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Ideas of Immanuel Kant, by Text

[German, 1724 - 1804, Born and died at Königsberg, on the Baltic. Professor at the University there.]

1780 Lectures on Ethics
422:53 p.85 The maxim for suicide is committed to the value of life, and is thus contradictory
1781 Critique of Pure Reason
p. Kant is read as the phenomena being 'contrained' by the noumenon, or 'free-floating' [Talbot]
p.-8 To some extent we must view ourselves as noumena [Korsgaard]
p.2 Kant exposed the illusions of reason in the Transcendental Dialectic [Fraassen]
p.3 Kant showed that theoretical reason cannot give anwers to speculative metaphysics [Korsgaard]
p.13 Kant turned metaphysics into epistemology, ignoring Aristotle's 'being qua being' [Macdonald]
p.13 Existence is merely derived from the word 'is' (rather than being a predicate) [Orenstein]
p.17 Kant says knowledge is when our representations sufficiently conform to our concepts [Critchley]
p.19 Kant bases the synthetic a priori on the categories of oneness and manyness [Bowie]
p.19 Kant's shift of view enables us to see a priority in terms of mental capacity, not truth and propositions [Burge]
p.20 For Kant analytic knowledge needs complex concepts, but the a priori can rest on the simple [Coffa]
p.22 Necessity is always knowable a priori, and what is known a priori is always necessary [Schroeter]
p.23 Kant's only answer as to how synthetic a priori judgements are possible was that we have a 'faculty'! [Nietzsche]
p.24 Knowledge is threefold: apprehension, reproduction by imagination, recognition by concepts [Bowie]
p.25 The concept of causality entails laws; random causality is a contradiction [Korsgaard]
p.27 We must be free, because we can act against our strongest desires [Korsgaard]
p.28 In Kantian idealism, objects fit understanding, not vice versa [Feuerbach]
p.28 Kant's idealism is a limited idealism based on the viewpoint of empiricism [Feuerbach]
p.32 For Kant experience is either structured like reality, or generates reality's structure [Gardner]
p.35 For Kant, essence is mental and a mere idea, and existence is the senses and mere appearance [Feuerbach]
p.36 Does Kant say the mind imposes categories, or that it restricts us to them? [Rowlands]
p.38 Kant says we can describe the categories of thought, but Hegel claims to deduce them [Meillassoux]
p.46 Kant showed that we have a priori knowledge which is not purely analytic [Russell]
p.49 Two plus two objects make four objects even if experience is impossible, so Kant is wrong [Russell]
p.49 If, as Kant says, arithmetic and logic are contributed by us, they could change if we did [Russell]
p.50 Kant's intuitions struggle to judge relevance, impossibility and exactness [Kitcher]
p.54 Kant thought he had refuted scepticism, but his critics say he is a sceptic, for rejecting reality [O'Grady]
p.62 Kantian 'intuition' is the bridge between pure reason and its application to sense experiences [Friend]
p.63 Modern logic says (with Kant) that existence is not a predicate, because it has been reclassified as a quantifier [Benardete,JA]
p.65 Kant only accepts potential infinity, not actual infinity [Brown,JR]
p.71 Kant thought that consciousness depends on self-consciousness ('apperception') [Crane]
p.71 For Kant, our conceptual scheme is disastrous when it reaches beyond experience [Fogelin]
p.72 For Kant, experience is relative to a scheme, but there are no further possible schemes [Fogelin]
p.77 Non-subject/predicate tautologies won't fit Kant's definition of analyticity [Shapiro]
p.78 Kant implies that concepts have analysable parts [Shapiro]
p.78 For Kant metaphysics must be necessary, so a priori, so can't be justified by experience [Maudlin]
p.79 Kantian intuitions are of particulars, and they give immediate knowledge [Shapiro]
p.88 Geometry studies the Euclidean space that dictates how we perceive things [Shapiro]
p.89 A priori metaphysics is fond of basic unchanging entities like God, the soul, Forms, atoms… [Fogelin]
p.89 For Kant the laws must be necessary, because contingency would destroy representation [Meillassoux]
p.96 Kant identifies nature with the scientific picture of it as the realm of law [McDowell]
p.104 We can think of 7 and 5 without 12, but it is still a contradiction to deny 7+5=12 [Ayer]
p.106 Kant fails to prove the necessity of laws, because his reasoning about chance is over-ambitious [Meillassoux]
p.107 Kant claims causal powers are relational rather than intrinsic [Bayne]
p.109 We judge causation by relating events together by some law of nature [Mares]
p.115 How can bachelor 'contain' unmarried man? Are all analytic truths in subject-predicate form? [Miller,A]
p.120 Kant says the cognitive and sensory elements in experience can't be separated [Dancy,J]
p.131 Seeing that only one parallel can be drawn to a line through a given point is clearly synthetic a priori [Benardete,JA]
p.133 Euclid's could be the only viable geometry, if rejection of the parallel line postulate doesn't lead to a contradiction [Benardete,JA]
p.157 Kant showed that the understanding (unlike reason) concerns what is finite and conditioned [Hegel]
