definition at the end of his discussion of causal powers. He only seems to allow powers to the kind rather than to the individual. How do we account for the causal powers of unique genius? I say the powers are the essences. |
| 4.03 | p.153 | 13600 | The point of models in theories is not to idealise, but to focus on what is essential |
| Full Idea: Most model theories abstract from reality in order to focus on the essential nature of some kind of process or system of relations. ... The point of idealizing in this case is not to simplify, but to eliminate what is not essential. | |||
| From: Brian Ellis (Scientific Essentialism [2001], 4.03) | |||
| A reaction: I like this idea a lot. It is where scientific essentialism cashes out in actual scientific practice. Ellis's example is the idealised Carnot heat engine, which never can exist, but which captures what is essential about the process. |
| 4.05 | p.160 | 13601 | Explanations of particular events are not essentialist, as they don't reveal essential structures |
| Full Idea: Explanations of particular events in history, geology, or evolution, are causal explanations, requiring belief in some causal mechanisms. But they are not essentialist explanations because they do not seek to lay bare the essential structure of anything. | |||
| From: Brian Ellis (Scientific Essentialism [2001], 4.05) | |||
| A reaction: The explanation might be two-stage, as when we explain an earthquake by a plate boundary rupture, which is in turn explained by a theory of plate techtonics. The relationship between mechanistic and essentialist explanation needs study. |
| 7.06 | p.241 | 13603 | A primary aim of science is to show the limits of the possible |
| Full Idea: Scientific essentialists hold that one of the primary aims of science is to define the limits of the possible. | |||
| From: Brian Ellis (Scientific Essentialism [2001], 7.06) | |||
| A reaction: I like this. It breaks down into the study of modal profiles, and it can work for abstracta as well as for the physical world. It even covers the study of character, and you could say that it is the subject matter of Jane Austen. |
| 7.06 | p.242 | 13604 | Real possibility and necessity has the logic of S5, which links equivalence classes of worlds of the same kind |
| Full Idea: The logic of real possibilities and necessities is just S5. This is because the accessibility relation for real possibilities links possible worlds of the same natural kind, which is an equivalence class. | |||
| From: Brian Ellis (Scientific Essentialism [2001], 7.06) | |||
| A reaction: Most people, except Nathan Salmon, agree with this. With full accessibility, you seem to take epistemological problems out of the system, and just focus on reality. |
| 75,92 | p.112 | 9436 | The property of 'being an electron' is not of anything, and only electrons could have it |
| Full Idea: There is no property of being an electron. It could only be instantiated by electrons, so it does not seem genuine. And what is the thing that supposedly instantiates the property of being an electron? | |||
| From: Brian Ellis (Scientific Essentialism [2001], 75,92), quoted by Stephen Mumford - Laws in Nature 7.3 | |||
| A reaction: I agree entirely. Bird launches an excellent attack on categorial properties. |
| 8.04 | p.269 | 13606 | Humean conceptions of reality drive the adoption of extensional logic |
| Full Idea: A Humean conception of reality lies behind, and motivates, the development of extensional logics with extensional semantics. | |||
| From: Brian Ellis (Scientific Essentialism [2001], 8.04) | |||
| A reaction: His proposal seems to be that it rests on the vision of a domain of separated objects. The alternative view seems to be that it is mathematics, with its absolute equality between 'objects', which drives extensionalism. |
| 8.09 | p.283 | 13607 | If events are unconnected, then induction cannot be solved |
| Full Idea: If one believes, as Hume did, that all events are loose and separate, then the problem of induction is probably insoluble. | |||
| From: Brian Ellis (Scientific Essentialism [2001], 8.09) | |||
| A reaction: This points to the essentialist solution of induction - that we can genuinely derive inductive truths if we can inductively identify the essences which give rise to the necessities of further cases. I take that to be a correct account. |
| 2002 | The Philosophy of Nature: new essentialism |
| Intro | p.3 | 5442 | For 'passivists' behaviour is imposed on things from outside |
| Full Idea: A 'passivist' believes that the tendencies of things to behave as they do can never be inherent in the things themselves; they must always be imposed on them from the outside. | |||
| From: Brian Ellis (The Philosophy of Nature: new essentialism [2002], Intro) | |||
| A reaction: This is the medieval view, inherited by Newton and Hume, which makes miracles a possibility, and makes the laws of nature contingent. Essentialism disagree. I think I am with the essentialists. |
| Intro | p.3 | 5445 | Essentialists regard inanimate objects as genuine causal agents |
| Full Idea: Essentialist suppose that the inanimate objects of nature are genuine causal agents: things capable of acting or interacting. | |||
| From: Brian Ellis (The Philosophy of Nature: new essentialism [2002], Intro) | |||
| A reaction: I have no idea how one might demonstrate such a fact, even though it seems to stare us in the face. This is where science bumps into philosophy. I find myself intuitively taking the essentialist side quite strongly. |
| Intro | p.7 | 5443 | Kripke and others have made essentialism once again respectable |
| Full Idea: The revival of essentialism owes much to the work of Saul Kripke and Hilary Putnam, who made belief in essences once again respectable, with Harré and Madden arguing that there were real causal powers in nature. | |||
| From: Brian Ellis (The Philosophy of Nature: new essentialism [2002], Intro) | |||
