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Ideas of John Hawthorne, by Text

[British, b.1964, Degree at Manchester. Professor at Rutgers University, then Waynflete Professor at Oxford University.]

2001 Causal Structuralism
Intro p.212 15123 Is the causal profile of a property its essence?
Intro p.212 15122 Could two different properties have the same causal profile?
Intro p.212 15121 An individual essence is a necessary and sufficient profile for a thing
1.3 p.215 15124 If properties are more than their powers, we could have two properties with the same power
1.5 p.219 15126 Maybe scientific causation is just generalisation about the patterns
2.4 p.223 15127 A categorical basis could hardly explain a disposition if it had no powers of its own
2.5 p.223 15128 We can treat the structure/form of the world differently from the nodes/matter of the world
Ch.25 p.264 15125 We only know the mathematical laws, but not much else
2003 Identity
3.1 p.112 8970 Our notion of identical sets involves identical members, which needs absolute identity
2005 The Case for Closure
Intro p.41 19551 How can we know the heavyweight implications of normal knowledge? Must we distort 'knowledge'?
1 p.42 19552 We wouldn't know the logical implications of our knowledge if small risks added up to big risks
2 p.44 19553 Commitment to 'I have a hand' only makes sense in a context where it has been doubted
2 p.45 19554 Denying closure is denying we know P when we know P and Q, which is absurd in simple cases
2008 Three-Dimensionalism v Four-Dimensionalism
1 p.264 14588 Modern metaphysicians tend to think space-time points are more fundamental than space-time regions
1.2 p.266 14589 A modal can reverse meaning if the context is seen differently, so maybe context is all?
2.1 p.270 14590 If we accept scattered objects such as archipelagos, why not think of cars that way?
2.2 p.273 14591 Four-dimensionalists say instantaneous objects are more fundamental than long-lived ones