p.171 Kant never denied that 'exist' could be a predicate - only that it didn't enlarge concepts [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
p.192 Kant taught that mathematics is independent of logic, and cannot be grounded in it [Hilbert]
p.213 A priori knowledge is limited to objects of possible experience [Jolley]
p.213 The Identity of Indiscernibles is true of concepts with identical properties, but not of particulars [Jolley]
p.241 Reason keeps asking why until explanation is complete [Korsgaard]
p.274 Objects having to be experiencable is not the same as full idealism [Gardner]
p.327 It is still possible to largely accept Kant as a whole (where others must be dismantled) [Gardner]
p.373 Understanding essentially involves singular elements [Burge]
A Pref xi n p.100 Religion and legislation can only be respected if they accept free and public examination
B Pref ix p.106 Logic has precise boundaries, and is the formal rules for all thinking
B Pref xvi p.110 Metaphysics might do better to match objects to our cognition (and not start with the objects)
B003 p.137 A priori knowledge occurs absolutely independently of all experience
B003 p.137 Propositions involving necessity are a priori, and pure a priori if they only derive from other necessities
B003-4 p.367 The apriori is independent of its sources, and marked by necessity and generality [Burge]
B004 p.137 Judgements which are essentially and strictly universal reveal our faculty of a priori cognition
B005 p.138 A priori knowledge is indispensable for the possibility and certainty of experience
B005 p.138 Causation obviously involves necessity, so it cannot just be frequent association
B006 p.138 Experienceless bodies have space; propertyless bodies have substance; this must be seen a priori
B008/A5 p.140 A dove cutting through the air, might think it could fly better in airless space (which Plato attempted)
B009/A5 p.140 Our reason mostly analyses concepts we already have of objects
B009/A5 p.140 One sort of a priori knowledge just analyses given concepts, but another ventures further
B010/A6 p.130 If the predicate is contained in the subject of a judgement, it is analytic; otherwise synthetic
B011/A7 p.130 Analytic judgements clarify, by analysing the subject into its component predicates
B011/A7 p.141 Analysis is becoming self-conscious about our concepts
B014 p.144 Maths must be a priori because it is necessary, and that cannot be derived from experience
B015 p.144 No analysis of the sum of seven and five will in itself reveal twelve
B016 p.144 With large numbers it is obvious that we could never find the sum by analysing the concepts
B016 p.145 That a straight line is the shortest is synthetic, as straight does not imply any quantity
B017 p.145 That force and counter-force are equal is necessary, and a priori synthetic
B019 p.146 The real problem of pure reason is: how are a priori synthetic judgments possible?
B021 p.147 You just can't stop metaphysical speculation, in any mature mind
B023 p.148 Analysis of our concepts is merely a preparation for proper a priori metaphysics
B025/A11 p.149 'Transcendental' cognition concerns what can be known a priori of its mode
B038/A23 p.175 We can't learn of space through experience; experience of space needs its representation
B038/A24 p.158 Space is an a priori necessary basic intuition, as we cannot imagine its absence
B045/A29 p.161 Colours and tastes are not qualities of things, but alterations of the subject
B045/A30 p.162 Objects in themselves are not known to us at all
B046/A31 p.162 One can never imagine appearances without time, so it is given a priori
B047/A32 p.162 That times cannot be simultaneous is synthetic, so it is known by intuition, not analysis
B056/A39 p.166 If space and time exist absolutely, we must assume to existence of two pointless non-entities
B059/A42 p.168 If we disappeared, then all relations of objects, and time and space themselves, disappear too
B059/A42 p.168 Without the subject or the senses, space and time vanish, as their appearances disappear
B060/A43 p.185 Even the most perfect intuition gets no closer to things in themselves
B065/A47 p.170 That two lines cannot enclose a space is an intuitive a priori synthetic proposition
B075/A51 p.193 Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind
B075/A51 p.194 Understanding has no intuitions, and senses no thought, so knowledge needs their unity
B082/A58 p.197 We must presuppose that truth is agreement of cognition with its objects
B082/A58 p.197 Cleverness is shown in knowing what can reasonably be asked
B083/A59 p.197 A sufficient but general sign of truth cannot possibly be provided
B084/A59 p.197 There must be a general content-free account of truth in the rules of logic
B093/A68 p.205 All human cognition is through concepts
B106/A80 p.212 Four categories of concept: Quantity, Quality, Relation and Modality
B124/A91 p.223 Appearances give rules of what usually happens, but cause involves necessity
B125/A93 p.224 Are a priori concepts necessary as a precondition for something to be an object?
