| 2002 | Intro to 'Philosophy of Logic' |
| §3 | p.4 | 9456 | Modal logic is multiple systems, shown in the variety of accessibility relations between worlds |
| §4 | p.5 | 9457 | The two main views in philosophy of logic are extensionalism and intensionalism |
| §4 | p.5 | 9461 | Intensionalists say meaning is determined by the possession of properties |
| §4 | p.5 | 9458 | Extensionalists say that quantifiers presuppose the existence of their objects |
| §4 | p.5 | 9460 | Extensionalist semantics forbids reference to nonexistent objects |
| §4 | p.5 | 9459 | Extensionalist semantics is circular, as we must know the extension before assessing 'Fa' |
| 2002 | Intro to I: Classical Logic |
| p.9 | p.9 | 9463 | Classical logic is bivalent, has excluded middle, and only quantifies over existent objects |
| 2002 | Intro to III: Quantifiers |
| p.143 | p.143 | 9466 | Nominalists like substitutional quantification to avoid the metaphysics of objects |
| p.143 | p.143 | 9467 | Wittgenstein tried unsuccessfully to reduce quantifiers to conjunctions and disjunctions |
| p.143 | p.143 | 9465 | Substitutional universal quantification retains truth for substitution of terms of the same type |
| 2002 | Ontology |
| Pref | p.-5 | 7678 | Ontology must include the minimum requirements for our semantics |
| Pref | p.-3 | 7679 | Ontology is the same as the conceptual foundations of logic |
| Ch. 2 | p.43 | 7681 | Logic describes inferences between sentences expressing possible properties of objects |
| Ch. 2 | p.44 | 7682 | Logic is not just about signs, because it relates to states of affairs, objects, properties and truth-values |
| Ch. 2 | p.52 | 7683 | Logic is based either on separate objects and properties, or objects as combinations of properties |
| Ch. 2 | p.53 | 7684 | Reduce states-of-affairs to object-property combinations, and possible worlds to states-of-affairs |
| Ch. 2 | p.59 | 7685 | An object is a predication subject, distinguished by a distinctive combination of properties |
| Ch. 2 | p.62 | 7687 | Existence is completeness and consistency |
| Ch. 2 | p.65 | 7688 | The actual world is a maximally consistent combination of actual states of affairs |
| Ch. 2 | p.70 | 7689 | The modal logic of C.I.Lewis was only interpreted by Kripke and Hintikka in the 1960s |
| Ch. 2 | p.73 | 7691 | The actual world is a consistent combination of states, made of consistent property combinations |
| Ch. 2 | p.76 | 7692 | Being is maximal consistency |
| Ch. 2 | p.81 | 7695 | Do proposition-structures not associated with the actual world deserve to be called worlds? |
| Ch. 6 | p.163 | 7697 | On Russell's analysis, the sentence "The winged horse has wings" comes out as false |
| Ch. 9 | p.79 | 7694 | We must experience the 'actual' world, which is defined by maximally consistent propositions |
| Ch. 9 | p.209 | 7699 | Numbers, sets and propositions are abstract particulars; properties, qualities and relations are universals |
| Ch. 9 | p.219 | 7701 | Can a Barber shave all and only those persons who do not shave themselves? |
| Ch. 9 | p.221 | 7702 | The extreme views on propositions are Frege's Platonism and Quine's extreme nominalism |
| Ch. 9 | p.230 | 7703 | If classes can't be eliminated, and they are property combinations, then properties (universals) can't be either |
| Ch.10 | p.244 | 7704 | Reduction of intentionality involving nonexistent objects is impossible, as reduction must be to what is actual |
| Ch.10 | p.247 | 7705 | The Twin Earth theory suggests that intentionality is independent of qualia |
| Ch.10 | p.251 | 7706 | If qualia supervene on intentional states, then intentional states are explanatorily fundamental |
| Conclusion | p.280 | 7707 | To grasp being, we must say why something exists, and why there is one world |