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Ideas of Richard M. Hare, by Text

[British, 1919 - 2002, Professor at Oxford University.]

1952 The Language of Morals
p.640 2855 In primary evaluative words like 'ought' prescription is constant but description can vary [Hooker,B]
5.2 p.80 16050 The goodness of a picture supervenes on the picture; duplicates must be equally good
1963 Freedom and Reason
p.57 22331 Moral statements are imperatives rather than the avowals of emotion - but universalisable [Glock]
p.191 22484 Universalised prescriptivism could be seen as implying utilitarianism [Foot]
p.123-4 p.44 6449 The categorical imperative leads to utilitarianism [Nagel]
1981 Moral Thinking: Its Levels,Method and Point
p.83 4125 Hare says I acquire an agglomeration of preferences by role-reversal, leading to utilitarianism [Williams,B]
p.86 4126 If we have to want the preferences of the many, we have to abandon our own deeply-held views [Williams,B]
p.89 4127 If morality is to be built on identification with the preferences of others, I must agree with their errors [Williams,B]
Ch.11 p.178 4360 By far the easiest way of seeming upright is to be upright
p.21 p.190 22483 A judgement is presciptive if we expect it to be acted on
1991 Universal Prescriptivism
p.452 p.452 2703 Descriptivism say ethical meaning is just truth-conditions; prescriptivism adds an evaluation
p.453 p.453 2704 If morality is just a natural or intuitive description, that leads to relativism
p.454 p.454 2705 How can intuitionists distinguish universal convictions from local cultural ones?
p.455 p.455 2706 Emotivists mistakenly think all disagreements are about facts, and so there are no moral reasons
p.455 p.455 2707 If there can be contradictory prescriptions, then reasoning must be involved
p.456 p.456 2708 An 'ought' statement implies universal application
p.457 p.457 2709 Prescriptivism sees 'ought' statements as imperatives which are universalisable
p.458 p.458 2710 Moral judgements must invoke some sort of principle
p.459 p.459 2711 Prescriptivism implies a commitment, but descriptivism doesn't
p.461 p.461 2712 You can't use intuitions to decide which intuitions you should cultivate