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Ideas of Dale Jacquette, by Text
[American, 1953 - 2016, Professor at Pennsylvania State University.]
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2002
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Intro to 'Philosophy of Logic'
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§3
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p.4
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9456
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Modal logic is multiple systems, shown in the variety of accessibility relations between worlds
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§4
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p.5
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9457
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The two main views in philosophy of logic are extensionalism and intensionalism
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§4
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p.5
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9458
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Extensionalists say that quantifiers presuppose the existence of their objects
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§4
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p.5
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9461
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Intensionalists say meaning is determined by the possession of properties
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§4
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p.5
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9459
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Extensionalist semantics is circular, as we must know the extension before assessing 'Fa'
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§4
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p.5
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9460
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Extensionalist semantics forbids reference to nonexistent objects
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2002
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Intro to I: Classical Logic
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p.9
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p.9
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9463
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Classical logic is bivalent, has excluded middle, and only quantifies over existent objects
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2002
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Intro to III: Quantifiers
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p.143
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p.143
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9465
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Substitutional universal quantification retains truth for substitution of terms of the same type
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p.143
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p.143
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9466
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Nominalists like substitutional quantification to avoid the metaphysics of objects
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Pref
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p.-5
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7678
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Ontology must include the minimum requirements for our semantics
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Pref
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p.-3
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7679
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Ontology is the same as the conceptual foundations of logic
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Ch. 2
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p.43
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7681
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Logic describes inferences between sentences expressing possible properties of objects
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Ch. 2
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p.44
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7682
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Logic is not just about signs, because it relates to states of affairs, objects, properties and truth-values
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Ch. 2
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p.52
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7683
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Logic is based either on separate objects and properties, or objects as combinations of properties
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Ch. 2
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p.53
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7684
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Reduce states-of-affairs to object-property combinations, and possible worlds to states-of-affairs
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Ch. 2
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p.59
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7685
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An object is a predication subject, distinguished by a distinctive combination of properties
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Ch. 2
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p.62
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7687
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Existence is completeness and consistency
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Ch. 2
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p.65
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7688
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The actual world is a maximally consistent combination of actual states of affairs
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Ch. 2
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p.70
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7689
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The modal logic of C.I.Lewis was only interpreted by Kripke and Hintikka in the 1960s
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Ch. 2
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p.73
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7691
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The actual world is a consistent combination of states, made of consistent property combinations
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Ch. 2
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p.76
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7692
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Being is maximal consistency
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Ch. 2
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p.81
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7695
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Do proposition-structures not associated with the actual world deserve to be called worlds?
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Ch. 6
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p.163
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7697
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On Russell's analysis, the sentence "The winged horse has wings" comes out as false
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Ch. 9
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p.79
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7694
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We must experience the 'actual' world, which is defined by maximally consistent propositions
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Ch. 9
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p.209
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7699
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Numbers, sets and propositions are abstract particulars; properties, qualities and relations are universals
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Ch. 9
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p.219
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7701
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Can a Barber shave all and only those persons who do not shave themselves?
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Ch. 9
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p.221
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7702
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The extreme views on propositions are Frege's Platonism and Quine's extreme nominalism
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Ch. 9
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p.230
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7703
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If classes can't be eliminated, and they are property combinations, then properties (universals) can't be either
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Ch.10
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p.244
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7704
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Reduction of intentionality involving nonexistent objects is impossible, as reduction must be to what is actual
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Ch.10
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p.251
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7706
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If qualia supervene on intentional states, then intentional states are explanatorily fundamental
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Conclusion
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p.280
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7707
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To grasp being, we must say why something exists, and why there is one world
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