| 2008 | What is Analytic Philosophy? |
| 5.2 | p.127 | 22332 | German and British idealism is not about individual ideas, but the intelligibility of reality |
| Full Idea: Neither German nor British Idealism reduced reality to episodes in the minds of individuals. Instsead, they insisted that reality is intelligible only because it is a manifestation of a divine spirit or rational principle. | |||
| From: Hans-Johann Glock (What is Analytic Philosophy? [2008], 5.2) | |||
| A reaction: They standardly reject Berkeley. Such Idealism seems either to be the design argument for God's existence, or neo-Stoicism (in its claim that nature is rational). Why not just say that nature seems to be intelligible, and stop there? |
| 6.1 | p.154 | 22334 | Analysis must include definitions, search for simples, concept analysis, and Kant's analysis |
| Full Idea: Under 'analysis' a minimum would include the Socratic quest for definitions, Descartes' search for simple natures, the empiricists' psychological resolution of complex ideas, and Kant's 'transcendental' analysis of our cognitive capacities. | |||
| From: Hans-Johann Glock (What is Analytic Philosophy? [2008], 6.1) | |||
| A reaction: This has always struck me, and I find the narrow focus on modern logic a very distorted idea of the larger project. The aim, I think, is to understand by taking things apart, in the spirit of figuring out how a watch works. |
| 8.2 | p.215 | 22335 | The variety of uses of 'game' may be that it has several meanings, and isn't a single concept |
| Full Idea: The proper conclusion to draw from the fact that we explain 'game' in a variety of different ways is that it is not a univocal term, but has different, albeit related, meanings. | |||
| From: Hans-Johann Glock (What is Analytic Philosophy? [2008], 8.2) | |||
| A reaction: [He cites Rundle 1990] Potter says Wittgenstein insisted that 'game' is a single concept. 'Game' certainly slides off into metaphor, as in 'are you playing games with me?'. The multivocal view would still meet family resemblance on a narrower range. |
| 8.2 | p.215 | 22336 | We might say that the family resemblance is just a consequence of meaning-as-use |
| Full Idea: Against Wittgenstein's family resemblance view one might evoke his own idea that the meaning of a word is its use, and that diversity of use entails diversity of meaning. | |||
| From: Hans-Johann Glock (What is Analytic Philosophy? [2008], 8.2) | |||
| A reaction: Wittgenstein might just accept the point. Diversity of concepts reflects diversity of usage. But how do you distinguish 'football is a game' from 'oy, what's your game?'. How does usage distinguish metaphorical from literal (if it does)? |