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Ideas of Robert Hanna, by Text

[American, fl. 2006, Professor at the University of Colorado, Boulder.]

2006 Rationality and Logic
Intro p.-11 11045 Most psychologists are now cognitivists
Intro p.-6 11046 Kantian principled rationality is recognition of a priori universal truths
Intro p.-6 11047 Hegelian holistic rationality is the capacity to seek coherence
Intro p.-6 11048 Humean Instrumental rationality is the capacity to seek contingent truths
1.1 p.3 11051 Frege's logical approach dominates the analytical tradition
1.1 p.6 11053 Explanatory reduction is stronger than ontological reduction
1.2 p.9 11054 Scientism says most knowledge comes from the exact sciences
1.2 p.11 11055 Supervenience can add covariation, upward dependence, and nomological connection
1.6 p.25 11058 Logic is explanatorily and ontologically dependent on rational animals
2.1 p.31 11059 Circular arguments are formally valid, though informally inadmissible
2.2 p.31 11061 Intensional consequence is based on the content of the concepts
2.4 p.37 11063 Logicism struggles because there is no decent theory of analyticity
4.0 p.77 11067 Rational animals have a normative concept of necessity
4.9 p.110 11068 One tradition says talking is the essence of rationality; the other says the essence is logic
5.4 p.141 11070 'Denying the antecedent' fallacy: φ→ψ, ¬φ, so ¬ψ
5.4 p.141 11071 'Affirming the consequent' fallacy: φ→ψ, ψ, so φ
5.7 p.151 11072 Logic is personal and variable, but it has a universal core
6.4 p.173 11077 Intuition includes apriority, clarity, modality, authority, fallibility and no inferences
6.4 p.175 11078 Intuition is only outside the 'space of reasons' if all reasons are inferential
6.5 p.186 11080 Intuition is more like memory, imagination or understanding, than like perception
6.6 p.193 11081 Imagination grasps abstracta, generates images, and has its own correctness conditions
6.6 p.194 11082 Should we take the 'depictivist' or the 'descriptivist/propositionalist' view of mental imagery?
6.6 p.196 11083 A sentence is necessary if it is true in a set of worlds, and nonfalse in the other worlds
6.6 p.196 11085 Nomological necessity is truth in all logically possible worlds with our laws
6.6 p.196 11086 Metaphysical necessity can be 'weak' (same as logical) and 'strong' (based on essences)
6.6 p.196 11084 Logical necessity is truth in all logically possible worlds, because of laws and concepts
7.3 p.218 11088 We can list at least fourteen informal fallacies
7.3 p.218 11089 Formally, composition and division fallacies occur in mereology