B126/A93 p.224 The categories are objectively valid, because they make experience possible
B126/A93 p.224 The a priori concept of objects in general is the ground of experience
B128/A95 p.226 Categories are general concepts of objects, which determine the way in which they are experienced
B132 p.246 Representation would be impossible without the 'I think' that accompanies it
B132 p.247 Mental representations would not be mine if they did not belong to a unified self-consciousness
B149 p.256 A substance could exist as a subject, but not as a mere predicate
B158 p.260 I have no cognition of myself as I am, but only as I appear to myself
B163 p.263 Categories are concepts that prescribe laws a priori to appearances
B166 p.264 Either experience creates concepts, or concepts make experience possible
B167 p.265 Categories are necessary, so can't be implanted in us to agree with natural laws
B173/A134 p.269 Philosophical examples rarely fit rules properly, and lead to inflexibility
B181/A142 p.274 A pure concept of the understanding can never become an image
B204-6/A164 p.87 Kant suggested that arithmetic has no axioms [Shapiro]
B205/A164 p.216 If 7+5=12 is analytic, then an infinity of other ways to reach 12 have to be analytic [Dancy,J]
B205/A164 p.288 Axioms ought to be synthetic a priori propositions
B205/A164 p.288 7+5=12 is not analytic, because 12 is not contained in 7 or 5 or their combination
B218/A176 p.295 Sensations are a posteriori, but that they come in degrees is known a priori
B219/A177 p.296 The three modes of time are persistence, succession and simultaneity
B224/A182 p.299 All appearances need substance, as that which persists through change
B226/A183 p.300 If time involved succession, we must think of another time in which succession occurs
B234/A189 p.305 Experience is only possible because we subject appearances to causal laws
B246/A201 p.311 The principle of sufficient reason is the ground of possible experience in time
B248/A203 p.312 A ball denting a pillow seems like simultaneous cause and effect, though time identifies which is cause
B250/A205 p.313 Substance must exist, as the persisting substratum of the process of change
B265/A217 p.321 Proof of the principle of sufficient reason cannot be found
B266/A218 p.321 Formal experience conditions show what is possible, and general conditions what is necessary
B266/A219 p.322 Modalities do not augment our concepts; they express their relation to cognition
B275 p.327 I can only determine my existence in time via external things
B282/A230 p.330 Is the possible greater than the actual, and the actual greater than the necessary?
B298/A239 p.90 Geometry would just be an idle game without its connection to our intuition
B299/A240 p.341 Maths is a priori, but without its relation to empirical objects it is meaningless
B303/A246 p.345 A priori the understanding can only anticipate possible experiences
B310/A255 p.362 We cannot know things in themselves, but are confined to appearances
B314/A258 p.364 We cannot represent objects unless we combine concepts with intuitions
B319/A263 p.368 If we ignore differences between water drops, we still distinguish them by their location
B334/A278 p.376 Self-knowledge can only be inner sensation, and thus appearance
B355/A299 p.387 Reason contains within itself certain underived concepts and principles
B355/A299 p.387 Reason has logical and transcendental faculties
B356/A299 p.387 Reason is distinct from understanding, and is the faculty of rules or principles
B373/A316 p.397 An obvious idea is a constitution based on maximum mutual freedom for citizens
B375/A319 p.398 We cannot derive moral laws from experience, as it is the mother of illusion
B391/A334 p.406 Transcendental ideas require unity of the subject, conditions of appearance, and objects of thought
B392/A335 p.406 Pure reason deals with concepts in the understanding, not with objects
B406-/A357 p.420 We have proved that bodies are appearances of the outer senses, not things in themselves
B406-/A364 p.423 As balls communicate motion, so substances could communicate consciousness, but not retain identity
B406-/A383 p.433 We need an account of the self based on rational principles, to avoid materialism
B406-/A388 p.435 All objections are dogmatic (against propositions), or critical (against proofs), or sceptical
B406-/A390 p.436 Soul and body connect physically, or by harmony, or by assistance
B406-/A395 p.439 The voyage of reason may go only as far as the coastline of experience reaches
B406-/A398-9 p.169 For Kant the self is a purely formal idea, not a substance [Lockwood]
B420 p.452 Neither materialism nor spiritualism can reveal the separate existence of the soul
