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Ideas of R Keefe / P Smith, by Text

[British, fl. 1997, both of Cambridge University.]

1997	Intro: Theories of Vagueness

§1

p.2

9044

If someone is borderline tall, no further information is likely to resolve the question

§1

p.2

9045

Vague predicates involve uncertain properties, uncertain objects, and paradoxes of gradual change

§1

p.5

9047

Many vague predicates are multi-dimensional; 'big' involves height and volume; heaps include arrangement

§1

p.6

9048

The simplest approach, that vagueness is just ignorance, retains classical logic and semantics

§1

p.7

9049

Supervaluationism keeps true-or-false where precision can be produced, but not otherwise

§1

p.7

9050

A third truth-value at borderlines might be 'indeterminate', or a value somewhere between 0 and 1

§1

p.15

9053

If there is a precise borderline area, that is not a case of vagueness

§2

p.19

9055

The epistemic view of vagueness must explain why we don't know the predicate boundary

§3

p.23

9056

Vague statements lack truth value if attempts to make them precise fail

§3

p.30

9058

Some of the principles of classical logic still fail with supervaluationism

§3

p.32

9059

The semantics of supervaluation (e.g. disjunction and quantification) is not classical

§3

p.33

9060

Supervaluation misunderstands vagueness, treating it as a failure to make things precise

§4

p.43

9061

People can't be placed in a precise order according to how 'nice' they are

§4

p.46

9062

If truth-values for vagueness range from 0 to 1, there must be someone who is 'completely tall'

§4

p.47

9063

How do we decide if my coat is red to degree 0.322 or 0.321?

§5

p.51

9064

Objects such as a cloud or Mount Everest seem to have fuzzy boundaries in nature

§5

p.55

9065

S5 collapses iterated modalities (◊□P→□P, and ◊◊P→◊P)