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Ideas of Rosalind Hursthouse, by Text
[New Zealand, fl. 1996, Of the Open University in Britain, and then Auckland University, NZ]
1992
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Virtue Theory and Abortion
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p.226
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p.81
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20195
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Eudaimonia first; virtue is a trait which promotes it; right acts are what virtues produce [Zagzebski]
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Intro
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p.9
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4324
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Animals and plants can 'flourish', but only rational beings can have eudaimonia
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Intro
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p.15
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4325
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Must all actions be caused in part by a desire, or can a belief on its own be sufficient?
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Ch.1
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p.33
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4327
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Deontologists do consider consequences, because they reveal when a rule might apply
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Ch.1
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p.37
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4328
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Preference utilitarianism aims to be completely value-free, or empirical
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Ch.2
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p.44
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4329
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After a moral dilemma is resolved there is still a 'remainder', requiring (say) regret
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Ch.2
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p.52
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4330
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Deontologists resolve moral dilemmas by saying the rule conflict is merely apparent
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Ch.2
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p.56
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4334
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Virtue ethics is open to the objection that it fails to show priority among the virtues
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Ch.2
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p.56
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4335
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'Codifiable' morality give rules for decisions which don't require wisdom
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Ch.2
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p.57
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4336
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Any strict ranking of virtues or rules gets abandoned when faced with particular cases
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Ch.2 n12
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p.60
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4337
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Teenagers are often quite wise about ideals, but rather stupid about consequences
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Ch.3
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p.64
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4338
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Deontologists usually accuse utilitarians of oversimplifying hard cases
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Ch.3
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p.69
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4339
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According to virtue ethics, two agents may respond differently, and yet both be right
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Ch.3
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p.74
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4341
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Involuntary actions performed in tragic dilemmas are bad because they mar a good life
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Ch.3
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p.83
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4343
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We are torn between utilitarian and deontological views of lying, depending on the examples
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Ch.3 n8
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p.73
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4340
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You are not a dishonest person if a tragic dilemma forces you to do something dishonest
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Ch.4
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p.102
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4346
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The emotions of sympathy, compassion and love are no guarantee of right action or acting well
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Ch.6
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p.127
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4349
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Virtuous people may not be fully clear about their reasons for action
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Ch.6
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p.133
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4350
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If people are virtuous in obedience to God, would they become wicked if they lost their faith?
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Ch.6
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p.137
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4351
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It is a fantasy that only through the study of philosophy can one become virtuous
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Ch.7
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p.141
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4352
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Performing an act simply because it is virtuous is sufficient to be 'morally motivated' or 'dutiful'
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Ch.7
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p.144
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4353
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If moral motivation is an all-or-nothing sense of duty, how can children act morally?
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Ch.7
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p.147
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4354
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Maybe in a deeply poisoned character none of their milder character traits could ever be a virtue
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Ch.7
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p.150
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4355
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There may be inverse akrasia, where the agent's action is better than their judgement recommends
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Ch.7
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p.155
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4356
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We are puzzled by a person who can show an exceptional virtue and also behave very badly
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Ch.8
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p.172
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4358
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Virtue may be neither sufficient nor necessary for eudaimonia
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Ch.8
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p.176
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4359
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When it comes to bringing up children, most of us think that the virtues are the best bet
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Ch.9
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p.202
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4361
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Good animals can survive, breed, feel characteristic pleasure and pain, and contribute to the group
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Ch.9
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p.213
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4364
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Being unusually virtuous in some areas may entail being less virtuous in others
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Ch.9 n20
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p.206
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4363
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The word 'person' is useless in ethics, because what counts as a good or bad self-conscious being?
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Ch10
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p.222
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4365
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We are distinct from other animals in behaving rationally - pursuing something as good, for reasons
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