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Ideas of Graeme Forbes, by Text

[American, fl. 1995, Professor at Tulane University.]

1985 The Metaphysics of Modality
p.25 11885 Only individual essences will ground identities across worlds in other properties [Mackie,P]
127-8 p.31 11888 Identities must hold because of other facts, which must be instrinsic [Mackie,P]
3.1 p.49 12003 De re modal formulae, unlike de dicto, are sensitive to transworld identities
3.5 p.66 12004 Counterpart theory is not good at handling the logic of identity
4.1 p.72 12005 The symbol 'ι' forms definite descriptions; (ιx)F(x) says 'the x which is such that F(x)'
4.2 p.77 12007 Possible worlds are points of logical space, rather like other times than our own
4.2 p.78 12008 Unlike places and times, we cannot separate possible worlds from what is true at them
4.2 p.79 12009 The problem with possible worlds realism is epistemological; we can't know properties of possible objects
4.4 p.82 12010 Is the meaning of 'and' given by its truth table, or by its introduction and elimination rules?
5.1 p.97 12013 Essential properties depend on a category, and perhaps also on particular facts
5.1 p.97 12012 Essential properties are those without which an object could not exist
5.1 p.97 12011 Transworld identity concerns the limits of possibility for ordinary things
5.1 p.99 12014 An individual essence is a set of essential properties which only that object can have
5.1 p.99 12015 Non-trivial individual essence is properties other than de dicto, or universal, or relational
5.1 p.100 12016 The problem of transworld identity can be solved by individual essences
5.5 p.130 12017 In all instances of identity, there must be some facts to ensure the identity
6.5 p.148 12020 An individual might change their sex in a world, but couldn't have differed in sex at origin
6.6 p.148 12021 Haecceitism attributes to each individual a primitive identity or thisness
7.2 p.168 12022 Same parts does not ensure same artefact, if those parts could constitute a different artefact
7.3 p.169 12023 Vagueness problems arise from applying sharp semantics to vague languages
7.4 p.179 12024 If we combined two clocks, it seems that two clocks may have become one clock.
7.6 p.186 12025 Artefacts have fuzzy essences
9.1 p.217 12027 There must be a plausible epistemological theory alongside any metaphysical theory
9.4 p.232 12028 De re necessity is a form of conceptual necessity, just as de dicto necessity is
9.4 p.235 12029 We believe in thisnesses, because we reject bizarre possibilities as not being about that individual
1986 In Defense of Absolute Essentialism
1 p.3 13804 A property is essential iff the object would not exist if it lacked that property
2 p.4 13805 Properties are trivially essential if they are not grounded in a thing's specific nature
2 p.4 13808 A relation is essential to two items if it holds in every world where they exist
2 p.4 13806 Trivially essential properties are existence, self-identity, and de dicto necessities
2 p.4 13807 A property is 'extraneously essential' if it is had only because of the properties of other objects
3 p.10 13809 One might be essentialist about the original bronze from which a statue was made
3 p.11 13810 The source of de dicto necessity is not concepts, but the actual properties of the thing