| A reaction: It seems to me important to separate two stages of this: 1) causation results from essences, and 2) essences can never change. The first seems persuasive to me. For the second, see METAPHYSICS/IDENTITY/COUNTERPARTS. |
| Ch.1 | p.12 | 5444 | 'Individual essences' fix a particular individual, and 'kind essences' fix the kind it belongs to |
| Full Idea: The new essentialism retains Aristotelian ideas about essential properties, but it distinguishes more clearly between 'individual essences' and 'kind essences'; the former define a particular individual, the latter what kind it belongs to. | |||
| From: Brian Ellis (The Philosophy of Nature: new essentialism [2002], Ch.1) | |||
| A reaction: This might actually come into conflict with Aristotle, who seems to think that my personal essence is largely a human nature I share with everyone else. The new distinction is trying to keep the Kantian individual on the stage. |
| Ch.1 | p.14 | 5446 | For essentialists two members of a natural kind must be identical |
| Full Idea: Modern essentialists would insist that any two members of the same natural kind must be identical in all essential respects. | |||
| From: Brian Ellis (The Philosophy of Nature: new essentialism [2002], Ch.1) | |||
| A reaction: For this reason, animals no longer qualify as natural kinds, but electrons, gold atoms, and water molecules do. My sticking point is when anyone asserts that an electron necessarily has (say) its mass. Why no close counterpart of electrons? |
| Ch.1 | p.15 | 5447 | Metaphysical necessities are true in virtue of the essences of things |
| Full Idea: Metaphysical necessities are propositions that are true in virtue of the essences of things. | |||
| From: Brian Ellis (The Philosophy of Nature: new essentialism [2002], Ch.1) | |||
| A reaction: I am cautious about this. It sounds like huge Leibnizian metaphysical claims riding in on the back of a rather sensible new view of the laws of science. How can we justify equating natural necessity with metaphysical necessity? |
| Ch.1 | p.16 | 5448 | 'Real essence' makes it what it is; 'nominal essence' makes us categorise it a certain way |
| Full Idea: The 'real essence' of a thing is that set of its properties or structures in virtue of which it is a thing of that kind; its 'nominal essence' is the properties or structures in virtue of which it is described as a thing of that kind. | |||
| From: Brian Ellis (The Philosophy of Nature: new essentialism [2002], Ch.1) | |||
| A reaction: I like this distinction, because it is the kind made by realists like me who are fighting to make philosophers keep their epistemology and their ontology separate. |
| Ch.3 | p.41 | 5453 | Essentialists mostly accept the primary/secondary qualities distinction |
| Full Idea: Essentialists mostly accept the distinction between primary and secondary qualities, ..where the primary qualities of things are those that are intrinsic to the objects that have them. | |||
| From: Brian Ellis (The Philosophy of Nature: new essentialism [2002], Ch.3) | |||
| A reaction: One reason I favour essentialism is because I have always thought that the primary/secondary distinction was a key to understanding the world. 'Primary' gets at the ontology, 'secondary' shows us the epistemology. |
| Ch.3 | p.43 | 5457 | Predicates assert properties, values, denials, relations, conventions, existence and fabrications |
| Full Idea: As well as properties, predicates can assert evaluation, denial, relations, conventions, existence or fabrication. | |||
| From: report of Brian Ellis (The Philosophy of Nature: new essentialism [2002], Ch.3) by PG - Db (ideas) | |||
| A reaction: This seems important, in order to disentangle our ontological commitments from our language, which was a confusion that ran throughout twentieth-century philosophy. A property is a real thing in the world, not a linguistic convention. |
| Ch.3 | p.43 | 5456 | Redness is not a property as it is not mind-independent |
| Full Idea: Redness is not a property, because it has no mind-independent existence. | |||
| From: Brian Ellis (The Philosophy of Nature: new essentialism [2002], Ch.3) | |||
| A reaction: Well said. Secondary qualities are routinely cited in discussions of properties, and they shouldn't be. Redness causes nothing to happen in the physical world, unless a consciousness experiences it. |
| Ch.3 | p.47 | 5458 | Nearly all fundamental properties of physics are dispositional |
| Full Idea: With few, if any, exceptions, the fundamental properties of physical theory are dispositional properties of the things that have them. | |||
| From: Brian Ellis (The Philosophy of Nature: new essentialism [2002], Ch.3) | |||
| A reaction: He is denying that they are passive (as Locke saw primary qualities), and says they are actively causal, or else capacities or propensities. Sounds right to me. |
| Ch.3 | p.48 | 5459 | Essentialists say dispositions are basic, rather than supervenient on matter and natural laws |
| Full Idea: Essentialists say that dispositional properties may be fundamental, whereas for a passivist such qualities are not primary, but supervene on the primary qualities of matter, and on the laws of nature. | |||
| From: Brian Ellis (The Philosophy of Nature: new essentialism [2002], Ch.3) | |||
| A reaction: I am strongly in favour of this view of nature. Without essentialism, we have laws of nature arising out of a total void (or God), and arbitrarily imposing themselves on matter. What are the 'primary qualities of matter', if not dispositions? |
| Ch.3 | p.49 | 5460 | Causal relations cannot be reduced to regularities, as they could occur just once |
| Full Idea: Causal relations cannot be reduced to mere regularities, as Hume supposed, as they could exist as a singular case, even if it never happened on more than one occasions. | |||
| From: Brian Ellis (The Philosophy of Nature: new essentialism [2002], Ch.3) | |||
