| 1899 | Foundations of Geometry |
| p.9 | 9546 | Euclid axioms concerns possibilities of construction, but Hilbert's assert the existence of objects | |
| Full Idea: Hilbert's geometrical axioms were existential in character, asserting the existence of certain geometrical objects (points and lines). Euclid's postulates do not assert the existence of anything; they assert the possibility of certain constructions. | |||
| From: report of David Hilbert (Foundations of Geometry [1899]) by Charles Chihara - A Structural Account of Mathematics 01.1 | |||
| A reaction: Chihara says geometry was originally understood modally, but came to be understood existentially. It seems extraordinary to me that philosophers of mathematics can have become more platonist over the centuries. |
| p.17 | 18742 | Hilbert's formalisation revealed implicit congruence axioms in Euclid | |
| Full Idea: In his formal investigation of Euclidean geometry, Hilbert uncovered congruence axioms that implicitly played a role in Euclid's proofs but were not explicitly recognised. | |||
| From: report of David Hilbert (Foundations of Geometry [1899]) by Horsten,L/Pettigrew,R - Mathematical Methods in Philosophy 2 | |||
| A reaction: The writers are offering this as a good example of the benefits of a precise and formal approach to foundational questions. It's hard to disagree, but dispiriting if you need a PhD in maths before you can start doing philosophy. |
| p.25 | 18217 | Hilbert's geometry is interesting because it captures Euclid without using real numbers | |
| Full Idea: Hilbert's formulation of the Euclidean theory is of special interest because (besides being rigorously axiomatised) it does not employ the real numbers in the axioms. | |||
| From: report of David Hilbert (Foundations of Geometry [1899]) by Hartry Field - Science without Numbers 3 | |||
| A reaction: Notice that this job was done by Hilbert, and not by the fictionalist Hartry Field. |
| p.42 | 13472 | Hilbert aimed to eliminate number from geometry | |
| Full Idea: One of Hilbert's aims in 'The Foundations of Geometry' was to eliminate number [as measure of lengths and angles] from geometry. | |||
| From: report of David Hilbert (Foundations of Geometry [1899]) by William D. Hart - The Evolution of Logic 2 | |||
| A reaction: Presumably this would particularly have to include the elimination of ratios (rather than actual specific lengths). |
| 1899 | Letter to Frege 29.12.1899 |
| p.51 | 15716 | If axioms and their implications have no contradictions, they pass my criterion of truth and existence | |
| Full Idea: If the arbitrarily given axioms do not contradict each other with all their consequences, then they are true and the things defined by the axioms exist. For me this is the criterion of truth and existence. | |||
| From: David Hilbert (Letter to Frege 29.12.1899 [1899]), quoted by R Kaplan / E Kaplan - The Art of the Infinite 2 'Mind' | |||
| A reaction: If an axiom says something equivalent to 'fairies exist, but they are totally undetectable', this would seem to avoid contradiction with anything, and hence be true. Hilbert's idea sounds crazy to me. He developed full Formalism later. |
| 1900 | On the Concept of Number |
| p.183 | p.129 | 22293 | Hilbert said (to block paradoxes) that mathematical existence is entailed by consistency |
| Full Idea: Hilbert proposed to circuvent the paradoxes by means of the doctrine (already proposed by Poincaré) that in mathematics consistency entails existence. | |||
| From: report of David Hilbert (On the Concept of Number [1900], p.183) by Michael Potter - The Rise of Analytic Philosophy 1879-1930 19 'Exist' | |||
| A reaction: Interesting. Hilbert's idea has struck me as weird, but it makes sense if its main motive is to block the paradoxes. Roughly, the idea is 'it exists if it isn't paradoxical'. A low bar for existence (but then it is only in mathematics!). |
| 1900 | works |
| p.148 | 10113 | The grounding of mathematics is 'in the beginning was the sign' | |
| Full Idea: The solid philosophical attitude that I think is required for the grounding of pure mathematics is this: In the beginning was the sign. | |||
