| 2006 | Rationality and Logic |
| Intro | p.-11 | 11045 | Most psychologists are now cognitivists |
| Intro | p.-6 | 11046 | Kantian principled rationality is recognition of a priori universal truths |
| Intro | p.-6 | 11048 | Humean Instrumental rationality is the capacity to seek contingent truths |
| Intro | p.-6 | 11047 | Hegelian holistic rationality is the capacity to seek coherence |
| 1.1 | p.3 | 11051 | Frege's logical approach dominates the analytical tradition |
| 1.1 | p.6 | 11053 | Explanatory reduction is stronger than ontological reduction |
| 1.2 | p.9 | 11054 | Scientism says most knowledge comes from the exact sciences |
| 1.2 | p.11 | 11055 | Supervenience can add covariation, upward dependence, and nomological connection |
| 1.6 | p.25 | 11058 | Logic is explanatorily and ontologically dependent on rational animals |
| 2.1 | p.31 | 11059 | Circular arguments are formally valid, though informally inadmissible |
| 2.2 | p.31 | 11061 | Intensional consequence is based on the content of the concepts |
| 2.4 | p.37 | 11063 | Logicism struggles because there is no decent theory of analyticity |
| 4.0 | p.77 | 11067 | Rational animals have a normative concept of necessity |
| 4.9 | p.110 | 11068 | One tradition says talking is the essence of rationality; the other says the essence is logic |
| 5.3 | p.134 | 11069 | Gödel's Second says that semantic consequence outruns provability |
| 5.4 | p.141 | 11071 | 'Affirming the consequent' fallacy: φ→ψ, ψ, so φ |
| 5.4 | p.141 | 11070 | 'Denying the antecedent' fallacy: φ→ψ, ¬φ, so ¬ψ |
| 5.7 | p.151 | 11072 | Logic is personal and variable, but it has a universal core |
| 6.4 | p.173 | 11077 | Intuition includes apriority, clarity, modality, authority, fallibility and no inferences |
| 6.4 | p.175 | 11078 | Intuition is only outside the 'space of reasons' if all reasons are inferential |
| 6.5 | p.186 | 11080 | Intuition is more like memory, imagination or understanding, than like perception |
| 6.6 | p.193 | 11081 | Imagination grasps abstracta, generates images, and has its own correctness conditions |
| 6.6 | p.194 | 11082 | Should we take the 'depictivist' or the 'descriptivist/propositionalist' view of mental imagery? |
| 6.6 | p.196 | 11083 | A sentence is necessary if it is true in a set of worlds, and nonfalse in the other worlds |
| 6.6 | p.196 | 11085 | Nomological necessity is truth in all logically possible worlds with our laws |
| 6.6 | p.196 | 11086 | Metaphysical necessity can be 'weak' (same as logical) and 'strong' (based on essences) |
| 6.6 | p.196 | 11084 | Logical necessity is truth in all logically possible worlds, because of laws and concepts |
| 7.3 | p.218 | 11089 | Formally, composition and division fallacies occur in mereology |
| 7.3 | p.218 | 11088 | We can list at least fourteen informal fallacies |