| A reaction: This seems to be the key reason for modern views moving away from Hume. The suspicion is that regularity is a test for or symptom of causation, but we are deeply committed to the real nature of causation being whatever creates the regularities. |
| Ch.3 | p.54 | 5461 | The essence of uranium is its atomic number and its electron shell |
| Full Idea: The essential properties of uranium are its atomic number, and the common electron shell structure for all uranium atoms. | |||
| From: Brian Ellis (The Philosophy of Nature: new essentialism [2002], Ch.3) | |||
| A reaction: For those who deny essences (e.g. Quineans) this is a nice challenge. You might have to add accounts of the essences of the various particles that make up the atoms. There is nothing arbitrary or conventional about what makes something uranium. |
| Ch.3 | p.56 | 5462 | Essential properties are usually quantitatively determinate |
| Full Idea: Most of the essential properties of things are quantitatively determinate properties. | |||
| From: Brian Ellis (The Philosophy of Nature: new essentialism [2002], Ch.3) | |||
| A reaction: This makes the essential nature of the world very much the province of science, which deals in quantities and equations. Essentialists must deal with mental events, as well as basic physics. |
| Ch.4 | p.59 | 5463 | Essentialists believe causation is necessary, resulting from dispositions and circumstances |
| Full Idea: Essentialists believe elementary causal relations involve necessary connections between events, namely between the displays of dispositional properties and the circumstances that give rise to them. | |||
| From: Brian Ellis (The Philosophy of Nature: new essentialism [2002], Ch.4) | |||
| A reaction: I like essentialism, but I feel a Humean caution about talk of 'natural necessity'. Let's just say that causation seems to be entirely the result of the nature of how things are. How things could be is a large topic for little mites like us. |
| Ch.4 | p.59 | 5464 | For essentialists, laws of nature are metaphysically necessary, being based on essences of natural kinds |
| Full Idea: Essentialist believe the laws of nature are metaphysically necessary, because anything that belongs to a natural kind is logically required (or is necessarily disposed) to behave as its essential properties dictate. | |||
| From: Brian Ellis (The Philosophy of Nature: new essentialism [2002], Ch.4) | |||
| A reaction: What a thrillingly large claim. Best approached with caution.. If we say 'essences make laws, and essences are necessary', we might wonder whether a natural kind essence could be SLIGHTLY different (a counterpart) in another world. |
| Ch.4 | p.60 | 5466 | Primary qualities are number, figure, size, texture, motion, configuration, impenetrability and (?) mass |
| Full Idea: For Boyle, Locke and Newton, the qualities inherent in bodies were just the primary qualities, namely number, figure, size, texture, motion and configuration of parts, impenetrability and, perhaps, body (or mass). | |||
| From: Brian Ellis (The Philosophy of Nature: new essentialism [2002], Ch.4) | |||
| A reaction: It is nice to have a list. Ellis goes on to say these are too passive, and urges dispositions as primary. Even so, the original seventeenth century insight seems to me a brilliant step forward in our understanding of the world. |
| Ch.4 | p.68 | 5468 | Properties are 'dispositional', or 'categorical' (the latter as 'block' or 'intrinsic' structures) |
| Full Idea: 'Dispositional' properties involve behaviour, and 'categorical properties' are structures in two or more dimensions. 'Block' structures (e.g. molecules) depend on other things, and 'instrinsic' structures (e.g. fields) involve no separate parts. | |||
| From: report of Brian Ellis (The Philosophy of Nature: new essentialism [2002], Ch.4) by PG - Db (ideas) | |||
| A reaction: This is an essentialist approach to properties, and sounds correct to me. The crucial preliminary step to understanding properties is to eliminate secondary qualities (e.g. colour), which are not properties at all, and cause confusion. |
| Ch.4 | p.70 | 5469 | The passive view of nature says categorical properties are basic, but others say dispositions |
| Full Idea: 'Categorical realism' is the most widely accepted theory of dispositional properties, because passivists can accept it, ..that is, that dispositions supervene on categorical properties; ..the opposite would imply nature is active and reactive. | |||
| From: Brian Ellis (The Philosophy of Nature: new essentialism [2002], Ch.4) | |||
| A reaction: Essentialists believe 'the opposite' - i.e. that dispositions are fundamental, and hence that the essence of nature is active. See 5468 for explanations of the distinctions. I am with the essentialists on this one. |
| Ch.5 | p.82 | 5472 | Natural kinds are of objects/substances, or events/processes, or intrinsic natures |
| Full Idea: Natural kinds appear to be of objects or substances, or of events or processes, or of the intrinsic nature of things; hence there should be laws of nature specific to each of these categories. | |||
| From: Brian Ellis (The Philosophy of Nature: new essentialism [2002], Ch.5) | |||
| A reaction: It is nice to see someone actually discussing what sort of natural kinds there are, instead of getting bogged down in how natural kinds terms get their meaning or reference. Ellis recognises that 'intrinsic nature' needs some discussion. |
| Ch.5 | p.82 | 5471 | Essentialism says natural kinds are fundamental to nature, and determine the laws |
| Full Idea: According to essentialists, the world is wholly structured at the most fundamental level into natural kinds, and the laws of nature are all determined by those kinds. | |||
| From: Brian Ellis (The Philosophy of Nature: new essentialism [2002], Ch.5) | |||
| A reaction: I am a fan of this view, despite being cautious about claims that natural kinds have necessary identity. Why are the essences active? That is the old Greek puzzle about the origin of movement. And why are natural kinds stable? |