| From: David Hilbert (works [1900]), quoted by A.George / D.J.Velleman - Philosophies of Mathematics Ch.6 | |||
| A reaction: Why did people invent those particular signs? Presumably they were meant to designate something, in the world or in our experience. |
| p.153 | 10115 | Hilbert substituted a syntactic for a semantic account of consistency | |
| Full Idea: Hilbert replaced a semantic construal of inconsistency (that the theory entails a statement that is necessarily false) by a syntactic one (that the theory formally derives the statement (0 =1 ∧ 0 not-= 1). | |||
| From: report of David Hilbert (works [1900]) by A.George / D.J.Velleman - Philosophies of Mathematics Ch.6 | |||
| A reaction: Finding one particular clash will pinpoint the notion of inconsistency, but it doesn't seem to define what it means, since the concept has very wide application. |
| p.156 | 10116 | Hilbert aimed to prove the consistency of mathematics finitely, to show infinities won't produce contradictions | |
| Full Idea: Hilbert's project was to establish the consistency of classical mathematics using just finitary means, to convince all parties that no contradictions will follow from employing the infinitary notions and reasoning. | |||
| From: report of David Hilbert (works [1900]) by A.George / D.J.Velleman - Philosophies of Mathematics Ch.6 | |||
| A reaction: This is the project which was badly torpedoed by Gödel's Second Incompleteness Theorem. |
| 6.7 | p.154 | 8717 | Hilbert wanted to prove the consistency of all of mathematics (which realists take for granted) |
| Full Idea: Hilbert wanted to derive ideal mathematics from the secure, paradox-free, finite mathematics (known as 'Hilbert's Programme'). ...Note that for the realist consistency is not something we need to prove; it is a precondition of thought. | |||
| From: report of David Hilbert (works [1900], 6.7) by Michèle Friend - Introducing the Philosophy of Mathematics | |||
| A reaction: I am an intuitive realist, though I am not so sure about that on cautious reflection. Compare the claims that there are reasons or causes for everything. Reality cannot contain contradicitions (can it?). Contradictions would be our fault. |
| 1904 | On the Foundations of Logic and Arithmetic |
| p.130 | p.130 | 17697 | The existence of an arbitrarily large number refutes the idea that numbers come from experience |
| Full Idea: The standpoint of pure experience seems to me to be refuted by the objection that the existence, possible or actual, of an arbitrarily large number can never be derived through experience, that is, through experiment. | |||
| From: David Hilbert (On the Foundations of Logic and Arithmetic [1904], p.130) | |||
| A reaction: Alternatively, empiricism refutes infinite numbers! No modern mathematician will accept that, but you wonder in what sense the proposed entities qualify as 'numbers'. |
| p.131 | p.131 | 17698 | Logic already contains some arithmetic, so the two must be developed together |
| Full Idea: In the traditional exposition of the laws of logic certain fundamental arithmetic notions are already used, for example in the notion of set, and to some extent also of number. Thus we turn in a circle, and a partly simultaneous development is required. | |||
| From: David Hilbert (On the Foundations of Logic and Arithmetic [1904], p.131) | |||
| A reaction: If the Axiom of Infinity is meant, it may be possible to purge the arithmetic from the logic. Then the challenge to derive arithmetic from it becomes rather tougher. |
| 1918 | Axiomatic Thought |
| [03] | p.1108 | 17963 | The facts of geometry, arithmetic or statics order themselves into theories |
| Full Idea: The facts of geometry order themselves into a geometry, the facts of arithmetic into a theory of numbers, the facts of statics, electrodynamics into a theory of statics, electrodynamics, or the facts of the physics of gases into a theory of gases. | |||
| From: David Hilbert (Axiomatic Thought [1918], [03]) | |||
| A reaction: This is the confident (I would say 'essentialist') view of axioms, which received a bit of a setback with Gödel's Theorems. I certainly agree that the world proposes an order to us - we don't just randomly invent one that suits us. |