B422 p.453 'I think therefore I am' is an identity, not an inference (as there is no major premise)
B425 p.454 Reason must assume as necessary that everything in a living organism has a proportionate purpose
B434/A407 p.460 Scepticism is the euthanasia of pure reason
B435/A409 p.460 Reason generates no concepts, but frees them from their link to experience in the understanding
B447/A419 p.466 Natural necessity is the unconditioned necessity of appearances
B450/A423 p.468 The battle of the antinomies is usually won by the attacker, and lost by any defender
B452/A424 p.469 Scepticism is absurd in maths, where there are no hidden false assertions
B474/A446 p.484 We must assume an absolute causal spontaneity beginning from itself
B478/A450 p.486 If there is a first beginning, there can be other sequences initiated from nothing
B484/A456 p.492 If you prove God cosmologically, by a regress in the sequences of causes, you can't abandon causes at the end
B496/A468 p.499 Without God, creation and free will, morality would be empty
B502/A474 p.502 Human reason considers all knowledge as belonging to a possible system
B521/A493 p.512 There are possible inhabitants of the moon, but they are just possible experiences
B535/A507 p.519 The free dialectic opposition of arguments is an invaluable part of the sceptical method
B575/A547 p.540 We only understand what exists, and can find no sign of what ought to be in nature
B579/A551 p.542 Pure reason exists outside of time
B582/A554 p.543 In reason things can only begin if they are voluntary
B583/A555 p.544 Moral blame is based on reason, since a reason is a cause which should have been followed
B585/A557 p.545 Freedom and natural necessity do not contradict, as they relate to different conditions
B619/A591 p.563 Only three proofs of God: the physico-theological (evidence), the cosmological (existence), the ontological (a priori)
B624/A596 n p.566 A concept is logically possible if non-contradictory (but may not be actually possible)
B625/A597 p.566 If 'this exists' is analytic, either the thing is a thought, or you have presupposed its existence
B625/A597 p.566 Is "This thing exists" analytic or synthetic?
B626/A598 p.566 If an existential proposition is synthetic, you must be able to cancel its predicate without contradiction
B626/A598 p.567 Being is not a real predicate, that adds something to a concept
B627/A599 p.567 You add nothing to the concept of God or coins if you say they exist
B628/A600 p.567 Saying a thing 'is' adds nothing to it - otherwise if my concept exists, it isn't the same as my concept
B630/A602 p.568 The analytic mark of possibility is that it does not generate a contradiction
B646/A618 p.576 Extension and impenetrability together make the concept of matter
B708/A680 p.610 Pure reason is only concerned with itself because it deals with understandings, not objects
B730/A702 p.622 Knowledge begins with intuitions, moves to concepts, and ends with ideas
B741/A713 p.380 Geometrical truth comes from a general schema abstracted from a particular object [Burge]
B743/A715 p.631 We know the shape of a cone from its concept, but we don't know its colour
B755/A727 p.637 Definitions exhibit the exhaustive concept of a thing within its boundaries
B756/A728 p.638 No a priori concept can be defined
B760/A732 p.640 Philosophy has no axioms, as it is just rational cognition of concepts
B766/A738 p.643 The existence of reason depends on the freedom of citizens to agree, doubt and veto ideas
B786/A758 p.653 The boundaries of reason can only be determined a priori
B787/A757 p.653 If I know the earth is a sphere, and I am on it, I can work out its area from a small part
B790/A762 p.655 We possess synthetic a priori knowledge in our principles which anticipate experience
B795/A767 p.657 An a priori principle of persistence anticipates all experience
B812/A784 p.666 I can express the motion of my body in a single point, but that doesn't mean it is a simple substance
B814/A786 p.667 Reason hates to be limited in its speculations
B819/A791 p.669 If a proposition implies any false consequences, then it is false
B827/A799 p.674 Our concept of an incorporeal nature is merely negative
B833/A805 p.677 Reason is only interested in knowledge, actions and hopes
B839/A811 p.680 Moral laws are commands, which must involve promises and threats, which only God could provide
B847/A819 p.684 We don't accept duties as coming from God, but assume they are divine because they are duties
B850/A822 p.686 Opinion is subjectively and objectively insufficient; belief is subjective but not objective; knowledge is both
