green numbers give full details.     |    back to list of philosophers     |     expand these ideas

Ideas of Thomas Hofweber, by Text

[German, fl. 2004, MA at Munich, PhD at Stanford. Professor at University of N.Carolina at Chapel Hill.]

2005 Number Determiners, Numbers, Arithmetic
§1 p.180 What is the relation of number words as singular-terms, adjectives/determiners, and symbols?
§2 p.183 We might eliminate adjectival numbers by analysing them into blocks of quantifiers
§3.1 p.187 An adjective contributes semantically to a noun phrase
§4.1 p.194 '2 + 2 = 4' can be read as either singular or plural
§4.2 p.198 Why is arithmetic hard to learn, but then becomes easy?
§4.3 p.199 Our minds are at their best when reasoning about objects
§6.2 p.215 Arithmetic doesn’t simply depend on objects, since it is true of fictional objects
§6.3 p.217 First-order logic captures the inferential relations of numbers, but not the semantics
§6.3 p.218 Quantifiers for domains and for inference come apart if there are no entities
§6.3 p.219 Arithmetic is not about a domain of entities, as the quantifiers are purely inferential
2006 Inexpressible Properties and Propositions
2.1 p.163 Quantification can't all be substitutional; some reference is obviously to objects
2.2 p.169 Since properties have properties, there can be a typed or a type-free theory of them
5.3 p.195 Instances of minimal truth miss out propositions inexpressible in current English
6.4 p.203 Holism says language can't be translated; the expressibility hypothesis says everything can
2009 Ambitious, yet modest, Metaphysics
1.1 p.261 Science has discovered properties of things, so there are properties - so who needs metaphysics?
2 p.273 Esoteric metaphysics aims to be top science, investigating ultimate reality
2 p.274 The quantifier in logic is not like the ordinary English one (which has empty names, non-denoting terms etc)
2016 Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics
01.1 p.1 Metaphysics is (supposedly) first the ontology, then in general what things are like
01.4.3 p.15 Without propositions there can be no beliefs or desires
02.3 p.25 'Singular terms' are not found in modern linguistics, and are not the same as noun phrases
02.3 p.26 If two processes are said to be identical, that doesn't make their terms refer to entities
02.5.2 p.42 Syntactic form concerns the focus of the sentence, as well as the truth-conditions
02.6.2 p.45 'Background deletion' is appropriately omitting background from an answer
02.6.3 p.47 'It's true that Fido is a dog' conjures up a contrast class, of 'it's false' or 'it's unlikely'
03.4.5 p.72 Inferential role semantics is an alternative to semantics that connects to the world
03.6 p.94 The inferential quantifier focuses on truth; the domain quantifier focuses on reality
05.1 p.117 Numbers are used as singular terms, as adjectives, and as symbols
05.4.4 p.139 'Semantic type coercion' is selecting the reading of a word to make the best sense
05.6 p.149 The Amazonian Piraha language is said to have no number words
06.1.1 p.154 Logicism makes sense of our ability to know arithmetic just by thought
06.1.3 p.159 Neo-Fregeans are dazzled by a technical result, and ignore practicalities
06.1.3 p.160 How can words be used for counting if they are objects?
07.3.1 p.192 Our perceptual beliefs are about ordinary objects, not about simples arranged chair-wise
08.1 p.205 Maybe not even names are referential, but are just by used by speakers to refer
08.2 p.207 The "Fido"-Fido theory of meaning says every expression in a language has a referent
08.3 p.210 Compositonality is a way to build up the truth-conditions of a sentence
08.4 p.222 Proposition have no content, because they are content
08.5 p.226 Since properties can have properties, some theorists rank them in 'types'
09.1.1 p.231 Properties can be expressed in a language despite the absence of a single word for them
09.2 p.237 'Being taller than this' is a predicate which can express many different properties
10 p.248 Reality can be seen as the totality of facts, or as the totality of things
10.2.4 p.263 There are probably ineffable facts, systematically hidden from us
10.3.3 p.268 Do there exist thoughts which we are incapable of thinking?
13.4.1 p.326 Counterfactuals are essential for planning, and learning from mistakes
13.4.1 p.327 Supervenience offers little explanation for things which necessarily go together
13.4.2 p.329 The fundamental theorem of arithmetic is that all numbers are composed uniquely of primes
13.4.2 p.330 'Fundamentality' is either a superficial idea, or much too obscure