| [05] | p.1108 | 17965 | The whole of Euclidean geometry derives from a basic equation and transformations |
| Full Idea: The linearity of the equation of the plane and of the orthogonal transformation of point-coordinates is completely adequate to produce the whole broad science of spatial Euclidean geometry purely by means of analysis. | |||
| From: David Hilbert (Axiomatic Thought [1918], [05]) | |||
| A reaction: This remark comes from the man who succeeded in producing modern axioms for geometry (in 1897), so he knows what he is talking about. We should not be wholly pessimistic about Hilbert's ambitious projects. He had to dig deeper than this idea... |
| [05] | p.1108 | 17964 | Number theory just needs calculation laws and rules for integers |
| Full Idea: The laws of calculation and the rules of integers suffice for the construction of number theory. | |||
| From: David Hilbert (Axiomatic Thought [1918], [05]) | |||
| A reaction: This is the confident Hilbert view that the whole system can be fully spelled out. Gödel made this optimism more difficult. |
| [09] | p.1109 | 17966 | Axioms must reveal their dependence (or not), and must be consistent |
| Full Idea: If a theory is to serve its purpose of orienting and ordering, it must first give us an overview of the independence and dependence of its propositions, and second give a guarantee of the consistency of all of the propositions. | |||
| From: David Hilbert (Axiomatic Thought [1918], [09]) | |||
| A reaction: Gödel's Second theorem showed that the theory can never prove its own consistency, which made the second Hilbert requirement more difficult. It is generally assumed that each of the axioms must be independent of the others. |
| [53] | p.1115 | 17967 | To decide some questions, we must study the essence of mathematical proof itself |
| Full Idea: It is necessary to study the essence of mathematical proof itself if one wishes to answer such questions as the one about decidability in a finite number of operations. | |||
| From: David Hilbert (Axiomatic Thought [1918], [53]) |
| [56] | p.1115 | 17968 | By digging deeper into the axioms we approach the essence of sciences, and unity of knowedge |
| Full Idea: By pushing ahead to ever deeper layers of axioms ...we also win ever-deeper insights into the essence of scientific thought itself, and become ever more conscious of the unity of our knowledge. | |||
| From: David Hilbert (Axiomatic Thought [1918], [56]) | |||
| A reaction: This is the less fashionable idea that scientific essentialism can also be applicable in the mathematic sciences, centring on the project of axiomatisation for logic, arithmetic, sets etc. |
| 1925 | On the Infinite |
| p.184 | p.66 | 9636 | My theory aims at the certitude of mathematical methods |
| Full Idea: The goal of my theory is to establish once and for all the certitude of mathematical methods. | |||
| From: David Hilbert (On the Infinite [1925], p.184), quoted by James Robert Brown - Philosophy of Mathematics Ch.5 | |||
| A reaction: This dream is famous for being shattered by Gödel's Incompleteness Theorem a mere six years later. Neverless there seem to be more limited certainties which are accepted in mathematics. The certainty of the whole of arithmetic is beyond us. |
| p.184 | p.184 | 12456 | I aim to establish certainty for mathematical methods |
| Full Idea: The goal of my theory is to establish once and for all the certitude of mathematical methods. | |||
| From: David Hilbert (On the Infinite [1925], p.184) | |||
| A reaction: This is the clearest statement of the famous Hilbert Programme, which is said to have been brought to an abrupt end by Gödel's Incompleteness Theorems. |
| p.184 | p.184 | 12455 | The idea of an infinite totality is an illusion |
| Full Idea: Just as in the limit processes of the infinitesimal calculus, the infinitely large and small proved to be a mere figure of speech, so too we must realise that the infinite in the sense of an infinite totality, used in deductive methods, is an illusion. | |||