B859/A831 p.690 In ordinary life the highest philosophy is no better than common understanding
B868/A840 p.695 Reason has two separate objects, morality and freedom, and nature, which ultimately unite
1781 Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysic
266 p.16 Analytic judgements say clearly what was in the concept of the subject
267 p.17 Analytic judgement rests on contradiction, since the predicate cannot be denied of the subject
268 p.18 Mathematics cannot be empirical because it is necessary, and that has to be a priori
269 p.19 7+5 = 12 is not analytic, because no analysis of 7+5 will reveal the concept of 12
269 p.20 Geometry is not analytic, because a line's being 'straight' is a quality
274 p.24 Metaphysics is generating a priori knowledge by intuition and concepts, leading to the synthetic
281 p.36 Mathematics can only start from an a priori intuition which is not empirical but pure
282 p.37 Some concepts can be made a priori, which are general thoughts of objects, like quantity or cause
282 p.37 Intuition is a representation that depends on the presence of the object
282 p.38 I can't intuit a present thing in itself, because the properties can't enter my representations
283 p.38 A priori intuitions can only concern the objects of our senses
283 p.38 A priori synthetic knowledge is only of appearances, not of things in themselves
283 p.38 A priori intuition of objects is only possible by containing the form of my sensibility
284 p.39 All necessary mathematical judgements are based on intuitions of space and time
284 p.39 Geometry rests on our intuition of space
284 p.39 Mathematics cannot proceed just by the analysis of concepts
284 p.39 Numbers are formed by addition of units in time
284 p.39 If all empirical sensation of bodies is removed, space and time are still left
285 p.40 Space must have three dimensions, because only three lines can meet at right angles
289 n.II p.45 I admit there are bodies outside us
289 n.II p.46 I count the primary features of things (as well as the secondary ones) as mere appearances
290 p.46 I can make no sense of the red experience being similar to the quality in the object
292 n.III p.50 Appearance gives truth, as long as it is only used within experience
333 p.97 The substance, once the predicates are removed, remains unknown to us
373 n p.144 'Transcendental' is not beyond experience, but a prerequisite of experience
1784 Answer to 'What is Enlightenment?'
p.55 p.55 Enlightenment requires the free use of reason in the public realm
1784 Idea for a Universal History
Intro p.41 The manifest will in the world of phenomena has to conform to the laws of nature
2nd p.42 Reason enables the unbounded extension of our rules and intentions
5th p.45 Our aim is a constitution which combines maximum freedom with strong restraint
8th p.50 The vitality of business needs maximum freedom (while avoiding harm to others)
8th p.51 The highest ideal of social progress is a universal cosmopolitan existence
1785 Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals
p.-10 Our rational choices confer value, arising from the sense that we ourselves are important [Korsgaard]
p.-9 We must only value what others find acceptable [Korsgaard]
p.28 If 'maxims' are deeper underlying intentions, Kant can be read as a virtue theorist [Statman]
p.43 We can only know we should obey God if we already have moral standards for judging God [MacIntyre]
p.51 Kant united religion and philosophy, by basing obedience to law on reason instead of faith [Taylor,R]
p.52 Kant thinks virtue becomes passive, and hence morally unaccountable [Annas]
p.65 The categorical imperative smells of cruelty [Nietzsche]
p.71 Kant is the father of the notion of exploitation as an evil [Berlin]
p.72 Values are created by human choices, and are not some intrinsic quality, out there [Berlin]
p.74 Retributive punishment is better than being sent to hospital for your crimes [Berlin]
p.75 Generosity and pity are vices, because they falsely imply one person's superiority to another [Berlin]
p.83 The intuition behind the categorical imperative is that one ought not to make an exception of oneself [Finlayson]
p.97 Kant was happy with 'good will', even if it had no result [Marx/Engels]
p.99 Kant made the political will into a pure self-determined "free" will [Marx/Engels]
p.101 For Kant, even a person who lacks all sympathy for others still has a motive for benevolence [Hursthouse]
p.107 Kant focuses exclusively on human values, and neglects cultural and personal values [Kekes]
p.114 Always treat humanity as an end and never as a means only
p.123 Kant has to attribute high moral worth to some deeply unattractive human lives [Graham]
