| 1988 | Wittgenstein |
| Ch.3 | p.100 | 7091 | The argument from analogy is not a strong inference, since the other being might be an actor or a robot |
| Full Idea: The argument from analogy is a weak one, because it does not logically guarantee the inference I draw to the other's inner states, for he might be dissimulating or acting, or may even be a cleverly contrived robot which feels nothing. | |||
| From: A.C. Grayling (Wittgenstein [1988], Ch.3) | |||
| A reaction: This gives the impression that for an argument to be strong it must logically guarantee its inference. It strikes me that analogy is a good reason for believing in other minds, but that is because I am looking for the best explanation, not logical proof. |
| 1996 | Russell |
| Ch.2 | p.31 | 6408 | Russell needed three extra axioms to reduce maths to logic: infinity, choice and reducibility |
| Full Idea: In order to deduce the theorems of mathematics from purely logical axioms, Russell had to add three new axioms to those of standards logic, which were: the axiom of infinity, the axiom of choice, and the axiom of reducibility. | |||
| From: A.C. Grayling (Russell [1996], Ch.2) | |||
| A reaction: The third one was adopted to avoid his 'barber' paradox, but many thinkers do not accept it. The interesting question is why anyone would 'accept' or 'reject' an axiom. |
| Ch.2 | p.42 | 6414 | Two propositions might seem self-evident, but contradict one another |
| Full Idea: Two propositions might contradict each other despite appearing self-evident when considered separately. | |||
| From: A.C. Grayling (Russell [1996], Ch.2) | |||
| A reaction: Russell's proposal (Idea 5416) is important here, that self-evidence comes in degrees. If self-evidence was all-or-nothing, Grayling's point would be a major problem, but it isn't. Bonjour explores the idea more fully (e.g. Idea 3704) |
| 2003 | What is Good? |
| Ch.2 | p.18 | 7809 | In an honour code shame is the supreme punishment, and revenge is a duty |
| Full Idea: An honour code is one in which the greatest punishment is shame, and in which revenge is a duty. | |||
| From: A.C. Grayling (What is Good? [2003], Ch.2) | |||
| A reaction: Is this really what Nietzsche wanted to revive? Shame isn't a private matter - it needs solidarity of values in the community, and contempt for dishonour, so that it becomes everyone's worst fear. |
| Ch.4 | p.77 | 7817 | To make an afterlife appealing, this life has to be denigrated |
| Full Idea: It is remarkable how much the life of this world has to be denigrated to make the promise of happiness after death appealing. | |||
| From: A.C. Grayling (What is Good? [2003], Ch.4) | |||
| A reaction: This seems to be true of most religions, but it could be otherwise. Surely you want such a wonderful life to continue after death? But then you would not be obliged to do anything difficult to achieve immortality. Power comes into it... |
| Ch.4 | p.82 | 7818 | In Greek mythology only heroes can go to heaven |
| Full Idea: In Greek mythology only a hero like Hercules could hope to go to heaven (by becoming a god himself). | |||
| From: A.C. Grayling (What is Good? [2003], Ch.4) | |||
| A reaction: This illustrates Nietsche's 'inversion of morality' most clearly, because Christianity says that the person most likely to go to heaven is the humblest person. |
| Ch.4 | p.83 | 7819 | Religion gives answers, comforts, creates social order, and panders to superstition |
| Full Idea: The four standard explanations given for religion are that it provides answer, that it gives comfort, that it makes for social order, and that it rests on mere superstition. | |||
| From: A.C. Grayling (What is Good? [2003], Ch.4) | |||
| A reaction: All four of these could be correct, though the first and fourth would be incompatible if religion gives correct answers. Why religion begins might be not the same as the reason why it continues. |
| Ch.5 | p.124 | 7823 | Lucretius was rediscovered in 1417 |
| Full Idea: Lucretius's 'De Rerum Natura' was rediscovered in 1417, after languishing forgotten for six centuries. | |||
| From: A.C. Grayling (What is Good? [2003], Ch.5) | |||
| A reaction: A wonder. Is it the greatest book of the ancient world - because it partially preserves the lost philosophy of great Democritus? |
| Ch.8 | p.206 | 7824 | If suicide is lawful, but assisting suicide is unlawful, powerless people are denied their rights |
| Full Idea: An anomaly created by England's 1961 Suicide Act is that it is lawful to take one's own life, but unlawful to help anyone else to do it. This means anyone unable to commit suicide without help is denied one of their fundamental rights. | |||
| From: A.C. Grayling (What is Good? [2003], Ch.8) | |||
| A reaction: There is a difference, not really captured either by law or by reason, between tolerating an activity, and encouraging and helping it. I think the test question is "this activity is legal, but would you want your child to do it?" |
| 2006 | Among the Dead Cities |
| Ch.6 | p.212 | 7292 | War must also have a good chance of success, and be waged with moderation |
| Full Idea: To Aquinas's three conditions for war (Idea 7291) modern theorists have added two others: that to be just a war must have a reasonable chance of success, and that the means used to conduct it must be proportional to the ends sought. | |||
| From: A.C. Grayling (Among the Dead Cities [2006], Ch.6) | |||