| Ch.5 | p.85 | 5473 | The laws of nature imitate the hierarchy of natural kinds |
| Full Idea: If the natural kinds are divided into hierarchical categories, then essentialists would expect the laws of nature also to divide up into these categories, with the same hierarchy. | |||
| From: Brian Ellis (The Philosophy of Nature: new essentialism [2002], Ch.5) | |||
| A reaction: This seems to me a real step forwards in our understanding of nature, and hence a nice example of the contribution which philosophy can make, instead of just physics. |
| Ch.5 | p.91 | 5474 | Laws of nature tend to describe ideal things, or ideal circumstances |
| Full Idea: Most of the propositions we think of as being (or as expressing) genuine laws of nature seem to describe only the behaviour of ideal kinds of things, or of things in ideal circumstances. | |||
| From: Brian Ellis (The Philosophy of Nature: new essentialism [2002], Ch.5) | |||
| A reaction: Ellis this suggests that this phenomenon is because science aims at broad understanding instead of strict prediction. Do we simplify because we are a bit dim? Or is it because generalisation wouldn't exist without idealisation and abstraction? |
| Ch.5 | p.92 | 5475 | We must explain the necessity, idealisation, ontology and structure of natural laws |
| Full Idea: There are four major problems about the laws of nature: a necessity problem (must they be true?), an idealisation problem (why is this preferable?), an ontological problem (their grounds), and a structural problem (their relationships). | |||
| From: Brian Ellis (The Philosophy of Nature: new essentialism [2002], Ch.5) | |||
| A reaction: One might also ask why the laws (or their underlying essences) are the way they are, and not some other way, though the prospects of answering that don't look good. I don't think we should be satisfied with saying all of these questions are hopeless. |
| Ch.6 | p.109 | 5476 | Essentialists say natural laws are in a new category: necessary a posteriori |
| Full Idea: Essentialists do not accept the standard position, which says necessity is a priori, and contingency is a posteriori. They have a radically new category: the necessary a posteriori. The laws of nature are, for example, both necessary and a posteriori. | |||
| From: Brian Ellis (The Philosophy of Nature: new essentialism [2002], Ch.6) | |||
| A reaction: Based on Kripke. I'm cautious about this. Presumably God, who would know the essences, could therefore infer the laws a priori. The laws may follow of necessity from the essences, but the essences can't be known a posteriori to be necessary. |
| Ch.6 | p.113 | 5477 | One thing can look like something else, without being the something else |
| Full Idea: In considering questions of real possibility, it is important to keep the distinction between what a thing is and what it looks like clearly in mind. There is a possible world containing a horse that could then look like a cow, but it wouldn't BE a horse. | |||
| From: Brian Ellis (The Philosophy of Nature: new essentialism [2002], Ch.6) | |||
| A reaction: This is an interesting test assertion of the notion that there are essences (although Ellis does not allow that animals actually have essences - how could you, given evolution?). His point is a good one. |
| Ch.6 | p.114 | 5478 | Imagination tests what is possible for all we know, not true possibility |
| Full Idea: The imaginability test of possibility confuses what is really or metaphysically possible with what is only epistemically possible. ..The latter is just what is possible for all we know. | |||
| From: Brian Ellis (The Philosophy of Nature: new essentialism [2002], Ch.6) |
| Ch.6 | p.115 | 5479 | Scientific essentialists say science should define the limits of the possible |
| Full Idea: Scientific essentialists hold that one of the primary aims of science is to define the limits of the possible. | |||
| From: Brian Ellis (The Philosophy of Nature: new essentialism [2002], Ch.6) | |||
| A reaction: I'm not sure working scientists will go along with that, but I like the claim that philosophy is very much part of the same enterprise as practical science (and NOT subservient to it!). I think of metaphysics as very high level physics. |
| Ch.6 | p.120 | 5480 | The whole of our world is a natural kind, so all worlds like it necessarily have the same laws |
| Full Idea: It is plausible to suppose that the world is an instance of a natural kind, ..and what is naturally necessary in our world is what must be true in any world of the same natural kind. | |||
| From: Brian Ellis (The Philosophy of Nature: new essentialism [2002], Ch.6) | |||
| A reaction: This is putting an awful lot of metaphysical weight on the concept of a 'natural kind', so it had better be a secure one. If we accept that natural laws necessarily follow from essences, why shouldn't the whole of our world have an essence, as water does? |
| Ch.7 | p.126 | 5481 | Properties have powers; they aren't just ways for logicians to classify objects |
| Full Idea: One cannot think of a property as just a set of objects in a domain (as Fregean logicians do), as though the property has no powers, but is just a way of classifying objects. | |||
| From: Brian Ellis (The Philosophy of Nature: new essentialism [2002], Ch.7) | |||
| A reaction: I agree. It is sometimes suggested that properties are what 'individuate' objects, but how could they do that if they didn't have some power? If properties are known by their causal role, why do they have that causal role? |
| Ch.7 | p.129 | 5482 | Possible worlds realism is only needed to give truth conditions for modals and conditionals |
| Full Idea: The main trouble with possible worlds realism is that the only reason anyone has, or ever could have, to believe in other possible worlds (other than this one) is that they are needed, apparently, to provide truth conditions for modals and conditionals. | |||
| From: Brian Ellis (The Philosophy of Nature: new essentialism [2002], Ch.7) | |||