p.123 Kantian respect is for humanity and reason (not from love or sympathy or solidarity) [Sandel]
p.174 We can ask how rational goodness is, but also why is rationality good [Putnam]
p.175 God is not proved by reason, but is a postulate of moral thinking [Davies,B]
p.176 Universalising a maxim needs to first stipulate the right description for the action [Anscombe]
p.184 If we are required to give moral thought the highest priority, this gives morality no content [Williams,B]
p.188 If Kant lives by self-administered laws, this is as feeble as self-administered punishments [Kierkegaard]
p.197 Almost any precept can be consistently universalized [MacIntyre]
p.197 The categorical imperative will not suggest maxims suitable for testing [MacIntyre]
p.197 The categorical imperative says nothing about what our activities and ends should be [MacIntyre]
p.198 Kantian duty seems to imply conformism with authority [MacIntyre]
p.198 I can universalize a selfish maxim, if it is expressed in a way that only applies to me [MacIntyre]
p.246 Kant completed Grotius's project of a non-religious basis for natural law [Scruton]
p.254 Why couldn't all rational beings accept outrageously immoral rules of conduct? [Mill]
p.363 Kant follows Rousseau in defining freedom and morality in terms of each other [Taylor,C]
393.1 p.59 The only purely good thing is a good will
393.2 p.59 Only a good will makes us worthy of happiness
394.3 p.60 A good will is not good because of what it achieves
396.7 p.62 The function of reason is to produce a good will
399.13 p.65 Dutiful actions are judged not by purpose, but by the maxim followed
401.15 p.66 Other causes can produce nice results, so morality must consist in the law, found only in rational beings
401.16 n p.67 Reverence is awareness of a value which demolishes my self-love
402.17 p.67 Act according to a maxim you can will as a universal law
402.18 p.68 Telling the truth from duty is quite different from doing so to avoid inconvenience
403.19 p.68 If lying were the universal law it would make promises impossible
407.26 p.72 We may claim noble motives, but we cannot penetrate our secret impulses
408.29 p.73 We judge God to be good by a priori standards of moral perfection
412.36 p.76 Metaphysics goes beyond the empirical, so doesn't need examples
414.39 p.78 A categorical imperative sees an action as necessary purely for its own sake
414.39 p.78 There are no imperatives for a holy will, as the will is in harmony with moral law
416.43 p.80 The good of an action is in the mind of the doer, not the consequences
420.50 p.83 The categorical imperative is a practical synthetic a priori proposition
421.52 p.84 Act as if your maxim were to become a universal law of nature
422.53 p.85 Suicide, false promises, neglected talent, and lack of charity all involve contradictions of principle [PG]
428.65 p.90 Our inclinations are not innately desirable; in fact most rational beings would like to be rid of them
428.65 p.91 Non-rational beings only have a relative value, as means rather than as ends
429.66 p.91 Rational beings necessarily conceive their own existence as an end in itself
430.68 p.92 Rational beings have a right to share in the end of an action, not just be part of the means
430.68 n p.92 The 'golden rule' cannot be a universal law as it implies no duties
432.73 p.94 Men are subject to laws which are both self-made and universal
435.79 p.97 Virtue lets a rational being make universal law, and share in the kingdom of ends
437.81 p.98 The will is good if its universalised maxim is never in conflict with itself
437.82 p.99 The hallmark of rationality is setting itself an end
446.97 p.107 Free will is a kind of causality which works independently of other causes
448.101 p.109 We cannot conceive of reason as being externally controlled
456.115 p.116 We shall never be able to comprehend how freedom is possible
p.19 p.184 It is basic that moral actions must be done from duty
p.66 p.66 Actions where people spread happiness because they enjoy it have no genuine moral worth
1786 Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science
534 p.93 Science is the reduction of diverse forces and powers to a smaller number that explain them
1788 Critique of Practical Reason
p.30 Kant may rate two things as finally valuable: having a good will, and deserving happiness [Orsi]
p.240 The good will is unconditionally good, because it is the only possible source of value [Korsgaard]
p.240 Only human reason can confer value on our choices [Korsgaard]
Intro p.15 Can pure reason determine the will, or are empirical conditions relevant?
