green numbers give full details.
|
back to list of philosophers
|
expand these ideas
Ideas of Pascal Engel, by Text
[French, fl. 2002, Taught at the Sorbonne, Paris.]
|
§1.1
|
p.11
|
4737
|
Are truth-bearers propositions, or ideas/beliefs, or sentences/utterances?
|
|
§1.1
|
p.11
|
4738
|
The coherence theory says truth is an internal relationship between groups of truth-bearers
|
|
§1.1
|
p.14
|
4739
|
In "if and only if" (iff), "if" expresses the sufficient condition, and "only if" the necessary condition
|
|
§1.2
|
p.25
|
4744
|
We can't explain the corresponding structure of the world except by referring to our thoughts
|
|
§1.3
|
p.27
|
4745
|
Any coherent set of beliefs can be made more coherent by adding some false beliefs
|
|
§1.5
|
p.35
|
4746
|
Pragmatism is better understood as a theory of belief than as a theory of truth
|
|
§2.2
|
p.44
|
4750
|
The redundancy theory gets rid of facts, for 'it is a fact that p' just means 'p'
|
|
§2.4
|
p.50
|
4751
|
Maybe there is no more to be said about 'true' than there is about the function of 'and' in logic
|
|
§2.4
|
p.53
|
4752
|
Deflationism must reduce bivalence ('p is true or false') to excluded middle ('p or not-p')
|
|
§2.5
|
p.54
|
4753
|
Deflationism seems to block philosophers' main occupation, asking metatheoretical questions
|
|
§2.5
|
p.57
|
4755
|
Deflationism cannot explain why we hold beliefs for reasons
|
|
§2.5
|
p.57
|
4754
|
Our beliefs are meant to fit the world (i.e. be true), where we want the world to fit our desires
|
|
§3.3
|
p.86
|
4759
|
Mental states as functions are second-order properties, realised by first-order physical properties
|
|
§4.2
|
p.110
|
4762
|
The Humean theory of motivation is that beliefs may be motivators as well as desires
|
|
§5.2
|
p.133
|
4763
|
'Evidentialists' say, and 'voluntarists' deny, that we only believe on the basis of evidence
|
|
§5.2
|
p.134
|
4764
|
We cannot directly control our beliefs, but we can control the causes of our involuntary beliefs
|