| A reaction: This attacks Lewis. Ellis makes this sound like a trivial technicality, but if our metaphysics is going to make sense it must cover modals and conditionals. What do they actually mean? Lewis has a theory, at least. |
| Ch.7 | p.131 | 5483 | Essentialists deny possible worlds, and say possibilities are what is compatible with the actual world |
| Full Idea: Essentialists are modal realists; ..what is really possible, they say, is what is compatible with the natures of things in this world (and this does not commit them to the existence of any world other than the actual world). | |||
| From: Brian Ellis (The Philosophy of Nature: new essentialism [2002], Ch.7) | |||
| A reaction: This introduces something like 'compatibilities' into our ontology. That must rest on some kind of idea of a 'natural contradiction'. We can discuss the possibilities resulting from essences, but what are the possible variations in the essences? |
| Ch.7 | p.135 | 5484 | Essentialists don't infer from some to all, but from essences to necessary behaviour |
| Full Idea: For essentialists the problem of induction reduces to discovering what natural kinds there are, and identifying their essential problems and structures. We then know how they must behave in any world, and there is no inference from some to all. | |||
| From: Brian Ellis (The Philosophy of Nature: new essentialism [2002], Ch.7) | |||
| A reaction: The obvious question is how you would determine the essences if you are not allowed to infer 'from some to all'. Personally I don't see induction as a problem, because it is self-evidently rational in a stable world. Hume was right to recommend caution. |
| Ch.7 | p.137 | 5485 | Emeralds are naturally green, and only an external force could turn them blue |
| Full Idea: Emeralds cannot all turn blue in 2050 (as Nelson Goodman envisaged), because to do so they would have to have an extrinsically variable nature. | |||
| From: Brian Ellis (The Philosophy of Nature: new essentialism [2002], Ch.7) | |||
| A reaction: I was never very impressed by the 'grue' problem, probably for this reason, but also because Goodman probably thought predicates and properties are the same thing, which they aren't (Idea 5457). |
| Ch.7 | p.138 | 5486 | Essentialism says metaphysics can't be done by analysing unreliable language |
| Full Idea: The new essentialism leads to a turning away from semantic analysis as a fundamental tool for the pursuit of metaphysical aims, ..since there is no reason to think that the language we speak accurately reflects the kind of world we live in. | |||
| From: Brian Ellis (The Philosophy of Nature: new essentialism [2002], Ch.7) | |||
| A reaction: The last part of that strikes me as false. We have every reason to think that a lot of our language very accurately reflects reality. It had better, because we have no plan B. We should analyse our best concepts, but not outdated, culture-laden ones. |
| Ch.7 | p.138 | 5487 | Essentialism requires a clear separation of semantics, epistemology and ontology |
| Full Idea: Scientific essentialism requires that philosophers distinguish clearly between semantic issues, epistemological issues, and ontological issues. | |||
| From: Brian Ellis (The Philosophy of Nature: new essentialism [2002], Ch.7) | |||
| A reaction: Music to my ears - but then I think everyone should require that of philosophers, because it where they get themselves most confused. The trouble is that ontology is only obtainable epistemologically, and only expressible semantically. |
| Ch.7 | p.141 | 5488 | Regularity theories of causation cannot give an account of human agency |
| Full Idea: A Humean theory of causation (as observed regularities) makes it very difficult for anyone even to suggest a plausible theory of human agency. | |||
| From: Brian Ellis (The Philosophy of Nature: new essentialism [2002], Ch.7) | |||
| A reaction: I'm not quite sure what a 'theory' of human agency would look like. Hume himself said we only get to understand our mental powers from repeated experience (Idea 2220). How do we learn about the essence of our own will? |
| Ch.7 | p.143 | 5489 | Humans have variable dispositions, and also power to change their dispositions |
| Full Idea: It seems that human beings not only have variable dispositional properties, as most complex systems have, but also meta-powers: powers to change their own dispositional properties. | |||
| From: Brian Ellis (The Philosophy of Nature: new essentialism [2002], Ch.7) | |||
| A reaction: This seems to me a key to how we act, and also to morality. 'What dispositions do you want to have?' is the central question of virtue theory. Humans are essentially multi-level thinkers. Irony is the window into the soul. |
| Ch.7 | p.156 | 5490 | Essentialism fits in with Darwinism, but not with extreme politics of left or right |
| Full Idea: The extremes of left and right in politics have much more reason than Darwinists to be threatened by the 'new essentialism', because it must reinstate the concept of human nature. | |||
| From: Brian Ellis (The Philosophy of Nature: new essentialism [2002], Ch.7) | |||
| A reaction: The point being that political extremes go against the grain of our nature. Personally I am favour of essentialism, and human nature. I notice that Steven Pinker is now defending human nature, from a background of linguistics and psychology. |
| Ch.7 | p.161 | 5491 | A general theory of causation is only possible in an area if natural kinds are involved |
| Full Idea: A general theory of causation in an area is possible only if the kinds of entities under investigation can reasonably be assumed to belong to natural kinds. | |||
| From: Brian Ellis (The Philosophy of Nature: new essentialism [2002], Ch.7) | |||
| A reaction: Human beings will be a problem, and also different levels of natural kinds (e.g. a chemical and an organism). 'Natural kind' is a very loose concept. He is referring to scientific, rather than philosophical, theories, I presume. |