Pref p.12 Necessity cannot be extracted from an empirical proposition
Concl p.169 What fills me with awe are the starry heavens above me and the moral law within me
I.1.1.§3 p.23 Consistency is the highest obligation of a philosopher
I.1.1.§4 p.27 No one would lend money unless a universal law made it secure, even after death
I.1.1.§7 p.32 A holy will is incapable of any maxims which conflict with the moral law
I.1.1.§8 p.35 Universality determines the will, and hence extends self-love into altruism
I.1.1.I p.45 A permanent natural order could not universalise a rule permitting suicide
I.1.II p.60 The sole objects of practical reason are the good and the evil
I.1.II p.61 The will is the faculty of purposes, which guide desires according to principles
I.1.II p.63 Good or evil cannot be a thing, but only a maxim of action, making the person good or evil
I.1.II p.64 Our happiness is all that matters, not as a sensation, but as satisfaction with our whole existence
I.1.II p.74 The highest worth for human beings lies in dispositions, not just actions
I.1.III p.75 Reason cannot solve the problem of why a law should motivate the will
I.1.III p.79 People cannot come to morality through feeling, because morality must not be sensuous
I.1.III p.85 Morality involves duty and respect for law, not love of the outcome
I.II.II p.116 Virtue is the supreme state of our pursuit of happiness, and so is supreme good
I.II.II.V p.131 Happiness is the condition of a rational being for whom everything goes as they wish
I.II.II.V p.131 We have to postulate something outside nature which makes happiness coincide with morality
I.II.II.V p.132 Obligation does not rest on the existence of God, but on the autonomy of reason
I.II.II.V p.135 Moral law is holy, and the best we can do is achieve virtue through respect for the law
I.II.II.V p.136 Morality is not about making ourselves happy, but about being worthy of happiness
I.II.II.V p.137 Wisdom is knowing the highest good, and conforming the will to it
I.II.II.V p.138 Everyone (even God) must treat rational beings as ends in themselves, and not just as means
I.II.II.V p.139 Belief in justice requires belief in a place for justice (heaven), a time (eternity), and a cause (God) [PG]
I.II.II.VI p.145 Using God to explain nature is referring to something inconceivable to explain what is in front of you
I.II.II.VI p.145 In all naturalistic concepts of God, if you remove the human qualities there is nothing left
I.II.II.VI p.145 Metaphysics is just a priori universal principles of physics
I.II.II.VI p.146 From our limited knowledge we can infer great virtues in God, but not ultimate ones
I.II.II.VI p.146 To know if this world must have been created by God, we would need to know all other possible worlds
1790 Critique of Judgement I: Aesthetic
p.3 Kant gave form and status to aesthetics, and Hegel gave it content [Scruton]
p.27 Only rational beings can experience beauty [Scruton]
p.146 The aesthetic attitude is a matter of disinterestedness [Wollheim]
p.160 Aesthetic values are not objectively valid, but we must treat them as if they are [Scruton]
p.423 Kant saw beauty as a sort of disinterested pleasure, which has become separate from the good [Taylor,C]
28-9 p.326 The sublime is a moral experience [Gardner]
CUP 1 5:203 p.64 The judgement of beauty is not cognitive, but relates, via imagination, to pleasurable feelings
CUP 2 5:204 p.67 Beauty is only judged in pure contemplation, and not with something else at stake
CUP 7 5:212 p.63 With respect to the senses, taste is an entirely personal matter
CUP 7 5:213 p.63 When we judge beauty, it isn't just personal; we judge on behalf of everybody
CUP 7 5:213 p.65 Saying everyone has their own taste destroys the very idea of taste
1790 Critique of Judgement II: Teleological
p.244 What is contemplated must have a higher value than contemplation [Korsgaard]
C3 442 p.242 Without men creation would be in vain, and without final purpose
C3 443 p.243 Only a good will can give man's being, and hence the world, a final purpose
1792 True in Theory, but not in Practice
Intro p.61 General rules of action also need a judgement about when to apply them
Intro p.62 It can't be a duty to strive after the impossible
1B p.65 Duty does not aim at an end, but gives rise to universal happiness as aim of the will
1Bb p.68 The will's motive is the absolute law itself, and moral feeling is receptivity to law
2 Intro p.73 Personal contracts are for some end, but a civil state contract involves a duty to share
2 Intro p.74 A lawful civil state must embody freedom, equality and independence for its members
2-2 p.75 Citizens can rise to any rank that talent, effort and luck can achieve
2-2 p.75 You can't make a contract renouncing your right to make contracts!
