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Ideas of Thomas Hofweber, by Text
[German, fl. 2004, MA at Munich, PhD at Stanford. Professor at University of N.Carolina at Chapel Hill.]
2005
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Number Determiners, Numbers, Arithmetic
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§1
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p.180
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9998
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What is the relation of number words as singular-terms, adjectives/determiners, and symbols?
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§2
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p.183
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10000
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We might eliminate adjectival numbers by analysing them into blocks of quantifiers
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§3.1
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p.187
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10001
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An adjective contributes semantically to a noun phrase
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§4.1
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p.194
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10002
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'2 + 2 = 4' can be read as either singular or plural
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§4.2
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p.198
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10003
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Why is arithmetic hard to learn, but then becomes easy?
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§4.3
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p.199
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10004
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Our minds are at their best when reasoning about objects
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§6.2
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p.215
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10005
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Arithmetic doesn’t simply depend on objects, since it is true of fictional objects
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§6.3
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p.217
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10006
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First-order logic captures the inferential relations of numbers, but not the semantics
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§6.3
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p.218
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10007
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Quantifiers for domains and for inference come apart if there are no entities
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§6.3
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p.219
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10008
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Arithmetic is not about a domain of entities, as the quantifiers are purely inferential
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2006
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Inexpressible Properties and Propositions
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2.1
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p.163
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17988
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Quantification can't all be substitutional; some reference is obviously to objects
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2.2
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p.169
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17989
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Since properties have properties, there can be a typed or a type-free theory of them
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5.3
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p.195
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17990
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Instances of minimal truth miss out propositions inexpressible in current English
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6.4
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p.203
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17991
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Holism says language can't be translated; the expressibility hypothesis says everything can
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2009
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Ambitious, yet modest, Metaphysics
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1.1
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p.261
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16413
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Science has discovered properties of things, so there are properties - so who needs metaphysics?
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2
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p.273
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16415
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Esoteric metaphysics aims to be top science, investigating ultimate reality
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2
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p.274
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16416
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The quantifier in logic is not like the ordinary English one (which has empty names, non-denoting terms etc)
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2016
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Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics
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01.1
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p.1
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21634
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Metaphysics is (supposedly) first the ontology, then in general what things are like
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01.4.3
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p.15
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21635
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Without propositions there can be no beliefs or desires
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02.3
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p.25
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21636
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'Singular terms' are not found in modern linguistics, and are not the same as noun phrases
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02.3
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p.26
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21637
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If two processes are said to be identical, that doesn't make their terms refer to entities
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02.5.2
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p.42
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21638
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Syntactic form concerns the focus of the sentence, as well as the truth-conditions
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02.6.2
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p.45
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21639
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'Background deletion' is appropriately omitting background from an answer
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02.6.3
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p.47
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21640
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'It's true that Fido is a dog' conjures up a contrast class, of 'it's false' or 'it's unlikely'
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03.4.5
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p.72
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21641
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Inferential role semantics is an alternative to semantics that connects to the world
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03.6
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p.94
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21643
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The inferential quantifier focuses on truth; the domain quantifier focuses on reality
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05.1
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p.117
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21644
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Numbers are used as singular terms, as adjectives, and as symbols
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05.4.4
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p.139
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21645
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'Semantic type coercion' is selecting the reading of a word to make the best sense
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05.6
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p.149
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21646
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The Amazonian Piraha language is said to have no number words
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06.1.1
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p.154
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21647
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Logicism makes sense of our ability to know arithmetic just by thought
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06.1.3
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p.159
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21648
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Neo-Fregeans are dazzled by a technical result, and ignore practicalities
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06.1.3
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p.160
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21649
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How can words be used for counting if they are objects?
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07.3.1
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p.192
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21652
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Our perceptual beliefs are about ordinary objects, not about simples arranged chair-wise
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08.1
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p.205
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21653
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Maybe not even names are referential, but are just by used by speakers to refer
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08.2
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p.207
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21654
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The "Fido"-Fido theory of meaning says every expression in a language has a referent
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08.3
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p.210
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21655
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Compositonality is a way to build up the truth-conditions of a sentence
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08.4
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p.222
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21656
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Proposition have no content, because they are content
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08.5
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p.226
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21657
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Since properties can have properties, some theorists rank them in 'types'
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09.1.1
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p.231
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21658
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Properties can be expressed in a language despite the absence of a single word for them
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09.2
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p.237
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21659
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'Being taller than this' is a predicate which can express many different properties
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10
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p.248
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21660
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Reality can be seen as the totality of facts, or as the totality of things
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10.2.4
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p.263
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21661
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There are probably ineffable facts, systematically hidden from us
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10.3.3
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p.268
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21662
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Do there exist thoughts which we are incapable of thinking?
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13.4.1
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p.326
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21663
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Counterfactuals are essential for planning, and learning from mistakes
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13.4.1
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p.327
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21664
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Supervenience offers little explanation for things which necessarily go together
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13.4.2
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p.329
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21665
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The fundamental theorem of arithmetic is that all numbers are composed uniquely of primes
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13.4.2
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p.330
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21666
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'Fundamentality' is either a superficial idea, or much too obscure
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