| 2005 | Katzav on limitations of dispositions |
| p.91 | 6616 | Least action is not a causal law, but a 'global law', describing a global essence | |
| Full Idea: The principle of least action is not a causal law, but is what I call a 'global law', which describes the essence of the global kind, which every object in the universe necessarily instantiates. | |||
| From: Brian Ellis (Katzav on limitations of dispositions [2005]) | |||
| A reaction: As a fan of essentialism I find this persuasive. If I inherit part of my essence from being a mammal, I inherit other parts of my essence from being an object, and all objects would share that essence, so it would look like a 'law' for all objects. |
| 90 | p.90 | 6612 | Without general principles, we couldn't predict the behaviour of dispositional properties |
| Full Idea: It is objected to dispositionalism that without the principle of least action, or some general principle of equal power, the specific dispositional properties of things could tell us very little about how these things would be disposed to behave. | |||
| From: Brian Ellis (Katzav on limitations of dispositions [2005], 90) | |||
| A reaction: Ellis attempts to meet this criticism, by placing dispositional properties within a hierarchy of broader properties. There remains a nagging doubt about how essentialism can account for space, time, order, and the existence of essences. |
| 91 | p.90 | 6613 | The natural kinds are objects, processes and properties/relations |
| Full Idea: There are three hierarchies of natural kinds: objects or substances (substantive universals), events or processes (dynamic universals), and properties or relations (tropic universals). | |||
| From: Brian Ellis (Katzav on limitations of dispositions [2005], 91) | |||
| A reaction: Most interesting here is the identifying of natural kinds with universals, making universals into the families of nature. Universals are high-level sets of natural kinds. To grasp universals you must see patterns, and infer the underlying order. |
| 91 | p.91 | 6614 | A hierarchy of natural kinds is elaborate ontology, but needed to explain natural laws |
| Full Idea: The hierarchy of natural kinds proposed by essentialism may be more elaborate than is strictly required for purposes of ontology, but it is necessary to explain the necessity of the laws of nature, and the universal applicability of global principles. | |||
| From: Brian Ellis (Katzav on limitations of dispositions [2005], 91) | |||
| A reaction: I am all in favour of elaborating ontology in the name of best explanation. There seem, though, to be some remaining ontological questions at the point where the explanations of essentialism run out. |
| 91 | p.91 | 6615 | A species requires a genus, and its essence includes the essence of the genus |
| Full Idea: A specific universal can exist only if the generic universal of which it is a species exists, but generic universals don't depend on species; …the essence of any genus is included in its species, but not conversely. | |||
| From: Brian Ellis (Katzav on limitations of dispositions [2005], 91) | |||
| A reaction: Thus the species 'electron' would be part of the genus 'lepton', or 'human' part of 'mammal'. The point of all this is to show how individual items connect up with the rest of the universe, giving rise to universal laws, such as Least Action. |
| 2009 | The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism |
| p.163 | 23781 | Categoricals exist to influence powers. Such as structures, orientations and magnitudes | |
| Full Idea: Ellis allows categoricals alongside powers, …to influence the sort of manifestations produced by powers. He lists structures, arrangements, distances, orientations, and magnitudes. | |||
| From: report of Brian Ellis (The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism [2009]) by Neil E. Williams - The Powers Metaphysics 05.2 | |||
| A reaction: I would have thought that all of these could be understood as manifestations of powers. The odd one out is distances, but then space and time are commonly overlooked in every attempt to produce a complete ontology. [also Molnar 2003:164]. |
| Intro | p.2 | 12665 | I support categorical properties, although most people only want causal powers |
| Full Idea: I want to insist on the existence of a class of categorical properties distinct from causal powers. This is contentious, for there is a growing body of opinion that all properties are causal powers. | |||
| From: Brian Ellis (The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism [2009], Intro) | |||
| A reaction: Alexander Bird makes a case against categorical properties. If what is meant is that 'being an electron' is the key property of an electron, then I disagree (quite strongly) with Ellis. Ellis says they are needed to explain causal powers. |
| 1 | p.14 | 12666 | We can base logic on acceptability, and abandon the Fregean account by truth-preservation |
| Full Idea: In logic, acceptability conditions can replace truth conditions, ..and the only price one has to pay for this is that one has to abandon the implausible Fregean idea that logic is the theory of truth preservation. | |||
| From: Brian Ellis (The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism [2009], 1) | |||
| A reaction: This has always struck me as correct, given that if you assign T and F in a semantics, they don't have to mean 'true' and 'false', and that you can do very good logic with propositions which you think are entirely false. |
| 1 | p.18 | 12667 | Metaphysics aims at the simplest explanation, without regard to testability |
| Full Idea: The methodology of metaphysics... is that of arguing to the simplest explanation, without regard to testability. | |||
| From: Brian Ellis (The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism [2009], 1) | |||
| A reaction: I love that! I'd be a bit cautious about 'simplest', since 'everything is the output of an ineffable God' is beautifully simple, and brings the whole discussion to a halt. I certainly think metaphysics goes deeper than testing. String Theory? |