2-3 p.78 A citizen must control his own life, and possess property or an important skill
2-3 p.79 There must be a unanimous contract that citizens accept majority decisions
2-Concl p.79 A contract is theoretical, but it can guide rulers to make laws which the whole people will accept
2-Concl p.79 A law is unjust if the whole people could not possibly agree to it
2-Concl p.86 There can be no restraints on freedom if reason does not reveal some basic rights
3 p.90 The people (who have to fight) and not the head of state should declare a war
1795 Perpetual Peace
p.73 Kant made the social contract international and cosmopolitan [Oksala]
1.3 p.9 Hiring soldiers is to use them as instruments, ignoring their personal rights
1.6 p.96 Some trust in the enemy is needed during wartime, or peace would be impossible
2 p.98 The state of nature always involves the threat of war
2.1st n p.99 Equality is where you cannot impose a legal obligation you yourself wouldn't endure
2.2nd p.102 Each nation should, from self-interest, join an international security constitution
App 1 p.118 A constitution must always be improved when necessary
App 1 p.123 The a priori general will of a people shows what is right
'Third' p.107 There is now a growing universal community, and violations of rights are felt everywhere
'Third' p.108 There are political and inter-national rights, but also universal cosmopolitan rights
1795 Wiener Logik
p.455 p.11 A simplification which is complete constitutes a definition
p.843 p.12 If we knew what we know, we would be astonished
1797 Metaphysics of Morals I: Doctrine of Right
Div B p.63 Equality is not being bound in ways you cannot bind others
Intro C p.133 Actions are right if the maxim respects universal mutual freedoms
Intro E p.135 We are equipped with the a priori intuitions needed for the concept of right
Pref p.36 Because there is only one human reason, there can only be one true philosophy from principles
§44 p.137 A power-based state of nature may not be unjust, but there is no justice without competent judges
§46 p.139 Women have no role in politics
§47 p.140 In the contract people lose their rights, but immediately regain them, in the new commonwealth
§49 Gen C p.150 The church has a political role, by offering a supreme power over people
§49 Gen D p.152 Hereditary nobility has not been earned, and probably won't be earned
§49 Gen E p.155 Human life is pointless without justice
§49 Gen E p.157 Justice asserts the death penalty for murder, from a priori laws
§51 p.161 Monarchs have the highest power; autocrats have complete power
§55 p.166 If someone has largely made something, then they own it
1797 Metaphysics of Morals II:Doctrine of Virtue
375 Pref p.181 For any subject, its system of non-experiential concepts needs a metaphysics
376 Pref p.182 Moral principles do not involve feelings
382 Intro I p.187 That a concept is not self-contradictory does not make what it represents possible
383 Intro II p.188 A duty of virtue is a duty which is also an end
392 Intro VIII p.195 Humans are distinguished from animals by their capacity to set themselves any sort of end
394 Intro IX p.197 Virtue is strong maxims for duty
395 Intro IX p.198 The supreme principle of virtue is to find universal laws for ends
399 Intro XII p.200 Duty is impossible without prior moral feeling, conscience, love and self-respect
403 Intro XIII p.204 Philosophers should not offer multiple proofs - suggesting the weakness of each of them
404n Intro XIII p.205 How do we distinguish a mean? The extremes can involve quite different maxims
406 Intro XIII p.207 There is one principle of virtues; the virtues are distinguished by their objects
409 Intro XVI p.210 If virtue becomes a habit, that is a loss of the freedom needed for adopting maxims
432 I.I p.228 If virtue is the mean between vices, then virtue is just the vanishing of vice
434 I.I p.230 Within nature man is unimportant, but as moral person he is above any price
441 I.I p.236 Moral self-knowledge is the beginning of all human wisdom
442 I.I p.237 Men can only have duties to those who qualify as persons
443 I.I p.238 Cruelty to animals is bad because it dulls our empathy for pain in humans
448 I.II p.243 We can love without respect, and show respect without love
449 I.II p.244 Respect is limiting our self-esteem by attending to the human dignity of other persons
449 I.II p.244 The duty of love is to makes the ends of others one's own
449 I.II p.244 Disrespect is using a person as a mere means to my own ends
449 I.II p.244 Love urges us to get closer to people, but respect to keep our distance
449 I.II p.244 Respect is purely negative (of not exalting oneself over others), and is thus a duty of Right
458 I.II p.251 The love of man is required in order to present the world as a beautiful and perfect moral whole
460-1 I.II p.253 Violation of rights deserves punishment, which is vengeance, rather than restitution
463 I.II p.255 We must respect the humanity even in a vicious criminal
471 I.II p.263 Man is both social, and unsociable
473-4 I.II App p.265 We are obliged to show the social virtues, but at least they make a virtuous disposition fashionable
488 II p.276 All morality directs the will to love of others' ends, and respect for others' rights