| A reaction: These two principles strike me as being much more civilized and humane than Aquinas's original contribution, suggesting that in our theoretical thinking we might be making some progress. |
| Ch.6 | p.215 | 7293 | It is legitimate to do harm if it is the unintended side-effect of an effort to achieve a good |
| Full Idea: The doctrine of double effect says that it is legitimate to do harm if the harm is the unintended side-effect of an effort to achieve a legitimate goal. | |||
| From: A.C. Grayling (Among the Dead Cities [2006], Ch.6) | |||
| A reaction: I think a key principle of morality is our duty to think about possible unnoticed consequences of our actions. To neglect concern for side-effects is wicked. Beyond that, the issue must concern the particulars of the situation. |
| 2020 | The Good State |
| 1 | p.22 | 23253 | Majority decisions are only acceptable if the minority interests are not vital |
| Full Idea: A majority being in favour of some course of action is the acceptable means of reaching decisions when no vital interest of a minority is endangered. | |||
| From: A.C. Grayling (The Good State [2020], 1) | |||
| A reaction: This is generally accepted in extreme cases, such as the majority voting to exterminate the minority. The difficulty is to decide what is a 'vital' interest, and to get the majority to care about it. |
| 2 | p.37 | 23256 | Liberty and equality cannot be reconciled |
| Full Idea: Liberty and equality appear to be irresolvable contradictions. | |||
| From: A.C. Grayling (The Good State [2020], 2) | |||
| A reaction: [He particularly cites Isaiah Berlin for this view] Hm. The liberty of one is the liberty of all. I don't think I would feel that my liberty was unreasonably infringed if I lived in a society of imposed equality. The greedy hate equality the most. |
| 2 | p.55 | 23258 | The very concept of democracy entails a need for justice |
| Full Idea: The concept of democracy - embodying the principles of participation and equal concern - entails that social justice is a mandatory aim. | |||
| From: A.C. Grayling (The Good State [2020], 2) | |||
| A reaction: The idea that democracy entails participation in any direct way is what the right wing reject. Sustained participation would presumably entail various sorts of justice. |
| 3 | p.72 | 23259 | There should be separate legislative, executive and judicial institutions |
| Full Idea: The obvious solution is where the legislative, executive and judicial powers are exercised by different institutions, distinguished by function. The executive is answerable to the legislative, and the judicial is controlled by neither. | |||
| From: A.C. Grayling (The Good State [2020], 3) | |||
| A reaction: Separation by institution, rather than merely by separate individuals exercising the powers. I agree (with Popper etc) that institutions are the way to secure long-term success and justice. Grayling says the judiciary must not paralyse government. |
| 4 | p.101 | 23260 | A cap on time of service would restrict party control and career ambitions |
| Full Idea: A method by which legislators can be rendered independent of both party control and career ambitions is a cap on the amount of time they can serve as legislators. | |||
| From: A.C. Grayling (The Good State [2020], 4) | |||
| A reaction: The time of service must allow for learning the job, and then using the wisdom of experience. Presumably some career ambitions are needed if we are to have leaders. Not all party discipline is bad; great achievements are hard without it. |
| 6 | p.137 | 23262 | Experience, sympathy and history are sensible grounds for laying claim to rights |
| Full Idea: Personal experience, social sympathies, and history together licence laying claim to rights …which we see to make good mutual as well as individual sense. | |||
| From: A.C. Grayling (The Good State [2020], 6) | |||
| A reaction: There are no such thing as natural rights, but there are clearly natural grounds on which it is very reasonable to base a claim for legal rights. If positive rights are just arbitrary, or expressions of power struggles, that is crazy. |
| Conc | p.170 | 23263 | Politics is driven by power cliques |
| Full Idea: What drives political history is power cliques. | |||
| From: A.C. Grayling (The Good State [2020], Conc) | |||
| A reaction: A simple ideas which strikes me as accurate. Alternative views are that power is universally distributed (Foucault), or that power resides in a social class (Marx). Grayling's idea strikes me as more accurate. Each class has its cliques. |
| p.23 | p.23 | 23254 | Democracies should require a supermajority for major questions |
| Full Idea: A threshhold or supermajority bar (such as 60%) is the appropriate way to deal with highly consequential questions. | |||
| From: A.C. Grayling (The Good State [2020], p.23) | |||
| A reaction: This seems to be a very conservative view, because rejection of a major change is a decision in favour of the status quo. Would this rule apply equally to abolishing capital punishment and to reintroducing it? |
| p.25 | p.25 | 23255 | It is essential for democracy that voting is free and well informed |
| Full Idea: A necessary condition for democracy to be realised is that the act of voting should be free and informed. | |||
| From: A.C. Grayling (The Good State [2020], p.25) | |||
| A reaction: The requirement that voters should be well informed has become an increasing modern problem, because the media are owned by the wealthy, and false rumours can spread at lightning speed. |