| 1 | p.19 | 12668 | Metaphysical necessity holds between things in the world and things they make true |
| Full Idea: Metaphysical necessitation is the relation that holds between things in the world and the things they make true. | |||
| From: Brian Ellis (The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism [2009], 1) | |||
| A reaction: Not sure about that. It implies that it is sentences that have necessity, and he confirms it by calling it 'a semantic relation'. So there are no necessities if there are no sentences? Not the Brian Ellis we know and love. |
| 2 | p.25 | 12669 | Science aims to explain things, not just describe them |
| Full Idea: The primary aim of science is to explain what happens, not just to describe it. | |||
| From: Brian Ellis (The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism [2009], 2) | |||
| A reaction: This I take to be a good motto for scientific essentialism. Any scientist who is happy with anything less than explanation is a mere journeyman, a servant in the kitchens of the great house of science. |
| 2 | p.39 | 12670 | A physical event is any change of distribution of energy |
| Full Idea: We may define a physical event as any change of distribution of energy in any of its forms. | |||
| From: Brian Ellis (The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism [2009], 2) | |||
| A reaction: This seems to result in an awful lot of events. My own (new this morning) definition is: 'An event is a process which can be individuated in time'. Now you just have to work out what a 'process' is, but that's easier than understanding an 'event'. |
| 2 | p.42 | 12671 | I deny forces as entities that intervene in causation, but are not themselves causal |
| Full Idea: The classical conception of force is an entity that intervenes between a physical cause and its effect, but is not itself a physical cause. I see no reason to believe in forces of this kind. | |||
| From: Brian Ellis (The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism [2009], 2) | |||
| A reaction: The difference of view between Leibniz and Newton is very illuminating on this one (coming this way soon!). Can you either have forces and drop causation, or have causation and drop forces? |
| 2 | p.44 | 12673 | Physical properties are those relevant to how a physical system might act |
| Full Idea: We may define a physical property as one whose value is relevant, in some circumstances, to how a physical system is likely to act. | |||
| From: Brian Ellis (The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism [2009], 2) | |||
| A reaction: Fair enough, but can we use the same 'word' property when we are discussing abstractions? Does 'The Enlightenment' have properties? Do very simple things have properties? Can 'red' act, if it isn't part of any physical system? |
| 2 | p.44 | 12672 | Properties and relations are discovered, so they can't be mere sets of individuals |
| Full Idea: To regard properties as sets of individuals, and relations as sets of ordered individuals, is to make a nonsense of the whole idea of discovering a new property or relationship. Sets are defined or constructed, not discovered. | |||
| From: Brian Ellis (The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism [2009], 2) | |||
| A reaction: This bizarre view of properties (as sets) drives me crazy, until it dawns on you that they are just using the word 'property' in a different way, probably coextensively with 'predicate', in order to make the logic work. |
| 2 | p.45 | 12674 | Energy is the key multi-valued property, vital to scientific realism |
| Full Idea: Perhaps the most important of all multi-valued properties is energy itself. I think a scientific realist must believe that energy exists. | |||
| From: Brian Ellis (The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism [2009], 2) | |||
| A reaction: It's odd that the existence of the most basic thing in physics needs a credo from a certain sort of believer. I have been bothered by notion of 'energy' for fifty years, and am still none the wiser. I'm sure I could be scientific realist without it. |
| 3 | p.54 | 12675 | Laws of nature are just descriptions of how things are disposed to behave |
| Full Idea: The laws of nature must be supposed to be just descriptions of the ways in which things are intrinsically disposed to behave: of how they would behave if they existed as closed and isolated systems. | |||
| From: Brian Ellis (The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism [2009], 3) | |||
| A reaction: I agree with this, and therefore take 'laws of nature' to be eliminable from any plausible ontology (which just contains the things and their behaviour). Ellis tends to defend laws, when he doesn't need to. |
| 3 | p.55 | 12676 | Causal powers can't rest on things which lack causal power |
| Full Idea: A causal power can never be dependent on anything that does not have any causal powers. | |||
| From: Brian Ellis (The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism [2009], 3) | |||
| A reaction: Sounds right, though you worry when philosophers make such bold assertions about such extreme generalities. But see Idea 12667. This is, of course, the key argument for saying that causal powers are the bedrock of reality, and of explanation. |
| 3 | p.58 | 12679 | A real essence is a kind's distinctive properties |
| Full Idea: A distinctive set of intrinsic properties for a given kind is called a 'real essence'. | |||
| From: Brian Ellis (The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism [2009], 3) | |||
| A reaction: Note that he thinks essence is a set of properties (rather than what gives rise to the properties), and that it is kinds (and not individuals) which have real essences, and that one role of the properties is to be 'distinctive' of the kind. Cf. Oderberg. |
| 3 | p.59 | 12680 | Natural kind structures go right down to the bottom level |
