2013 | Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2013 ver) |
1 | p.2 | 19120 | Semantic theories need a powerful metalanguage, typically including set theory |
1.1 | p.2 | 19121 | We can reduce properties to true formulas |
1.1 | p.2 | 19122 | Nominalists can reduce theories of properties or sets to harmless axiomatic truth theories |
1.2 | p.3 | 19124 | A natural theory of truth plays the role of reflection principles, establishing arithmetic's soundness |
1.2 | p.3 | 19123 | If soundness cannot be proved internally, 'reflection principles' be added which assert soundness |
1.3 | p.3 | 19125 | If we define truth, we can eliminate it |
1.3 | p.4 | 19126 | If deflationary truth is not explanatory, truth axioms should be 'conservative', proving nothing new |
3.2 | p.6 | 19127 | The T-sentences are deductively weak, and also not deductively conservative |
3.3 | p.7 | 19128 | If a language cannot name all objects, then satisfaction must be used, instead of unary truth |
4.3 | p.10 | 19129 | The FS axioms use classical logical, but are not fully consistent |
4.4 | p.11 | 19130 | KF is formulated in classical logic, but describes non-classical truth, which allows truth-value gluts |