| From: David Hilbert (On the Infinite [1925], p.184) | |||
| A reaction: This is a very authoritative rearguard action. I no longer think the dispute matters much, it being just a dispute over a proposed new meaning for the word 'number'. |
| p.186 | p.186 | 12457 | There is no continuum in reality to realise the infinitely small |
| Full Idea: A homogeneous continuum which admits of the sort of divisibility needed to realise the infinitely small is nowhere to be found in reality. | |||
| From: David Hilbert (On the Infinite [1925], p.186) | |||
| A reaction: He makes this remark as a response to Planck's new quantum theory (the year before the big works of Heisenberg and Schrödinger). Personally I don't see why infinities should depend on the physical world, since they are imaginary. |
| p.191 | p.65 | 9633 | No one shall drive us out of the paradise the Cantor has created for us |
| Full Idea: No one shall drive us out of the paradise the Cantor has created for us. | |||
| From: David Hilbert (On the Infinite [1925], p.191), quoted by James Robert Brown - Philosophy of Mathematics | |||
| A reaction: This is Hilbert's famous refusal to accept any account of mathematics, such as Kant's, which excludes actual infinities. Cantor had laid out a whole glorious hierarchy of different infinities. |
| p.192 | p.192 | 12459 | The subject matter of mathematics is immediate and clear concrete symbols |
| Full Idea: The subject matter of mathematics is the concrete symbols themselves whose structure is immediately clear and recognisable. | |||
| From: David Hilbert (On the Infinite [1925], p.192) | |||
| A reaction: I don't think many people will agree with Hilbert here. Does he mean token-symbols or type-symbols? You can do maths in your head, or with different symbols. If type-symbols, you have to explain what a type is. |
| p.195 | p.195 | 12460 | We extend finite statements with ideal ones, in order to preserve our logic |
| Full Idea: To preserve the simple formal rules of ordinary Aristotelian logic, we must supplement the finitary statements with ideal statements. | |||
| From: David Hilbert (On the Infinite [1925], p.195) | |||
| A reaction: I find very appealing the picture of mathematics as rooted in the physical world, and then gradually extended by a series of 'idealisations', which should perhaps be thought of as fictions. |
| p.196 | p.174 | 18112 | Mathematics divides in two: meaningful finitary statements, and empty idealised statements |
| Full Idea: We can conceive mathematics to be a stock of two kinds of formulas: first, those to which the meaningful communications of finitary statements correspond; and secondly, other formulas which signify nothing and which are ideal structures of our theory. | |||
| From: David Hilbert (On the Infinite [1925], p.196), quoted by David Bostock - Philosophy of Mathematics 6.1 |
| p.200 | p.200 | 12461 | We believe all mathematical problems are solvable |
| Full Idea: The thesis that every mathematical problem is solvable - we are all convinced that it really is so. | |||
| From: David Hilbert (On the Infinite [1925], p.200) | |||
| A reaction: This will include, for example, Goldbach's Conjecture (every even is the sum of two primes), which is utterly simple but with no proof anywhere in sight. |
| p.201 | p.201 | 12462 | Only the finite can bring certainty to the infinite |
| Full Idea: Operating with the infinite can be made certain only by the finitary. | |||
| From: David Hilbert (On the Infinite [1925], p.201) | |||
| A reaction: See 'Compactness' for one aspect of this claim. I think Hilbert was fighting a rearguard action, and his idea now has few followers. |
| 1927 | The Foundations of Mathematics |
| p.476 | p.285 | 18844 | You would cripple mathematics if you denied Excluded Middle |
| Full Idea: Taking the principle of Excluded Middle away from the mathematician would be the same, say, as prohibiting the astronomer from using the telescope or the boxer from using his fists. | |||
| From: David Hilbert (The Foundations of Mathematics [1927], p.476), quoted by Ian Rumfitt - The Boundary Stones of Thought 9.4 | |||
| A reaction: [p.476 in Van Heijenoort] |