2008 | On the Philosophy of Logic |
p.102 | 8946 | We could make our intuitions about heaps precise with a million-valued logic |
03.I | p.38 | 8940 | Tarski avoids the Liar Paradox, because truth cannot be asserted within the object language |
06.III | p.84 | 8941 | We can't explain 'possibility' in terms of 'possible' worlds |
07.I | p.95 | 8943 | Three-valued logic says excluded middle and non-contradition are not tautologies |
07.II | p.97 | 8944 | Vagueness can involve components (like baldness), or not (like boredom) |
07.II | p.100 | 8945 | Fuzzy logic has many truth values, ranging in fractions from 0 to 1 |
08.I | p.107 | 8947 | If all truths are implied by a falsehood, then not-p might imply both q and not-q |
08.III | p.117 | 8949 | In relevance logic, conditionals help information to flow from antecedent to consequent |
09.I | p.131 | 8950 | Logic formalizes how we should reason, but it shouldn't determine whether we are realists |
12.I | p.162 | 8951 | Classical logic is: excluded middle, non-contradiction, contradictions imply all, disjunctive syllogism |
12.IV | p.187 | 8952 | We reach 'reflective equilibrium' when intuitions and theory completely align |