1978 | Philosophy of Logics |
7.5 | p.103 | 2570 | The same sentence could be true in one language and meaningless in another, so truth is language-relative |
Full Idea: The definition of truth will have to be, Tarski argues, relative to a language, for one and the same sentence may be true in one language, and false or meaningless in another. | |||
From: Susan Haack (Philosophy of Logics [1978], 7.5) |
7.6 | p.113 | 2572 | Logical truth seems much less likely to 'correspond to the facts' than factual truth does |
Full Idea: It is surely less plausible to suppose that logical truth consists in correspondence to the facts than that 'factual' truth does. | |||
From: Susan Haack (Philosophy of Logics [1978], 7.6) |