| Full Idea: Natural kind structures go all the way down to the most basic levels of existence. | |||
| From: Brian Ellis (The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism [2009], 3) | |||
| A reaction: Even the bottom level? Is there anything to explain why the bottom level is a kind, given that all the higher kinds presumably have an explanation? |
| 3 | p.60 | 12681 | There are natural kinds of processes |
| Full Idea: There are natural kinds of processes. | |||
| From: Brian Ellis (The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism [2009], 3) | |||
| A reaction: Interesting. I am tempted by the view that processes are the most basic feature of reality, since I think of the mind as a process, and quantum reality seems more like processes than like objects. |
| 3 | p.63 | 12682 | Essentialism needs categorical properties (spatiotemporal and numerical relations) and dispositions |
| Full Idea: Essentialist metaphysics seem to require that there be at least two kinds of properties in nature: dispositional properties (causal powers, capacities and propensities), and categorical ones (spatiotemporal and numerical relations). | |||
| From: Brian Ellis (The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism [2009], 3) | |||
| A reaction: At last someone tells us what a 'categorical' property is! Couldn't find it in Stanford! Bird and Molnar reject the categorical ones as true properties. If there are six cats, which cat has the property of being six? Which cat is 'three metres apart'? |
| 3 | p.68 | 12683 | Objects and substances are a subcategory of the natural kinds of processes |
| Full Idea: The category of natural kinds of objects or substances should be regarded simply as a subcategory of the category of the natural kinds of processes. | |||
| From: Brian Ellis (The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism [2009], 3) | |||
| A reaction: This is a new, and interesting, proposal from Ellis (which will be ignored by the philosophical community, as all new theories coming from elderly philosophers are ignored! Cf Idea 12652). A good knowledge of physics is behind Ellis's claim. |
| 3 | p.70 | 12684 | Spatial, temporal and numerical relations have causal roles, without being causal |
| Full Idea: Spatial, temporal and numerical relations can have various causal roles without themselves being instances of causal powers. | |||
| From: Brian Ellis (The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism [2009], 3) | |||
| A reaction: He cites gaps, aggregates, orientations, approaching and receding, as examples of categorical properties which make a causal difference. I would have thought these could be incorporated in accounts of more basic causal powers. |
| 3 n8 | p.70 | 12685 | Categorical properties depend only on the structures they represent |
| Full Idea: I would define categorical properties as those whose identities depend only on the kinds of structures they represent. | |||
| From: Brian Ellis (The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism [2009], 3 n8) | |||
| A reaction: Aha. So categorical properties would be much more perspicaciously labelled as 'structural' properties. Why does philosophical terminology make it all more difficult than it needs to be? |
| 5 | p.93 | 12686 | Causal powers are a proper subset of the dispositional properties |
| Full Idea: The causal powers are just a proper subset of the dispositional properties. | |||
| From: Brian Ellis (The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism [2009], 5) | |||
| A reaction: Sounds wrong. Causal powers have a physical reality, while a disposition sounds as if it can wholly described by a counterfactual claim. It seems better to say that things have dispositions because they have powers. |
| 6 | p.116 | 12687 | Metaphysical necessities are those depending on the essential nature of things |
| Full Idea: A metaphysically necessary proposition is one that is true in virtue of the essential nature of things. | |||
| From: Brian Ellis (The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism [2009], 6) | |||
| A reaction: It take this to be what Kit Fine argues for, though it tracks back to Aristotle. I also take it to be correct, though one might ask whether there are any other metaphysical necessities, ones not depending on essences. |
| 6 | p.117 | 12688 | Mathematics is the formal study of the categorical dimensions of things |
| Full Idea: I wish to explore the idea that mathematics is the formal study of the categorical dimensions of things. | |||
| From: Brian Ellis (The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism [2009], 6) | |||
| A reaction: Categorical dimensions are spatiotemporal relations and other non-causal properties. Ellis defends categorical properties as an aspect of science. The obvious connection seems to be with structuralism in mathematics. Shapiro is sympathetic. |
| 6 | p.124 | 12689 | Simultaneity can be temporal equidistance from the Big Bang |
| Full Idea: Cosmologists have a concept of objective simultaneity, which they take to mean something like 'temporally equidistant from the Big Bang'. | |||
| From: Brian Ellis (The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism [2009], 6) | |||
| A reaction: I find this very appealing, when faced with all the relativity theory that tells me there is no such thing as global simultaneity, a claim which I find deeply counterintuitive, but seems to have the science on its side. Bravo. |
| 6 | p.127 | 12690 | The present is the collapse of the light wavefront from the Big Bang |
| Full Idea: The global wavefront that collapses when a light signal from the Big Bang is observed is what most plausibly defines the frontier between past and future. | |||
| From: Brian Ellis (The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism [2009], 6) | |||
| A reaction: I'm not sure I understand this, but it is clearly worth passing on. Of all the deep mysteries, the 'present' time may be the deepest. |